9.4 The Problem of Conflicting Duties
The problem of conflicting duties in Kant’s moral philosophy is a significant challenge to his ethical framework. This issue arises when two or more moral obligations seem to conflict, making it difficult to determine the right course of action.
Taking it to the Streets….
Ask a friend to help you through this thought puzzle. You live in 1944 occupied France and you are trying to help some Jewish neighbors hide from the Nazis. You have promised to let them hide in a secret room you have in your cellar. Suddenly the Nazi Gestapo is knocking on the door. They ask you directly if you are harboring Jews. What do you say? On the one hand you have a duty to keep your promise to the Jews, yet on the other hand you have a duty to always tell the truth. How should you decide?
Remember, Kant believed in absolute, universal moral duties derived from reason and argued that genuine moral duties cannot conflict. However, he has difficulty explaining what we should do in situations where two or more such duties seem to be in opposition. For example, consider the classic scenario of hiding innocent people from persecutors and being asked about their whereabouts. On the one hand there seems to be an absolute duty to tell the truth the persecutors if they ask, yet on the other hand there is an absolute duty to protect innocent life. Not to mention the duty of keeping one’s promise to the innocents. How are we to know which duty to follow in such a case?
Kant himself insisted that true moral duties cannot actually conflict and that what would be needed here is more precise formulation of maxims to come up with the most pressing duty. However, many have questioned whether Kant’s system can adequately resolve all apparent conflicts. Some have suggested refining the formulation of maxims to reveal true duties in an effort to develop a clearer hierarchy of duties.
This problem of conflicting duties remains a significant point of discussion in moral philosophy. It challenges the idea of universal, absolute moral laws and raises questions about how to navigate complex ethical situations. While Kant’s framework offers valuable insights into moral reasoning, this issue underscores the difficulties in applying rigid ethical principles to the nuanced realities of human experience.
W.D. Ross, a 20th-century British philosopher, attempted to address the problem of conflicting duties in Kantian ethics through his theory of prima facie duties. Prima facie duties (“at first sight” duties) are conditional duties that are binding unless overridden by stronger obligations.
When duties conflict, Ross argued, one must use practical wisdom to determine which duty is more pressing in that specific situation. The overridden duty doesn’t cease to exist; it’s simply outweighed in that instance. The more pressing duty becomes our actual duty at that moment. Actual duties are specific to the situation at hand and what one is morally required to do in that instance after careful moral deliberation.
It seems that Ross’ system allows for moral complexity and nuance and recognizes that moral life often involves weighing competing considerations. It avoids the rigidity of absolute moral rules while maintaining objective moral standards.
While Ross’s theory of prima facie duties and his approach to conflicting duties have been influential in moral philosophy, they are not without criticisms. For one thing, Ross doesn’t provide a systematic method for determining which duty should take precedence when duties conflict. This can lead to uncertainty and potentially arbitrary decisions in complex moral situations. He also relies heavily on moral intuition, arguing that prima facie duties are self-evident to mature moral agents. His theory has a potential for moral relativism as well. Without a clear hierarchy or decision procedure, different individuals might reach different conclusions about actual duties in similar situations. While more nuanced than some ethical theories, Ross’s approach might still oversimplify the complexity of moral decision-making.
Despite these criticisms, Ross’s theory remains influential and is often seen as a valuable middle ground between rigid, rule-based approaches and purely consequentialist ethics. Many philosophers and ethicists continue to engage with and refine Ross’s ideas, acknowledging both its strengths in capturing common moral intuitions and its limitations in providing a complete ethical framework.
