{"id":709,"date":"2025-03-13T18:56:38","date_gmt":"2025-03-13T18:56:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/9-3-2-the-second-formulation-of-the-categorical-imperative\/"},"modified":"2025-04-16T22:54:33","modified_gmt":"2025-04-16T22:54:33","slug":"9-3-2-the-second-formulation-of-the-categorical-imperative","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/9-3-2-the-second-formulation-of-the-categorical-imperative\/","title":{"raw":"9.3.3 The Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative","rendered":"9.3.3 The Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative"},"content":{"raw":"
\r\n

Kant\u2019s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative takes a different approach to ascertaining whether a choice is moral and rational:<\/p>\r\n

So<\/em> act that\u00a0you use\u00a0humanity, in your own person as well as\u00a0in the person of any other, always\u00a0at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.<\/em><\/p>\r\n

Often called <\/span>the Formula of Humanity or the Formula of the End in Itself<\/strong>, put very simply <\/span>this formula <\/span>says you should not use <\/span>rational agents (human or otherwise) as a means to some other <\/span>end, <\/span> because<\/span> if you do, you are failing to treat them as rational agents, and this is morally wrong.<\/span> For Kant, the highest good in the universe is the rational mind. Here he takes strong exception with the Utilitarians who did not see individuals as <\/span>intrinsic<\/em> goods and often viewed them as <\/span>instrumental<\/em> means to some higher, greater good. <\/span><\/p>\r\n

For example, if I use your essay without your knowledge then I have not treated you as a rational agent like I would have done had I asked you for your essay and you had freely chosen to let me have it. But given that I did not ask you, I was, in a sense,\u00a0making choices on your behalf<\/em> and thus did not treat you as a rational agent. So according to Kant, I should always treat you as an end<\/em>,<\/strong> never as a means. I should always treat you as a free rational agent.<\/p>\r\n

You will note the similarity between both the first and second formulations lies in Kant\u2019s value of upholding reason as the ultimate test of a moral action. In the first formulation it is the rationality of the universalized maxim that comes into question. In this second formulation it is the rationality of the persons involved in the choice.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n
\r\n

Taking it to the Streets...<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n

Ask friends the question \u201cIs it ever right to use another person without their consent?\u201d What kinds of answers do they offer?<\/span><\/p>\r\n

If they say no, can you suggest to them times when indeed it might be? For example, people convicted of crimes do not give consent to be imprisoned, yet society puts them there anyway. Or, more benignly, someone might tell a <\/span>trivial lie<\/span> so as not to hurt another person\u2019s feelings. <\/span><\/p>\r\n

What would Kant say about these choices?<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\nKant\u2019s theory then has a way of respecting the<\/span>\u00a0dignity<\/em> of people. We should treat people with respect and with dignity purely on the basis that they are rational agents, and not because of their race, gender, education, upbringing, etc. From this, you can also see that Kant\u2019s theory allows us to speak about <\/span>rights<\/span>. If someone has a right then they have this right irrespective of gender, education, upbringing, etc. For example, Jill has a right to free speech because she is a person, consequently that right will not disappear if she changes her location, personal circumstances, relationship status, political viewpoint, etc. After all, she does not stop being a person.<\/span>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

Importantly, <\/span>this second formulation<\/span> does not say that you<\/span>\u00a0either<\/em>\u00a0treat someone as a means<\/span>\u00a0or<\/em>\u00a0an end. I<\/span>t\u2019s conceivable that I<\/span> could treat someone as an end<\/span>\u00a0by<\/em>\u00a0treating them as a means. Suppose that you have freely decided to become a taxi driver. If I use you as a means by asking you to take me to the airport, I am also treating you as an end. But Kant does not believe this to be morally wrong because I am respecting you as a rational agent; after all, you<\/span>\u00a0chose<\/em>\u00a0to be a taxi driver. Of course, if I get into your car and point a gun at your head and ask to be taken to the airport then I am not treating you as an end but rather solely as a means, which is wrong.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n

Excerpts from Kant\u2019s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/h4>\r\n


<\/em>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/em> (1785; German: Grundlegung<\/em> zur<\/em> Metaphysik<\/em> der <\/em>Sitten<\/em>) is the first of Immanuel Kant's mature works on moral philosophy. In the following selections, see if you can find:<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n

In what follows...<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n\r\nWhat does Kant suggest is a characteristic unique to rational beings?\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognized as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

What does Kant mean by an \u201cimperative\u201d?<\/div>\r\n

The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an Imperative.<\/p>\r\n

All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for everyone. \u2026<\/p>\r\n\r\n

What are the two kinds of Imperatives? How do they differ?<\/div>\r\n

Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.<\/p>\r\n

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and, on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical\u2026.<\/p>\r\n

Accordingly, the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual. \u2026. [while] the categorical imperative declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose\u2026.<\/p>\r\n

And thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one\u2019s own happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as means to another purpose.<\/p>\r\n

Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be called that of Morality\u2026.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Which kind of imperative is appropriate for a moral law?<\/div>\r\n

We shall therefore have to investigate \u00e0 priori the possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of a practical Law: all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law\u2026.<\/p>\r\n

When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

What is Kant\u2019s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative?<\/div>\r\n

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n

Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.<\/p>\r\n

Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature.<\/strong><\/p>\r\n

We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.<\/p>\r\n

In these four examples, how does Kant say we should employ the Categorical Imperative?<\/p>\r\n

A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: \u201cFrom self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.\u201d It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.<\/p>\r\n

Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: \u201cIs it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?\u201d Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: \u201cWhen I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so.\u201d Now this principle of self-love or of one\u2019s own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, \u201cIs it right?\u201d I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: \u201cHow would it be if my maxim were a universal law?\u201d Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.<\/p>\r\n

A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.<\/p>\r\n

A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: \u201cWhat concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!\u201d Now, no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and goodwill, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.<\/p>\r\n

These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so. \u2026<\/p>\r\n\r\n

How do we recognize duties from mere options?<\/div>\r\n

We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove \u00e0 priori<\/em> that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a practical law which commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse, and that the following of this law is duty.<\/p>\r\n

With the view of attaining to this, it is of extreme importance to remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all), and for this reason only be also a law for all human wills. \u2026<\/p>\r\n\r\n

What does Kant mean by saying that the human being is an \u201cend\u201d?<\/div>\r\n

Now I say: man, and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations, themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus, the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature\u2019s, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

How does he use this idea to restate the Categorical Imperative into a Second Formulation?<\/div>\r\n

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only<\/em>. We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

How does Kant reconsider the earlier four examples in light of this new formulation?<\/div>\r\n

To abide by the previous examples:<\/p>\r\n

Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e.g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.)<\/p>\r\n

Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.<\/p>\r\n

Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end.<\/p>\r\n

Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The natural end that all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all, this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if everyone does not also endeavor, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also if that conception is to have its full effect with me.<\/p>\r\n

This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every man\u2019s freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly, because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything about them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end to men (subjectively), that is as an object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective ends, let them be what we will; it must therefore spring from pure reason. In fact the objective principle of all practical legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say, e.g., a law of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end; now by the second principle, the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"

\n

Kant\u2019s second formulation of the Categorical Imperative takes a different approach to ascertaining whether a choice is moral and rational:<\/p>\n

So<\/em> act that\u00a0you use\u00a0humanity, in your own person as well as\u00a0in the person of any other, always\u00a0at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.<\/em><\/p>\n

Often called <\/span>the Formula of Humanity or the Formula of the End in Itself<\/strong>, put very simply <\/span>this formula <\/span>says you should not use <\/span>rational agents (human or otherwise) as a means to some other <\/span>end, <\/span> because<\/span> if you do, you are failing to treat them as rational agents, and this is morally wrong.<\/span> For Kant, the highest good in the universe is the rational mind. Here he takes strong exception with the Utilitarians who did not see individuals as <\/span>intrinsic<\/em> goods and often viewed them as <\/span>instrumental<\/em> means to some higher, greater good. <\/span><\/p>\n

For example, if I use your essay without your knowledge then I have not treated you as a rational agent like I would have done had I asked you for your essay and you had freely chosen to let me have it. But given that I did not ask you, I was, in a sense,\u00a0making choices on your behalf<\/em> and thus did not treat you as a rational agent. So according to Kant, I should always treat you as an end<\/em>,<\/strong> never as a means. I should always treat you as a free rational agent.<\/p>\n

You will note the similarity between both the first and second formulations lies in Kant\u2019s value of upholding reason as the ultimate test of a moral action. In the first formulation it is the rationality of the universalized maxim that comes into question. In this second formulation it is the rationality of the persons involved in the choice.<\/span><\/p>\n

\n
<\/div>\n<\/header>\n
\n

Taking it to the Streets…<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/header>\n

\n

Ask friends the question \u201cIs it ever right to use another person without their consent?\u201d What kinds of answers do they offer?<\/span><\/p>\n

If they say no, can you suggest to them times when indeed it might be? For example, people convicted of crimes do not give consent to be imprisoned, yet society puts them there anyway. Or, more benignly, someone might tell a <\/span>trivial lie<\/span> so as not to hurt another person\u2019s feelings. <\/span><\/p>\n

What would Kant say about these choices?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Kant\u2019s theory then has a way of respecting the<\/span>\u00a0dignity<\/em> of people. We should treat people with respect and with dignity purely on the basis that they are rational agents, and not because of their race, gender, education, upbringing, etc. From this, you can also see that Kant\u2019s theory allows us to speak about <\/span>rights<\/span>. If someone has a right then they have this right irrespective of gender, education, upbringing, etc. For example, Jill has a right to free speech because she is a person, consequently that right will not disappear if she changes her location, personal circumstances, relationship status, political viewpoint, etc. After all, she does not stop being a person.<\/span><\/p>\n

Importantly, <\/span>this second formulation<\/span> does not say that you<\/span>\u00a0either<\/em>\u00a0treat someone as a means<\/span>\u00a0or<\/em>\u00a0an end. I<\/span>t\u2019s conceivable that I<\/span> could treat someone as an end<\/span>\u00a0by<\/em>\u00a0treating them as a means. Suppose that you have freely decided to become a taxi driver. If I use you as a means by asking you to take me to the airport, I am also treating you as an end. But Kant does not believe this to be morally wrong because I am respecting you as a rational agent; after all, you<\/span>\u00a0chose<\/em>\u00a0to be a taxi driver. Of course, if I get into your car and point a gun at your head and ask to be taken to the airport then I am not treating you as an end but rather solely as a means, which is wrong.<\/span><\/p>\n

Excerpts from Kant\u2019s Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/h4>\n


<\/em>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/em> (1785; German: Grundlegung<\/em> zur<\/em> Metaphysik<\/em> der <\/em>Sitten<\/em>) is the first of Immanuel Kant’s mature works on moral philosophy. In the following selections, see if you can find:<\/p>\n

\n
\n

In what follows…<\/p>\n<\/header>\n

\n

What does Kant suggest is a characteristic unique to rational beings?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognized as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.<\/p>\n

What does Kant mean by an \u201cimperative\u201d?<\/div>\n

The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an Imperative.<\/p>\n

All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for everyone. \u2026<\/p>\n

What are the two kinds of Imperatives? How do they differ?<\/div>\n

Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.<\/p>\n

Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and, on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical\u2026.<\/p>\n

Accordingly, the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual. \u2026. [while] the categorical imperative declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose\u2026.<\/p>\n

And thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one\u2019s own happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as means to another purpose.<\/p>\n

Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be called that of Morality\u2026.<\/p>\n

Which kind of imperative is appropriate for a moral law?<\/div>\n

We shall therefore have to investigate \u00e0 priori the possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of a practical Law: all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law\u2026.<\/p>\n

When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.<\/p>\n

What is Kant\u2019s first formulation of the Categorical Imperative?<\/div>\n

There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law<\/em>.<\/p>\n

Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.<\/p>\n

Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature.<\/strong><\/p>\n

We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.<\/p>\n

In these four examples, how does Kant say we should employ the Categorical Imperative?<\/p>\n

A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: \u201cFrom self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.\u201d It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.<\/p>\n

Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: \u201cIs it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?\u201d Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: \u201cWhen I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so.\u201d Now this principle of self-love or of one\u2019s own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, \u201cIs it right?\u201d I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: \u201cHow would it be if my maxim were a universal law?\u201d Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.<\/p>\n

A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.<\/p>\n

A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: \u201cWhat concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!\u201d Now, no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and goodwill, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.<\/p>\n

These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so. \u2026<\/p>\n

How do we recognize duties from mere options?<\/div>\n

We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove \u00e0 priori<\/em> that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a practical law which commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse, and that the following of this law is duty.<\/p>\n

With the view of attaining to this, it is of extreme importance to remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all), and for this reason only be also a law for all human wills. \u2026<\/p>\n

What does Kant mean by saying that the human being is an \u201cend\u201d?<\/div>\n

Now I say: man, and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations, themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus, the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature\u2019s, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.<\/p>\n

How does he use this idea to restate the Categorical Imperative into a Second Formulation?<\/div>\n

If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: So act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only<\/em>. We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.<\/p>\n

How does Kant reconsider the earlier four examples in light of this new formulation?<\/div>\n

To abide by the previous examples:<\/p>\n

Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e.g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.)<\/p>\n

Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.<\/p>\n

Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end.<\/p>\n

Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The natural end that all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all, this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if everyone does not also endeavor, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also if that conception is to have its full effect with me.<\/p>\n

This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every man\u2019s freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly, because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything about them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end to men (subjectively), that is as an object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective ends, let them be what we will; it must therefore spring from pure reason. In fact the objective principle of all practical legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say, e.g., a law of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end; now by the second principle, the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will.<\/p>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":6,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-709","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":932,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/709","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/709\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1354,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/709\/revisions\/1354"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/932"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/709\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=709"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=709"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=709"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=709"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}