7.1 Psychological Egoism: We are fundamentally self-interested.

Where the world comes in my way – and it comes in my way everywhere – I consume it to quiet the hunger of my egoism. For me you are nothing but – my food, even as I too am fed upon and turned to use by you. — Max Stirner

Ethical Egoism is the normative position that moral agents ought to act in their own self-interest. It differs from psychological egoism, which is a descriptive claim that people can only act in their self-interest. Ethical egoism also holds to a principle of rational self-interest, that it is rational to act in one’s self-interest. Ethical egoism holds, therefore, that actions whose consequences will benefit the doer are ethical.

Calling egoism a theory of ethics may seem to stretch the meaning of the word “ethics” to the breaking point, since egoism seems to deny that we can or should really care about ethical rules. But since advocates of Ethical Egoism make explicit claims about the relationship between ethics and rationality, any discussion of philosophical ethics cannot avoid dealing with egoism. Egoists claim, in fact, that rationality undermines the possibility of ethics as it has been traditionally understood. To the extent that we follow reason, as opposed to customary authority, we can and should cease to be concerned with the good of others. It is not that we will suddenly be cold to the needs and desires of others where we previously kept these interests close to our hearts. It is that we will recognize certain things about the way the world and human beings work that will compel us to give up certain ways of looking at the world. But we are getting ahead of ourselves here.

We should note the differences between Psychological Egoism and, for want of a better term, Ethical Egoism. Psychological Egoism is the view that we cannot be unselfish even if we may want to be. This is a descriptive claim about human behavior, stating a view about human nature itself. Ethical Egoism, on the other hand, is the normative view that we should not be unselfish even though we can be. It offers rules for human behavior based upon the fact of psychological egoism.

Psychological Egoism is the view that all human actions are ultimately motivated by self-interest. It asserts that people always act to promote their own interests, even when their behavior appears to be altruistic or selfless. According to this view, every action, no matter how noble it seems, is driven by some form of personal benefit or self-serving motive. Psychological Egoism makes a very straightforward claim: we cannot be unselfish. That is, certain facts about human psychology prevent unselfish or “altruistic” behavior from being a live option. This may sound outrageous, but defenders of Psychological Egoism think that there is a compelling case that can be made for this view. Note that Psychological Egoism is not claiming that we should be selfish. That is what Ethical Egoism claims and is a very different type of claim. Psychological Egoism presents itself as a hard-nosed and realistic view that simply reports on the way things are – “let’s just face it, we all have an agenda, and anyone who denies this is a fool.” According to Psychological Egoism, a careful and rational assessment of the evidence concerning human behavior, shows that ethical rules do not make very much sense, since we cannot ever put others first. That is, altruism, (acting selflessly, putting others needs and interests before one’s own) is not possible. We will examine the arguments for this view in a moment.

Arguments for psychological egoism

Clearly if Psychological Egoism were true, this would have an enormous impact on our lives. If we simply cannot ever really be unselfish, at best we are confused when we talk about ethics, and at worst we are deceiving ourselves about human nature. Whatever the case may be, Psychological Egoism compels us to give up the idea that we can ever act unselfishly – it relieves us from the burdens that go with ethical demands to help others and frees us to pursue our own self-interest without the guilt feelings that society has traditionally encouraged us to feel when we put ourselves first. Furthermore, the view that we are never unselfish strikes some people as a realistic antidote to the idealistic tone of ethics.

If Psychological Egoism is true, describing human actions in terms of what we should and shouldn’t do, in terms of duties and obligations, etc. is simply unrealistic and we should give it up. The ethical perspective would be revealed to be obsolete from the new, more “scientific” standpoint of Psychological Egoism. On the other hand, if Psychological Egoism is true, we would not ever have any grounds for complaint about the way others treat us. If nobody really can be unselfish, what right would we ever have to ask others to take our interests seriously and not try to take advantage of us?

But is psychological egoism a true description of human nature and behavior? So far, we haven’t been given any reason to suppose that it is in fact true. So let us look at the arguments that might be offered in its defense. There are two main arguments in defense of Psychological Egoism. The first is a purely theoretical argument. It is based on an analysis of rational decision-making and claims that because of certain facts about the way we make decisions, these decisions are always selfish.

What this argument is claiming is that if we think about what is involved in rational action in general, we will soon realize that it must be selfish by definition. Since my reasons for action are nobody’s but my own, they must be oriented toward my own good. After all, this is what it means to act rationally – rational action is action that effectively realizes one’s goals. But since these goals must be my goals, otherwise they would fail to motivate my decisions, it clearly seems to follow that I have no choice but to act for my own sake. Acting for someone else’s goals is just impossible. But acting for one’s own goals exclusively is just what it means to be selfish. Hence Psychological Egoism must be true.

A second argument for Psychological Egoism is an empirical argument. It does not rest on the claim that we are, by nature, selfish even though that is what Psychological Egoism ultimately claims. Instead, it appeals to evidence about real human behavior in the real world.

To many this argument just seems silly. Aren’t there in fact are plenty of examples of real altruistic behavior out there? Sure, some people are selfish, but there are many people who help other people at no apparent gain to themselves. Here are a few ordinary examples:

• A person gives all their extra money, after paying their bills and buying groceries, to charity and does so anonymously.
• Another person stops to help the victim of an accident on the highway even though doing so makes them late for an important meeting.
• Someone else spends their weekends volunteering at the hospital.

As you may already suspect, a defender of Psychological Egoism has an answer to this objection. The second argument for Psychological Egoism does not instantly fall apart under the weight of these apparent counterexamples. This is because, according to Psychological Egoism, they are only apparent examples of altruism – on closer examination these apparently altruistic acts can be shown to really be based on underlying selfish motives. Take the case of a person who gives to charity anonymously. Isn’t there likely to be a selfish motive in this? Perhaps this person feels guilty for having as much money as she has and decides that the best way to make herself feel better is to give a large anonymous donation to a charity. Or maybe it is a way of avoiding paying taxes on the rest of her money – if you do it right, donating to charity can save you money on your taxes by lowering your tax bracket. The same kind of argument can apply in the other cases as well. Can’t we reinterpret the motives of people who help strangers in a way that makes them seem less altruistic and more selfish? Once again, the motives for helping people might be to relieve one’s own guilt feelings, or to enjoy the feeling of being a hero, or the fame that goes with getting your picture in the paper as the heroic rescuer of that poor, helpless victim of the accident. Volunteering? Well, that looks great on your resume, plus it is a great way to meet people without having to buy them drinks, etc. This line of reasoning is intended to provide additional support in defense of Psychological Egoism against the objection that people “obviously” do not always act on the basis of selfish motives.

But what about the first argument? This argument claimed that we could see that human behavior has to be selfish to the extent that it is rational simply because we all are only capable of making decisions that fulfill our own goals. Rational decision-making is decision-making that realizes one’s own goals and so it is bound to be selfish, the argument concludes. A little reflection on this argument, however, reveals a subtle problem. Does the fact that a goal is my own goal mean that my interests alone are at stake in the attempt to satisfy that goal? Only if we assume that I cannot have goals that involve helping other people. But why should we assume this? PE claims that my goals are always my goals, and so they must be selfish. But doesn’t this mix up two different meanings of the expression “my goals?” Clearly it is true that my goals are my own – if they are going to get my body moving, they must be in my own head. That is a trivial truth of human psychology – it is so obvious that there usually isn’t much point mentioning it. The thoughts in your head cannot cause me to do anything, at least in any direct way. But “my goals” might also mean, “my goals, as opposed to your goals” in a situation where both cannot be satisfied simultaneously. If my goal is to rob you of all your money and your goal is to prevent me from doing that this is the meaning of the expression “my goals” that is appropriate. But these two meanings are different, so if our argument uses both meanings as if they were equivalent, it is guilty of the fallacy of equivocation. Thus, the first argument is revealed to be invalid, since it equivocates on the meaning of the expression “my goals.”