{"id":698,"date":"2025-03-13T18:56:37","date_gmt":"2025-03-13T18:56:37","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/8-2-2-mills-rule-utilitarianism\/"},"modified":"2025-03-31T21:18:57","modified_gmt":"2025-03-31T21:18:57","slug":"8-2-2-mills-rule-utilitarianism","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/8-2-2-mills-rule-utilitarianism\/","title":{"raw":"8.2.2 Mill\u2019s Rule Utilitarianism","rendered":"8.2.2 Mill\u2019s Rule Utilitarianism"},"content":{"raw":"
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John Stuart Mill<\/strong> (1806\u20131873) was concerned by many of the problems facing the utilitarian theory put forward by Bentham, but as a hedonist, he did not wish to see the theory rejected. Mill sought to refine and improve the Benthamite utilitarian theory in order to create a successful version of Hedonistic Utilitarianism.<\/p>\r\n\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"349\"]\"John John Stuart Mill (1806\u20131873), Wikipedia.com<\/a>, Public Domain.[\/caption]\r\n

Mill was so confident about the prospects for a version of Hedonistic Utilitarianism because he believed that there was empirically backed proof available to support the principle that the greatest happiness\/pleasure should always be secured for the greatest number. Mill\u2019s proof, much like Bentham\u2019s empirical defense of Hedonism, relies on evidence from observations that people desire their own happiness. This observation supports Mill\u2019s claim that since people desire their own happiness, this is evidence that such happiness is desirable<\/em>. Mill says \u201c\u2026each person\u2019s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons\u201d. Since our happiness is good for us, and general happiness is just the total happiness of all persons, then general happiness is also good. To put it another way, if individual happiness is a good worth pursuing then happiness, in general, must be worth pursuing.<\/p>\r\n

In order to justify Hedonism, Mill sought to justify the claim that the good of happiness is the\u00a0only<\/em> thing that makes our lives go better. Mill defends this claim by suggesting that knowledge, health, freedom, etc. are only valuable in so far as<\/em>\u00a0they bring about happiness. Knowledge is desired only because it provides happiness when acquired, not because it, by itself and in isolation, makes life go better.<\/p>\r\n

Mill\u2019s proof of Utilitarianism in terms of the general desirability of maximizing total happiness is, however, open to criticism. For one thing, the fact that something is desired does not seem to justify the claim that it is desirable.\u00a0G. E. Moore\u00a0(1873\u20131958) points out that Mill moves from the factual sense that something is desirable if it is desired to the normative sense that it\u00a0should\u00a0<\/em>be desired without any justification. It is possible, for example, to desire to kill another person. This is desirable in the sense people could and do desire it (it is possible to do so\u00a0\u2014\u00a0it is an action that is desire-able<\/em>), but not in the sense that we would want them to desire it.<\/p>\r\n

In addition, the idea that other apparent goods, such as knowledge and health, are only valuable in so far as they promote happiness\/pleasure is extremely controversial; can you imagine a situation in which you gained value from knowledge without any associated pleasure or happiness? If so, you may have a counter-example to Mill\u2019s claim.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Mill\u2019s Qualitative Utilitarianism<\/strong><\/h2>\r\n

In attempting to redraw Bentham\u2019s Utilitarianism, Mill\u2019s most substantial thought was to move away from Bentham\u2019s idea that all that mattered was the\u00a0quantity<\/em> of total pleasure. Instead, Mill thought that the\u00a0quality<\/em>\u00a0of pleasure was also crucial to deciding what is moral.<\/p>\r\n

Bentham\u2019s Utilitarianism is quantitative in the sense that all Bentham focuses on is the maximization of hedonically calculated quantities of total pleasure. Thus, he says that \u201cPrejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry\u201d. All that matters for Bentham is that choices produce pleasure and the way this is achieved is unimportant. If playing on a console affords you more pleasure than reading Shakespeare, then Bentham would view your life as going better if you play on the console. However, Mill introduces a quality criterion for pleasure. Mill says that:<\/p>\r\n

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is only because they only know their own side of the question.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n

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Ponder if you will...<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n\r\nThink about the life experienced by your cat or dog. In many ways, its life seems ideal. It has all it needs to eat and drink. It gets your attention and affirmation. It gets to sleep as much as it wants. It has all it could ever need or want.\r\n\r\nNow consider, if it were possible to trade places with your pet, would you do so? Why or why not?\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

Bentham could not admit that the unhappy Socrates would be living a life with more value than the happier fool. Mill, on the other hand, believes that\u00a0quality<\/em>, not merely quantity, of pleasure matters and can therefore defend the claim that Socrates has a better life even by hedonistic standards.<\/p>\r\n

According to Mill, higher pleasures are worth more than lower pleasures. Higher pleasures are those pleasures of the intellect brought about via activities like poetry, reading, or attending the theatre. Lower pleasures are animalistic and base; pleasures associated with drinking beer, having sex, or lazing on a sun-lounger. What we should seek to maximize are the higher quality pleasures even if the total pleasure (hedonically calculated via Bentham\u2019s calculus) turns out to be quantitatively lower as a result. Justifying this distinction between higher and lower quality pleasures as non-arbitrary and not just an expression of his own tastes, Mill says that \u201ccompetent judges,\u201d those people who have experienced both types of pleasure, are best placed to select which pleasures are higher and lower. Such competent judges, says Mill, would and do favor pleasures of the intellect over the base pleasures of the body. On this basis, Mill is open to the criticism that many people have both read books and drunk beer and that if given the choice would choose the latter. Whether or not Mill\u2019s defense of his supposedly non-prejudiced distinction of higher and lower pleasures is successful is an open question for your evaluation and analysis.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Mill\u2019s Rule Utilitarianism versus Bentham\u2019s Act Utilitarianism<\/strong><\/h2>\r\n

In addition to a difference in views regarding the importance of the quality of pleasure, Mill and Bentham are also separated by reference to Act and Rule Utilitarianism and although such terms emerged only after Mill\u2019s death, Mill is typically considered a rule utilitarian and Bentham an act utilitarian.<\/p>\r\n

Act Utilitarians, such as Bentham, focus only on the consequences of individual actions when making moral judgments. However, this focus on the outcome of individual acts can sometimes lead to odd and objection-raising examples. Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929\u20132020) (as we saw in the video at the beginning of section 4.0) raised the problem of the \u201ctransplant surgeon\u201d.<\/p>\r\n

Imagine a case where a doctor had five patients requiring new organs to stop their death and one healthy patient undergoing a routine check. In this case, it would seem that total pleasure is best promoted by killing one healthy patient, harvesting his organs, and saving the other five lives; their pleasure outweighs the cost to the formerly healthy patient.<\/p>\r\n

While Bentham does suggest that we should have \u201crules of thumb\u201d against such actions, for typically they will lead to unforeseen painful consequences, in the case as simply described the act utilitarian appears powerless to deny that such a killing is required in order to maximize total pleasure (just add your own details to secure this conclusion for the act utilitarian).<\/p>\r\n

Rule Utilitarians, in whose camp we can place Mill, adopt a different moral decision procedure. Their view is that we should create a set of rules that, if followed, would produce the greatest amount of total happiness. In the transplant case, killing the healthy man would not seem to be part of the best set of utilitarian-justified rules since a rule allowing the killing of healthy patients would not seem to promote total happiness; one outcome, for example, would be that people would very likely stop coming to hospitals for fear for their life! Therefore, if a rule permitting killing was allowed then the maximization of total happiness would not be promoted overall.<\/p>\r\n

It is through Rule Utilitarianism that we can make sense of Mill\u2019s \u201charm principle\u201d. According to Mill, there is:<\/p>\r\n

\u2026one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n

\r\n\r\nThat principle is:\r\n\r\nThe only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.<\/em>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

Even if a particular act of harming another person might bring about an increase in total pleasure on a single occasion, that act may not be condoned by the set of rules that best promotes total pleasure overall. As such, the action would not be morally permitted.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

Strong versus Weak Rule Utilitarianism<\/strong><\/h2>\r\n

Rule Utilitarians may seem to avoid troubling cases like the transplant surgeon and be able to support and uphold individual human and legal rights based on rules that reflect the harm principle. This fact would also help rule Utilitarians overcome objections based on the treatment of minorities because the exploitation of minority groups would, perhaps, fail to be supported by the best utilitarian-justified set of rules. Yet, rule Utilitarians face a troubling dilemma:<\/p>\r\n

Strong Rule Utilitarianism<\/strong>: Guidance from the set of rules that, if followed, would promote the greatest amount of total happiness must\u00a0always<\/em>\u00a0be followed.<\/p>\r\n

Weak Rule Utilitarianism<\/strong>: Guidance from the set of rules that, if followed, would promote the greatest amount of total happiness can be ignored in circumstances where more happiness would be produced by breaking the rule.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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Ponder if you will\u2026.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n\r\nConsidering Mill\u2019s \u201charm principle,\u201d was dropping atomic bombs on the two Japanese cities during World War II justified? Remember to look at \u201cboth sides of the issue.\u201d\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

The strong rule utilitarian appears to suffer from what\u00a0J. J. C. Smart (1920\u20132012) described as \u201cRule Worship.\u201d No longer focusing on the consequences of the action before them, the strong rule utilitarian appears to ignore the option to maximize total happiness in favor of following a general and non-relative rule regarding how to act. The strong rule utilitarian may be able to avoid problems based on the treatment of minorities or a lack of absolute legal and human rights, but it is not clear that they survive these problems by holding on to a teleological, relativistic utilitarian theory. Utilitarianism seems to be saved from troubling implications only by denying core features.<\/p>\r\n

On the other hand, while Weak Rule Utilitarianism retains a teleological nature it appears to collapse into Act Utilitarianism. The rules provide guidelines that can be broken and given that the act utilitarian can also offer \u201crules of thumb\u201d against actions that tend not to produce maximum goodness or utility in general, such as killing healthy patients, it is not clear where this version of Rule Utilitarianism gains a unique identity. In what cases would Act Utilitarianism and Weak Rule Utilitarianism actually provide different moral guidance? This is something you should consider in light of your own examples or previous examples in this chapter. (Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher, Ethics for A-Level<\/em>. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers)<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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Taking it to the Streets...<\/strong><\/p>\r\n

Ask five people: Is being happy the greatest good a human can experience? Why or why not? Do you believe we have a moral duty to be as happy as possible? Do we have a moral duty to promote societal happiness? Why or why not?<\/p>\r\n

What commonalities do you notice among the responses? Which response stands out to you as the strongest? Which response is the weakest?<\/p>\r\n

In the following excerpt, does Mill offer a better way than Bentham to solve the Trolley Problem?<\/p>\r\nExcerpts from John Stuart Mill's \u00a0Utilitarianism<\/em>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n

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In what follows,<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

consider to what extent Mill agreed with Bentham and to what extent he diverged from his predecessor.<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n \r\n

Chapter 2: What Utilitarianism Is<\/strong><\/p>\r\n

\u2026The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.<\/p>\r\n

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit they designate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.<\/p>\r\n

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast\u2019s pleasures do not satisfy a human being\u2019s conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life that does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former- that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points Utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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Ponder if you will\u2026.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n\r\nWe have seen that Epicurus was an ancient hedonist who taught that humans ought to seek to live a tranquil life by doing everything possible to avoid pain and augment pleasure. His philosophy is practiced by some still today.\r\n\r\nCan you think of forms of happiness higher than physical pleasures like tasting good food, lying on a beach, or sleeping in? Is Epicurus right, are these the highest good for us?\r\n\r\nOr is Mill correct by saying that even animals can experience these things, but for humans, there are higher forms of pleasure or happiness that no animals can access?\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

How does Mill establish that happiness is a higher aim than mere pleasure?<\/div>\r\n

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast\u2019s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.<\/p>\r\n

Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness- that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior- confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

How does Mill anticipate and counter objections to his position on the superiority of happiness over pleasure?<\/div>\r\n

It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.<\/p>\r\n

It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

What is the role of \u201ccompetent judges\u201d in evaluating the superiority of happiness?<\/div>\r\n

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.<\/p>\r\n

Note here how Mill stresses the principle of the greatest good for the most people.<\/p>\r\n

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent\u2019s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous.<\/p>\r\n\r\n

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Ponder if you will\u2026.<\/em><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n\r\nMany people today believe that animals are part of the \u201csentient creation\u201d that Mill mentions here and as a result, should be recipients of the Greater Happiness Principle. After reading this paragraph, do you think Mill would agree with them? Why or why not?\r\n\r\nWhat is your opinion? Is there a moral duty to maximize animals\u2019 pleasure? Why or why not?\r\n\r\nWhat does your opinion infer about the consuming of animals for food or clothing?\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self- observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.<\/p>\r\n

\u2026I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent\u2019s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being\u2019s sentient existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its, true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it; what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates\u2026.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"

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John Stuart Mill<\/strong> (1806\u20131873) was concerned by many of the problems facing the utilitarian theory put forward by Bentham, but as a hedonist, he did not wish to see the theory rejected. Mill sought to refine and improve the Benthamite utilitarian theory in order to create a successful version of Hedonistic Utilitarianism.<\/p>\n

\"John
John Stuart Mill (1806\u20131873), Wikipedia.com<\/a>, Public Domain.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

Mill was so confident about the prospects for a version of Hedonistic Utilitarianism because he believed that there was empirically backed proof available to support the principle that the greatest happiness\/pleasure should always be secured for the greatest number. Mill\u2019s proof, much like Bentham\u2019s empirical defense of Hedonism, relies on evidence from observations that people desire their own happiness. This observation supports Mill\u2019s claim that since people desire their own happiness, this is evidence that such happiness is desirable<\/em>. Mill says \u201c\u2026each person\u2019s happiness is a good to that person, and the general happiness, therefore, a good to the aggregate of all persons\u201d. Since our happiness is good for us, and general happiness is just the total happiness of all persons, then general happiness is also good. To put it another way, if individual happiness is a good worth pursuing then happiness, in general, must be worth pursuing.<\/p>\n

In order to justify Hedonism, Mill sought to justify the claim that the good of happiness is the\u00a0only<\/em> thing that makes our lives go better. Mill defends this claim by suggesting that knowledge, health, freedom, etc. are only valuable in so far as<\/em>\u00a0they bring about happiness. Knowledge is desired only because it provides happiness when acquired, not because it, by itself and in isolation, makes life go better.<\/p>\n

Mill\u2019s proof of Utilitarianism in terms of the general desirability of maximizing total happiness is, however, open to criticism. For one thing, the fact that something is desired does not seem to justify the claim that it is desirable.\u00a0G. E. Moore\u00a0(1873\u20131958) points out that Mill moves from the factual sense that something is desirable if it is desired to the normative sense that it\u00a0should\u00a0<\/em>be desired without any justification. It is possible, for example, to desire to kill another person. This is desirable in the sense people could and do desire it (it is possible to do so\u00a0\u2014\u00a0it is an action that is desire-able<\/em>), but not in the sense that we would want them to desire it.<\/p>\n

In addition, the idea that other apparent goods, such as knowledge and health, are only valuable in so far as they promote happiness\/pleasure is extremely controversial; can you imagine a situation in which you gained value from knowledge without any associated pleasure or happiness? If so, you may have a counter-example to Mill\u2019s claim.<\/p>\n

Mill\u2019s Qualitative Utilitarianism<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In attempting to redraw Bentham\u2019s Utilitarianism, Mill\u2019s most substantial thought was to move away from Bentham\u2019s idea that all that mattered was the\u00a0quantity<\/em> of total pleasure. Instead, Mill thought that the\u00a0quality<\/em>\u00a0of pleasure was also crucial to deciding what is moral.<\/p>\n

Bentham\u2019s Utilitarianism is quantitative in the sense that all Bentham focuses on is the maximization of hedonically calculated quantities of total pleasure. Thus, he says that \u201cPrejudice apart, the game of push-pin is of equal value with the arts and sciences of music and poetry\u201d. All that matters for Bentham is that choices produce pleasure and the way this is achieved is unimportant. If playing on a console affords you more pleasure than reading Shakespeare, then Bentham would view your life as going better if you play on the console. However, Mill introduces a quality criterion for pleasure. Mill says that:<\/p>\n

It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, is of a different opinion, it is only because they only know their own side of the question.<\/em><\/p>\n

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Ponder if you will…<\/p>\n<\/header>\n

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Think about the life experienced by your cat or dog. In many ways, its life seems ideal. It has all it needs to eat and drink. It gets your attention and affirmation. It gets to sleep as much as it wants. It has all it could ever need or want.<\/p>\n

Now consider, if it were possible to trade places with your pet, would you do so? Why or why not?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

Bentham could not admit that the unhappy Socrates would be living a life with more value than the happier fool. Mill, on the other hand, believes that\u00a0quality<\/em>, not merely quantity, of pleasure matters and can therefore defend the claim that Socrates has a better life even by hedonistic standards.<\/p>\n

According to Mill, higher pleasures are worth more than lower pleasures. Higher pleasures are those pleasures of the intellect brought about via activities like poetry, reading, or attending the theatre. Lower pleasures are animalistic and base; pleasures associated with drinking beer, having sex, or lazing on a sun-lounger. What we should seek to maximize are the higher quality pleasures even if the total pleasure (hedonically calculated via Bentham\u2019s calculus) turns out to be quantitatively lower as a result. Justifying this distinction between higher and lower quality pleasures as non-arbitrary and not just an expression of his own tastes, Mill says that \u201ccompetent judges,\u201d those people who have experienced both types of pleasure, are best placed to select which pleasures are higher and lower. Such competent judges, says Mill, would and do favor pleasures of the intellect over the base pleasures of the body. On this basis, Mill is open to the criticism that many people have both read books and drunk beer and that if given the choice would choose the latter. Whether or not Mill\u2019s defense of his supposedly non-prejudiced distinction of higher and lower pleasures is successful is an open question for your evaluation and analysis.<\/p>\n

Mill\u2019s Rule Utilitarianism versus Bentham\u2019s Act Utilitarianism<\/strong><\/h2>\n

In addition to a difference in views regarding the importance of the quality of pleasure, Mill and Bentham are also separated by reference to Act and Rule Utilitarianism and although such terms emerged only after Mill\u2019s death, Mill is typically considered a rule utilitarian and Bentham an act utilitarian.<\/p>\n

Act Utilitarians, such as Bentham, focus only on the consequences of individual actions when making moral judgments. However, this focus on the outcome of individual acts can sometimes lead to odd and objection-raising examples. Judith Jarvis Thomson (1929\u20132020) (as we saw in the video at the beginning of section 4.0) raised the problem of the \u201ctransplant surgeon\u201d.<\/p>\n

Imagine a case where a doctor had five patients requiring new organs to stop their death and one healthy patient undergoing a routine check. In this case, it would seem that total pleasure is best promoted by killing one healthy patient, harvesting his organs, and saving the other five lives; their pleasure outweighs the cost to the formerly healthy patient.<\/p>\n

While Bentham does suggest that we should have \u201crules of thumb\u201d against such actions, for typically they will lead to unforeseen painful consequences, in the case as simply described the act utilitarian appears powerless to deny that such a killing is required in order to maximize total pleasure (just add your own details to secure this conclusion for the act utilitarian).<\/p>\n

Rule Utilitarians, in whose camp we can place Mill, adopt a different moral decision procedure. Their view is that we should create a set of rules that, if followed, would produce the greatest amount of total happiness. In the transplant case, killing the healthy man would not seem to be part of the best set of utilitarian-justified rules since a rule allowing the killing of healthy patients would not seem to promote total happiness; one outcome, for example, would be that people would very likely stop coming to hospitals for fear for their life! Therefore, if a rule permitting killing was allowed then the maximization of total happiness would not be promoted overall.<\/p>\n

It is through Rule Utilitarianism that we can make sense of Mill\u2019s \u201charm principle\u201d. According to Mill, there is:<\/p>\n

\u2026one very simple principle, as entitled to govern absolutely the dealings of society with the individual in the way of compulsion and control.<\/em><\/p>\n

\n

That principle is:<\/p>\n

The only purpose for which power can be rightfully exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent harm to others. His own good, either physical or moral, is not a sufficient warrant.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

Even if a particular act of harming another person might bring about an increase in total pleasure on a single occasion, that act may not be condoned by the set of rules that best promotes total pleasure overall. As such, the action would not be morally permitted.<\/p>\n

Strong versus Weak Rule Utilitarianism<\/strong><\/h2>\n

Rule Utilitarians may seem to avoid troubling cases like the transplant surgeon and be able to support and uphold individual human and legal rights based on rules that reflect the harm principle. This fact would also help rule Utilitarians overcome objections based on the treatment of minorities because the exploitation of minority groups would, perhaps, fail to be supported by the best utilitarian-justified set of rules. Yet, rule Utilitarians face a troubling dilemma:<\/p>\n

Strong Rule Utilitarianism<\/strong>: Guidance from the set of rules that, if followed, would promote the greatest amount of total happiness must\u00a0always<\/em>\u00a0be followed.<\/p>\n

Weak Rule Utilitarianism<\/strong>: Guidance from the set of rules that, if followed, would promote the greatest amount of total happiness can be ignored in circumstances where more happiness would be produced by breaking the rule.<\/p>\n

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Ponder if you will\u2026.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/header>\n

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Considering Mill\u2019s \u201charm principle,\u201d was dropping atomic bombs on the two Japanese cities during World War II justified? Remember to look at \u201cboth sides of the issue.\u201d<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

The strong rule utilitarian appears to suffer from what\u00a0J. J. C. Smart (1920\u20132012) described as \u201cRule Worship.\u201d No longer focusing on the consequences of the action before them, the strong rule utilitarian appears to ignore the option to maximize total happiness in favor of following a general and non-relative rule regarding how to act. The strong rule utilitarian may be able to avoid problems based on the treatment of minorities or a lack of absolute legal and human rights, but it is not clear that they survive these problems by holding on to a teleological, relativistic utilitarian theory. Utilitarianism seems to be saved from troubling implications only by denying core features.<\/p>\n

On the other hand, while Weak Rule Utilitarianism retains a teleological nature it appears to collapse into Act Utilitarianism. The rules provide guidelines that can be broken and given that the act utilitarian can also offer \u201crules of thumb\u201d against actions that tend not to produce maximum goodness or utility in general, such as killing healthy patients, it is not clear where this version of Rule Utilitarianism gains a unique identity. In what cases would Act Utilitarianism and Weak Rule Utilitarianism actually provide different moral guidance? This is something you should consider in light of your own examples or previous examples in this chapter. (Mark Dimmock and Andrew Fisher, Ethics for A-Level<\/em>. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers)<\/p>\n

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Taking it to the Streets…<\/strong><\/p>\n

Ask five people: Is being happy the greatest good a human can experience? Why or why not? Do you believe we have a moral duty to be as happy as possible? Do we have a moral duty to promote societal happiness? Why or why not?<\/p>\n

What commonalities do you notice among the responses? Which response stands out to you as the strongest? Which response is the weakest?<\/p>\n

In the following excerpt, does Mill offer a better way than Bentham to solve the Trolley Problem?<\/p>\n

Excerpts from John Stuart Mill’s \u00a0Utilitarianism<\/em><\/p>\n<\/div>\n

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In what follows,<\/p>\n<\/header>\n

consider to what extent Mill agreed with Bentham and to what extent he diverged from his predecessor.<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

 <\/p>\n

Chapter 2: What Utilitarianism Is<\/strong><\/p>\n

\u2026The creed which accepts as the foundation of morals, Utility, or the Greatest Happiness Principle, holds that actions are right in proportion as they tend to promote happiness, wrong as they tend to produce the reverse of happiness. By happiness is intended pleasure, and the absence of pain, by unhappiness, pain, and the privation of pleasure. To give a clear view of the moral standard set up by the theory, much more requires to be said; in particular, what things it includes in the ideas of pain and pleasure; and to what extent this is left an open question. But these supplementary explanations do not affect the theory of life on which this theory of morality is grounded- namely, that pleasure, and freedom from pain, are the only things desirable as ends; and that all desirable things (which are as numerous in the utilitarian as in any other scheme) are desirable either for the pleasure inherent in themselves, or as means to the promotion of pleasure and the prevention of pain.<\/p>\n

Now, such a theory of life excites in many minds, and among them in some of the most estimable in feeling and purpose, inveterate dislike. To suppose that life has (as they express it) no higher end than pleasure- no better and nobler object of desire and pursuit they designate as utterly mean and groveling; as a doctrine worthy only of swine, to whom the followers of Epicurus were, at a very early period, contemptuously likened; and modern holders of the doctrine are occasionally made the subject of equally polite comparisons by its German, French, and English assailants.<\/p>\n

When thus attacked, the Epicureans have always answered, that it is not they, but their accusers, who represent human nature in a degrading light; since the accusation supposes human beings to be capable of no pleasures except those of which swine are capable. If this supposition were true, the charge could not be gainsaid, but would then be no longer an imputation; for if the sources of pleasure were precisely the same to human beings and to swine, the rule of life which is good enough for the one would be good enough for the other. The comparison of the Epicurean life to that of beasts is felt as degrading, precisely because a beast\u2019s pleasures do not satisfy a human being\u2019s conceptions of happiness. Human beings have faculties more elevated than the animal appetites, and when once made conscious of them, do not regard anything as happiness which does not include their gratification. I do not, indeed, consider the Epicureans to have been by any means faultless in drawing out their scheme of consequences from the utilitarian principle. To do this in any sufficient manner, many Stoic, as well as Christian elements require to be included. But there is no known Epicurean theory of life that does not assign to the pleasures of the intellect, of the feelings and imagination, and of the moral sentiments, a much higher value as pleasures than to those of mere sensation. It must be admitted, however, that utilitarian writers in general have placed the superiority of mental over bodily pleasures chiefly in the greater permanency, safety, uncostliness, etc., of the former- that is, in their circumstantial advantages rather than in their intrinsic nature. And on all these points Utilitarians have fully proved their case; but they might have taken the other, and, as it may be called, higher ground, with entire consistency. It is quite compatible with the principle of utility to recognize the fact, that some kinds of pleasure are more desirable and more valuable than others. It would be absurd that while, in estimating all other things, quality is considered as well as quantity, the estimation of pleasures should be supposed to depend on quantity alone.<\/p>\n

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Ponder if you will\u2026.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/header>\n

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We have seen that Epicurus was an ancient hedonist who taught that humans ought to seek to live a tranquil life by doing everything possible to avoid pain and augment pleasure. His philosophy is practiced by some still today.<\/p>\n

Can you think of forms of happiness higher than physical pleasures like tasting good food, lying on a beach, or sleeping in? Is Epicurus right, are these the highest good for us?<\/p>\n

Or is Mill correct by saying that even animals can experience these things, but for humans, there are higher forms of pleasure or happiness that no animals can access?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

If I am asked, what I mean by difference of quality in pleasures, or what makes one pleasure more valuable than another, merely as a pleasure, except its being greater in amount, there is but one possible answer. Of two pleasures, if there be one to which all or almost all who have experience of both give a decided preference, irrespective of any feeling of moral obligation to prefer it, that is the more desirable pleasure. If one of the two is, by those who are competently acquainted with both, placed so far above the other that they prefer it, even though knowing it to be attended with a greater amount of discontent, and would not resign it for any quantity of the other pleasure which their nature is capable of, we are justified in ascribing to the preferred enjoyment a superiority in quality, so far outweighing quantity as to render it, in comparison, of small account.<\/p>\n

How does Mill establish that happiness is a higher aim than mere pleasure?<\/div>\n

Now it is an unquestionable fact that those who are equally acquainted with, and equally capable of appreciating and enjoying, both, do give a most marked preference to the manner of existence which employs their higher faculties. Few human creatures would consent to be changed into any of the lower animals, for a promise of the fullest allowance of a beast\u2019s pleasures; no intelligent human being would consent to be a fool, no instructed person would be an ignoramus, no person of feeling and conscience would be selfish and base, even though they should be persuaded that the fool, the dunce, or the rascal is better satisfied with his lot than they are with theirs. They would not resign what they possess more than he for the most complete satisfaction of all the desires which they have in common with him. If they ever fancy they would, it is only in cases of unhappiness so extreme, that to escape from it they would exchange their lot for almost any other, however undesirable in their own eyes. A being of higher faculties requires more to make him happy, is capable probably of more acute suffering, and certainly accessible to it at more points, than one of an inferior type; but in spite of these liabilities, he can never really wish to sink into what he feels to be a lower grade of existence. We may give what explanation we please of this unwillingness; we may attribute it to pride, a name which is given indiscriminately to some of the most and to some of the least estimable feelings of which mankind are capable: we may refer it to the love of liberty and personal independence, an appeal to which was with the Stoics one of the most effective means for the inculcation of it; to the love of power, or to the love of excitement, both of which do really enter into and contribute to it: but its most appropriate appellation is a sense of dignity, which all human beings possess in one form or other, and in some, though by no means in exact, proportion to their higher faculties, and which is so essential a part of the happiness of those in whom it is strong, that nothing which conflicts with it could be, otherwise than momentarily, an object of desire to them.<\/p>\n

Whoever supposes that this preference takes place at a sacrifice of happiness- that the superior being, in anything like equal circumstances, is not happier than the inferior- confounds the two very different ideas, of happiness, and content. It is indisputable that the being whose capacities of enjoyment are low, has the greatest chance of having them fully satisfied; and a highly endowed being will always feel that any happiness which he can look for, as the world is constituted, is imperfect. But he can learn to bear its imperfections, if they are at all bearable; and they will not make him envy the being who is indeed unconscious of the imperfections, but only because he feels not at all the good which those imperfections qualify. It is better to be a human being dissatisfied than a pig satisfied; better to be Socrates dissatisfied than a fool satisfied. And if the fool, or the pig, are of a different opinion, it is because they only know their own side of the question. The other party to the comparison knows both sides.<\/p>\n

How does Mill anticipate and counter objections to his position on the superiority of happiness over pleasure?<\/div>\n

It may be objected, that many who are capable of the higher pleasures, occasionally, under the influence of temptation, postpone them to the lower. But this is quite compatible with a full appreciation of the intrinsic superiority of the higher. Men often, from infirmity of character, make their election for the nearer good, though they know it to be the less valuable; and this no less when the choice is between two bodily pleasures, than when it is between bodily and mental. They pursue sensual indulgences to the injury of health, though perfectly aware that health is the greater good.<\/p>\n

It may be further objected, that many who begin with youthful enthusiasm for everything noble, as they advance in years sink into indolence and selfishness. But I do not believe that those who undergo this very common change, voluntarily choose the lower description of pleasures in preference to the higher. I believe that before they devote themselves exclusively to the one, they have already become incapable of the other. Capacity for the nobler feelings is in most natures a very tender plant, easily killed, not only by hostile influences, but by mere want of sustenance; and in the majority of young persons it speedily dies away if the occupations to which their position in life has devoted them, and the society into which it has thrown them, are not favorable to keeping that higher capacity in exercise. Men lose their high aspirations as they lose their intellectual tastes, because they have not time or opportunity for indulging them; and they addict themselves to inferior pleasures, not because they deliberately prefer them, but because they are either the only ones to which they have access, or the only ones which they are any longer capable of enjoying. It may be questioned whether anyone who has remained equally susceptible to both classes of pleasures, ever knowingly and calmly preferred the lower; though many, in all ages, have broken down in an ineffectual attempt to combine both.<\/p>\n

What is the role of \u201ccompetent judges\u201d in evaluating the superiority of happiness?<\/div>\n

From this verdict of the only competent judges, I apprehend there can be no appeal. On a question which is the best worth having of two pleasures, or which of two modes of existence is the most grateful to the feelings, apart from its moral attributes and from its consequences, the judgment of those who are qualified by knowledge of both, or, if they differ, that of the majority among them, must be admitted as final. And there needs be the less hesitation to accept this judgment respecting the quality of pleasures, since there is no other tribunal to be referred to even on the question of quantity. What means are there of determining which is the acutest of two pains, or the intensest of two pleasurable sensations, except the general suffrage of those who are familiar with both? Neither pains nor pleasures are homogeneous, and pain is always heterogeneous with pleasure. What is there to decide whether a particular pleasure is worth purchasing at the cost of a particular pain, except the feelings and judgment of the experienced? When, therefore, those feelings and judgment declare the pleasures derived from the higher faculties to be preferable in kind, apart from the question of intensity, to those of which the animal nature, disjoined from the higher faculties, is susceptible, they are entitled on this subject to the same regard.<\/p>\n

Note here how Mill stresses the principle of the greatest good for the most people.<\/p>\n

I have dwelt on this point, as being a necessary part of a perfectly just conception of Utility or Happiness, considered as the directive rule of human conduct. But it is by no means an indispensable condition to the acceptance of the utilitarian standard; for that standard is not the agent\u2019s own greatest happiness, but the greatest amount of happiness altogether; and if it may possibly be doubted whether noble character is always the happier for its nobleness, there can be no doubt that it makes other people happier, and that the world in general is immensely a gainer by it. Utilitarianism, therefore, could only attain its end by the general cultivation of nobleness of character, even if each individual were only benefited by the nobleness of others, and his own, so far as happiness is concerned, were a sheer deduction from the benefit. But the bare enunciation of such an absurdity as this last, renders refutation superfluous.<\/p>\n

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\n

Ponder if you will\u2026.<\/em><\/p>\n<\/header>\n

\n

Many people today believe that animals are part of the \u201csentient creation\u201d that Mill mentions here and as a result, should be recipients of the Greater Happiness Principle. After reading this paragraph, do you think Mill would agree with them? Why or why not?<\/p>\n

What is your opinion? Is there a moral duty to maximize animals\u2019 pleasure? Why or why not?<\/p>\n

What does your opinion infer about the consuming of animals for food or clothing?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

According to the Greatest Happiness Principle, as above explained, the ultimate end, with reference to and for the sake of which all other things are desirable (whether we are considering our own good or that of other people), is an existence exempt as far as possible from pain, and as rich as possible in enjoyments, both in point of quantity and quality; the test of quality, and the rule for measuring it against quantity, being the preference felt by those who in their opportunities of experience, to which must be added their habits of self-consciousness and self- observation, are best furnished with the means of comparison. This, being, according to the utilitarian opinion, the end of human action, is necessarily also the standard of morality; which may accordingly be defined, the rules and precepts for human conduct, by the observance of which an existence such as has been described might be, to the greatest extent possible, secured to all mankind; and not to them only, but, so far as the nature of things admits, to the whole sentient creation.<\/p>\n

\u2026I must again repeat, what the assailants of utilitarianism seldom have the justice to acknowledge, that the happiness which forms the utilitarian standard of what is right in conduct, is not the agent\u2019s own happiness, but that of all concerned. As between his own happiness and that of others, utilitarianism requires him to be as strictly impartial as a disinterested and benevolent spectator. In the golden rule of Jesus of Nazareth, we read the complete spirit of the ethics of utility. To do as you would be done by, and to love your neighbor as yourself, constitute the ideal perfection of utilitarian morality. As the means of making the nearest approach to this ideal, utility would enjoin, first, that laws and social arrangements should place the happiness, or (as speaking practically it may be called) the interest, of every individual, as nearly as possible in harmony with the interest of the whole; and secondly, that education and opinion, which have so vast a power over human character, should so use that power as to establish in the mind of every individual an indissoluble association between his own happiness and the good of the whole; especially between his own happiness and the practice of such modes of conduct, negative and positive, as regard for the universal happiness prescribes; so that not only he may be unable to conceive the possibility of happiness to himself, consistently with conduct opposed to the general good, but also that a direct impulse to promote the general good may be in every individual one of the habitual motives of action, and the sentiments connected therewith may fill a large and prominent place in every human being\u2019s sentient existence. If the impugners of the utilitarian morality represented it to their own minds in this its, true character, I know not what recommendation possessed by any other morality they could possibly affirm to be wanting to it; what more beautiful or more exalted developments of human nature any other ethical system can be supposed to foster, or what springs of action, not accessible to the utilitarian, such systems rely on for giving effect to their mandates\u2026.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":29,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-698","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":917,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/698","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/698\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1185,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/698\/revisions\/1185"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/917"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/698\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=698"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=698"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=698"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=698"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}