{"id":706,"date":"2025-03-13T18:56:38","date_gmt":"2025-03-13T18:56:38","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/9-2-duty-and-the-good-will\/"},"modified":"2025-03-31T21:34:52","modified_gmt":"2025-03-31T21:34:52","slug":"9-2-duty-and-the-good-will","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/9-2-duty-and-the-good-will\/","title":{"raw":"9.2 Duty and The Good Will","rendered":"9.2 Duty and The Good Will"},"content":{"raw":"
\r\n

Kant began his ethical theory by arguing that the only virtue that can be an unqualified good is a good will<\/strong>. No other virtue qualifies as the starting point for ethics because every other virtue\u2014e.g.: honesty, compassion, courage, moderation\u2014other thing, can be used to achieve immoral ends. For example, the virtue of\u00a0loyalty\u00a0is not good if one is loyal to an evil person. The\u00a0good will<\/em>\u00a0is singularly unique in that it is always good and maintains its moral value regardless of it achieves its moral intentions.\u00a0Kant regarded the\u00a0good will\u00a0as the foremost moral principle that requires us to freely chooses to use other virtues for genuinely moral ends.<\/p>\r\n

For Kant, a\u00a0good will<\/em>\u00a0has a broader conception than a will that acts simply from duty. It might be one\u2019s duty to take out the trash, obey speed limits, or stand watch at an outpost in enemy territory. Such tasks might be obligatory but, if done begrudgingly, are not what Kant means by doing one\u2019s duty.<\/p>\r\n

Here Kant makes an important distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting for the sake of duty, from the good will.<\/p>\r\n

Acting<\/strong> in Accordance with<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0Duty<\/strong> a<\/strong>nd<\/strong> Acting <\/strong>for the Sake of<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0Duty<\/strong><\/p>\r\n

When we act in Accordance with Duty, we are often acting to fulfill obligations put on us by others, e.g. the obligation to pay taxes, the obligation to honor thy father and thy mother, the obligation to care for our children. Whereas these obligations are important, they are not what Kant means by acting for the Sake of Duty. These obligations are often done begrudgingly, to comply with the expectations of others. Even if we choose to see the good in these things, that good comes as a consequence<\/em> of performing such duties, and thus is not fit for ethical consideration.<\/p>\r\n

When we act for the Sake of Duty, on the other hand, <\/span>we are acting from our own inner imperative, from our desire to do the right thing regardless of consequences. <\/span>We act regardless of what others expect. We act without consideration for rewards. We act <\/span>because we must. <\/span>For Kant this means that acting for the sake of duty is the<\/span>\u00a0only<\/em>\u00a0way that an action can have moral worth. We <\/span>will see below what we <\/span>must<\/span> do for our actions to be carried out for the sake of duty. However, before we do this, we need to be <\/span>clear<\/span> on this point about moral worth.<\/span><\/p>\r\n

Imagine that you are walking with a friend. You pass someone begging on the street. Your friend starts to weep, fumbles in his wallet and gives the beggar some money and tells you that he<\/span>\u00a0feels<\/em>\u00a0such an empathy with the poor man that he just <\/span>has to<\/span> help him.<\/span><\/p>\r\n

For Kant, your friend\u2019s action has<\/span>\u00a0no<\/em>\u00a0moral worth because what is moving him to give money is empathy rather than duty<\/span>. He is acting as society expects him to act, in accordance with duty, and for the consequence of bettering the life of the beggar and making himself feel better.<\/span> Although<\/span> Kant does think your friend should be applauded as such an action is something that is of value although it wouldn\u2019t be correct to call it a<\/span>\u00a0moral<\/em>\u00a0action.<\/span><\/p>\r\n

To make this point clearer, Kant asks us to consider someone who has no sympathy for the suffering of others and no inclination to help them. But despite this:<\/span><\/p>\r\n

\u2026 he nevertheless tears himself from his deadly insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth<\/em>.<\/span> (Groundwork, Ch. 2)<\/span><\/p>\r\n

In contrast to our friend, this person is acting<\/span>\u00a0<\/em>for the sake of\u00a0duty <\/span>because he knows that to give to the poor is the right thing to do regardless of how one feels about it or what society says, <\/span>and hence their action is moral. We must be careful though.<\/span>\u00a0<\/em>Kant is not telling us to become emotionally barren robots! He is not saying that before we can act <\/span>morally,<\/span> we need to get rid of sympathy, empathy, desires, love, and inclinations. This would make Kant\u2019s moral philosophy an absurd non-starter.<\/span><\/p>\r\n

Let us see why Kant is not saying this. Consider an action such as giving to others. We should ask whether an action of giving to others\u00a0would have\u00a0been performed\u00a0even if\u00a0the agent lacked the desire to do so<\/em>. If the answer is \u201cyes\u201d then the act has moral worth. The question for Kant is not whether an agent has desires but what moved the agent to act.<\/em> If they acted\u00a0because\u00a0of those desires, they acted in accordance with duty and their action had no moral worth. If they acted for the sake of duty, and just happened to have those desires, then their action has moral worth.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n

Ponder if you will\u2026<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n

Which of these choices would Kant label as acting in Accordance with Duty and which for the Sake of Duty?<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    \r\n \t
  1. Paying taxes because you fear legal consequences.<\/li>\r\n \t
  2. Helping a stranger in need without expecting anything in return.<\/li>\r\n \t
  3. Being faithful to your spouse to maintain social standing.<\/li>\r\n \t
  4. Donating to charity for a tax deduction.<\/li>\r\n \t
  5. Respecting others' autonomy even when you disagree with their choices.<\/li>\r\n \t
  6. Helping a friend because you expect them to return the favor.<\/li>\r\n \t
  7. Telling the truth when lying would be easier and more advantageous.<\/li>\r\n \t
  8. Keeping a promise even when breaking it would be more beneficial.<\/li>\r\n \t
  9. Developing one's talents and abilities out of a sense of moral obligation.<\/li>\r\n \t
  10. Being faithful to your spouse to maintain social standing.<\/li>\r\n \t
  11. Telling the truth to avoid the stress of maintaining a lie.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n

    If you have understood Kant\u2019s distinction here you will see statements 1, 3, 4, 6, and 10 are examples of what he would call acting in Accordance with Duty, while the others are examples of acting for the Sake of Duty.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

    Kant's conception of duty does not necessarily require that people perform their duties grudgingly. Although duty often constrains people and prompts them to act against their inclinations, it still comes from an agent's\u00a0volition: they desire to keep the moral law from respect of the moral law. Thus, when an agent performs an action from duty it is because their moral incentives are chosen over and above any opposing inclinations, consequences or expectations of others. Kant wished to move beyond the conception of morality as externally imposed duties, and present an ethics of\u00a0autonomy, when rational agents freely recognize the claims reason makes upon them.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    The Good Will <\/strong>as<\/strong> Good Without <\/strong>Qualification<\/strong><\/h2>\r\n

    But this raises the question. If it is not our desires that move us to do what is right (even our strong desires), then what does? In our example, why is it that we keep our promise despite the strong desire to gossip? Kant\u2019s answer is \u201cthe good will.\u201d\u00a0 For Kant, the good will is something in us that desires to do what is right regardless of the effects or consequences:<\/p>\r\n

    A Good Will is good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e. in itself; and, considered by itself, it is to be esteemed beyond compare much higher than anything that could ever be brought about by it in favor of some inclinations, and indeed, if you will, the sum of all inclinations. Even if by some particular disfavor of fate, or by the scanty endowment of a stepmotherly nature, this Will should entirely lack the capacity to carry through its purpose; if despite its greatest striving it should still accomplish nothing, and only the Good Will were to remain (not of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all means that are within our control); then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has full worth in itself\". (Groundwork)<\/p>\r\n

    It is also good without qualification. In his Foundations for a Metaphysics of Morals<\/em> (1785) he claimed:<\/p>\r\n

    Nothing in the world\u2014indeed nothing even beyond the world\u2014can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a Good Will<\/p>\r\n

    By this Kant means that a good will is always good and does not require anything else to be good.\u00a0It is, to use terminology from our chapter on the Utilitarians, an intrinsic<\/em> good, good in and of itself. He believed that a good will is one that acts in accordance with the moral law and out of respect for that law, rather than out of natural inclinations.<\/p>\r\n

    Kant also believed that other good things are \"qualified\" goods, meaning they are only instrumentally<\/em> good.\u00a0For example, if you volunteer with a charity because you believe you have an obligation to help, but also because you enjoy it, Kant might say that you deserve some moral credit for your action, but not as much as if you were primarily motivated by duty.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    \r\n

    Ponder if you will...<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

    \r\n\r\nPick motivation you like that you think might make an action good \u2014 happiness, pleasure, courage, success, rewards, loyalty, productivity. Now try to imagine how working from that motivation might lead to bad actions. For example, imagine someone who is happy when kicking a cat; someone taking pleasure in torture; or a serial killer whose courage allows her to abduct children in broad daylight. In such cases, happiness, pleasure, and courage only serve to make the actions eviler.\r\n\r\nNow try to consider what your actions would be like if your only motive was the desire to do the right thing for its own sake. Would the cat still be kicked, the victim still be tortured, the children still be abducted? Kant thinks not. Do you agree?\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

    The good will, unlike anything else, is good unconditionally and in all situations, and what makes a good will \u201cgood\u201d is the willing<\/em> alone, not other attitudes, consequences, or characteristics of the agent.<\/p>\r\n

    Consider\u00a0<\/strong>Mahatma Gandhi\u2019s (1869\u20131948) non-violent protest for Indian independence. He stood peacefully whilst the British police beat him. Here is a case where there must have been an overwhelming desire to fight back. But he did not. In this type of action, Kant would claim that we \u201csee\u201d the good will \u201cshining like a jewel.\u201d \u00a0Seeing such resilience in the face of such awful violence, we are humbled and can recognize, what Kant calls, its moral worth.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

    \r\n

    Taking it to the Streets...<\/strong><\/p>\r\n

    Ask friends to share a list of moral actions that are good without qualification, or without considering the consequences.<\/p>\r\n

    Evaluate each friend\u2019s responses by sharing them with the other friends. Ask them for their feedback. Do they agree with the choices? If not, what is wrong with one or more of them?<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

    Obviously, not all actions are as significant as Gandhi\u2019s. However, Kant thinks that any acts like this, which are performed despite conflicting desires, are due to the good will. Considering such actions means we can recognize that the good will exists.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"

    \n

    Kant began his ethical theory by arguing that the only virtue that can be an unqualified good is a good will<\/strong>. No other virtue qualifies as the starting point for ethics because every other virtue\u2014e.g.: honesty, compassion, courage, moderation\u2014other thing, can be used to achieve immoral ends. For example, the virtue of\u00a0loyalty\u00a0is not good if one is loyal to an evil person. The\u00a0good will<\/em>\u00a0is singularly unique in that it is always good and maintains its moral value regardless of it achieves its moral intentions.\u00a0Kant regarded the\u00a0good will\u00a0as the foremost moral principle that requires us to freely chooses to use other virtues for genuinely moral ends.<\/p>\n

    For Kant, a\u00a0good will<\/em>\u00a0has a broader conception than a will that acts simply from duty. It might be one\u2019s duty to take out the trash, obey speed limits, or stand watch at an outpost in enemy territory. Such tasks might be obligatory but, if done begrudgingly, are not what Kant means by doing one\u2019s duty.<\/p>\n

    Here Kant makes an important distinction between acting in accordance with duty and acting for the sake of duty, from the good will.<\/p>\n

    Acting<\/strong> in Accordance with<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0Duty<\/strong> a<\/strong>nd<\/strong> Acting <\/strong>for the Sake of<\/em><\/strong>\u00a0Duty<\/strong><\/p>\n

    When we act in Accordance with Duty, we are often acting to fulfill obligations put on us by others, e.g. the obligation to pay taxes, the obligation to honor thy father and thy mother, the obligation to care for our children. Whereas these obligations are important, they are not what Kant means by acting for the Sake of Duty. These obligations are often done begrudgingly, to comply with the expectations of others. Even if we choose to see the good in these things, that good comes as a consequence<\/em> of performing such duties, and thus is not fit for ethical consideration.<\/p>\n

    When we act for the Sake of Duty, on the other hand, <\/span>we are acting from our own inner imperative, from our desire to do the right thing regardless of consequences. <\/span>We act regardless of what others expect. We act without consideration for rewards. We act <\/span>because we must. <\/span>For Kant this means that acting for the sake of duty is the<\/span>\u00a0only<\/em>\u00a0way that an action can have moral worth. We <\/span>will see below what we <\/span>must<\/span> do for our actions to be carried out for the sake of duty. However, before we do this, we need to be <\/span>clear<\/span> on this point about moral worth.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Imagine that you are walking with a friend. You pass someone begging on the street. Your friend starts to weep, fumbles in his wallet and gives the beggar some money and tells you that he<\/span>\u00a0feels<\/em>\u00a0such an empathy with the poor man that he just <\/span>has to<\/span> help him.<\/span><\/p>\n

    For Kant, your friend\u2019s action has<\/span>\u00a0no<\/em>\u00a0moral worth because what is moving him to give money is empathy rather than duty<\/span>. He is acting as society expects him to act, in accordance with duty, and for the consequence of bettering the life of the beggar and making himself feel better.<\/span> Although<\/span> Kant does think your friend should be applauded as such an action is something that is of value although it wouldn\u2019t be correct to call it a<\/span>\u00a0moral<\/em>\u00a0action.<\/span><\/p>\n

    To make this point clearer, Kant asks us to consider someone who has no sympathy for the suffering of others and no inclination to help them. But despite this:<\/span><\/p>\n

    \u2026 he nevertheless tears himself from his deadly insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty then for the first time his action has genuine moral worth<\/em>.<\/span> (Groundwork, Ch. 2)<\/span><\/p>\n

    In contrast to our friend, this person is acting<\/span>\u00a0<\/em>for the sake of\u00a0duty <\/span>because he knows that to give to the poor is the right thing to do regardless of how one feels about it or what society says, <\/span>and hence their action is moral. We must be careful though.<\/span>\u00a0<\/em>Kant is not telling us to become emotionally barren robots! He is not saying that before we can act <\/span>morally,<\/span> we need to get rid of sympathy, empathy, desires, love, and inclinations. This would make Kant\u2019s moral philosophy an absurd non-starter.<\/span><\/p>\n

    Let us see why Kant is not saying this. Consider an action such as giving to others. We should ask whether an action of giving to others\u00a0would have\u00a0been performed\u00a0even if\u00a0the agent lacked the desire to do so<\/em>. If the answer is \u201cyes\u201d then the act has moral worth. The question for Kant is not whether an agent has desires but what moved the agent to act.<\/em> If they acted\u00a0because\u00a0of those desires, they acted in accordance with duty and their action had no moral worth. If they acted for the sake of duty, and just happened to have those desires, then their action has moral worth.<\/p>\n

    \n
    \n

    Ponder if you will\u2026<\/span><\/em><\/span><\/p>\n<\/header>\n

    \n

    Which of these choices would Kant label as acting in Accordance with Duty and which for the Sake of Duty?<\/p>\n

      \n
    1. Paying taxes because you fear legal consequences.<\/li>\n
    2. Helping a stranger in need without expecting anything in return.<\/li>\n
    3. Being faithful to your spouse to maintain social standing.<\/li>\n
    4. Donating to charity for a tax deduction.<\/li>\n
    5. Respecting others’ autonomy even when you disagree with their choices.<\/li>\n
    6. Helping a friend because you expect them to return the favor.<\/li>\n
    7. Telling the truth when lying would be easier and more advantageous.<\/li>\n
    8. Keeping a promise even when breaking it would be more beneficial.<\/li>\n
    9. Developing one’s talents and abilities out of a sense of moral obligation.<\/li>\n
    10. Being faithful to your spouse to maintain social standing.<\/li>\n
    11. Telling the truth to avoid the stress of maintaining a lie.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n

      If you have understood Kant\u2019s distinction here you will see statements 1, 3, 4, 6, and 10 are examples of what he would call acting in Accordance with Duty, while the others are examples of acting for the Sake of Duty.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

      Kant’s conception of duty does not necessarily require that people perform their duties grudgingly. Although duty often constrains people and prompts them to act against their inclinations, it still comes from an agent’s\u00a0volition: they desire to keep the moral law from respect of the moral law. Thus, when an agent performs an action from duty it is because their moral incentives are chosen over and above any opposing inclinations, consequences or expectations of others. Kant wished to move beyond the conception of morality as externally imposed duties, and present an ethics of\u00a0autonomy, when rational agents freely recognize the claims reason makes upon them.<\/p>\n

      The Good Will <\/strong>as<\/strong> Good Without <\/strong>Qualification<\/strong><\/h2>\n

      But this raises the question. If it is not our desires that move us to do what is right (even our strong desires), then what does? In our example, why is it that we keep our promise despite the strong desire to gossip? Kant\u2019s answer is \u201cthe good will.\u201d\u00a0 For Kant, the good will is something in us that desires to do what is right regardless of the effects or consequences:<\/p>\n

      A Good Will is good not because of what it effects, or accomplishes, not because of its fitness to attain some intended end, but good just by its willing, i.e. in itself; and, considered by itself, it is to be esteemed beyond compare much higher than anything that could ever be brought about by it in favor of some inclinations, and indeed, if you will, the sum of all inclinations. Even if by some particular disfavor of fate, or by the scanty endowment of a stepmotherly nature, this Will should entirely lack the capacity to carry through its purpose; if despite its greatest striving it should still accomplish nothing, and only the Good Will were to remain (not of course, as a mere wish, but as the summoning of all means that are within our control); then, like a jewel, it would still shine by itself, as something that has full worth in itself”. (Groundwork)<\/p>\n

      It is also good without qualification. In his Foundations for a Metaphysics of Morals<\/em> (1785) he claimed:<\/p>\n

      Nothing in the world\u2014indeed nothing even beyond the world\u2014can possibly be conceived which could be called good without qualification except a Good Will<\/p>\n

      By this Kant means that a good will is always good and does not require anything else to be good.\u00a0It is, to use terminology from our chapter on the Utilitarians, an intrinsic<\/em> good, good in and of itself. He believed that a good will is one that acts in accordance with the moral law and out of respect for that law, rather than out of natural inclinations.<\/p>\n

      Kant also believed that other good things are “qualified” goods, meaning they are only instrumentally<\/em> good.\u00a0For example, if you volunteer with a charity because you believe you have an obligation to help, but also because you enjoy it, Kant might say that you deserve some moral credit for your action, but not as much as if you were primarily motivated by duty.<\/p>\n

      \n
      \n

      Ponder if you will…<\/p>\n<\/header>\n

      \n

      Pick motivation you like that you think might make an action good \u2014 happiness, pleasure, courage, success, rewards, loyalty, productivity. Now try to imagine how working from that motivation might lead to bad actions. For example, imagine someone who is happy when kicking a cat; someone taking pleasure in torture; or a serial killer whose courage allows her to abduct children in broad daylight. In such cases, happiness, pleasure, and courage only serve to make the actions eviler.<\/p>\n

      Now try to consider what your actions would be like if your only motive was the desire to do the right thing for its own sake. Would the cat still be kicked, the victim still be tortured, the children still be abducted? Kant thinks not. Do you agree?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

      The good will, unlike anything else, is good unconditionally and in all situations, and what makes a good will \u201cgood\u201d is the willing<\/em> alone, not other attitudes, consequences, or characteristics of the agent.<\/p>\n

      Consider\u00a0<\/strong>Mahatma Gandhi\u2019s (1869\u20131948) non-violent protest for Indian independence. He stood peacefully whilst the British police beat him. Here is a case where there must have been an overwhelming desire to fight back. But he did not. In this type of action, Kant would claim that we \u201csee\u201d the good will \u201cshining like a jewel.\u201d \u00a0Seeing such resilience in the face of such awful violence, we are humbled and can recognize, what Kant calls, its moral worth.<\/p>\n

      \n

      Taking it to the Streets…<\/strong><\/p>\n

      Ask friends to share a list of moral actions that are good without qualification, or without considering the consequences.<\/p>\n

      Evaluate each friend\u2019s responses by sharing them with the other friends. Ask them for their feedback. Do they agree with the choices? If not, what is wrong with one or more of them?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n

      Obviously, not all actions are as significant as Gandhi\u2019s. However, Kant thinks that any acts like this, which are performed despite conflicting desires, are due to the good will. Considering such actions means we can recognize that the good will exists.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":2,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-706","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":932,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/706","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/706\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1196,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/706\/revisions\/1196"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/932"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/706\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=706"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=706"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=706"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=706"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}