{"id":673,"date":"2025-03-13T18:56:36","date_gmt":"2025-03-13T18:56:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/6-2-the-social-contract\/"},"modified":"2025-03-31T22:38:17","modified_gmt":"2025-03-31T22:38:17","slug":"6-2-the-social-contract","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/6-2-the-social-contract\/","title":{"raw":"6.2\u00a0The Social Contract","rendered":"6.2\u00a0The Social Contract"},"content":{"raw":"<div class=\"6.2\u00a0the-social-contract\">\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"><em class=\"import-Emphasis\">For Hobbes,<\/em><em>\u00a0<\/em>as for other advocates of Social Contract Theory, the big problem of a life without binding moral rules is that cooperation between individuals is impossible. If I have no reason to keep my promises to you, then, should I be tempted to not deliver what I have promised to deliver, I won\u2019t bother. If I have no reason not to respect your property when I am able to take it for myself, I will just take it. If there is no reason why I should avoid endangering your well-being, when it is to my advantage to do so, I won\u2019t pay any attention to whether my actions hurt or even kill you. Since, however, it is just these failings that would make life in a state of nature unbearable to all of us, it seems like these are the kind of things we\u2019d all be willing to create rules against. Since not keeping promises, stealing and recklessly endangering others are what we\u2019d most like to escape from in a state of nature, then these are the kinds of things that our moral rules should forbid. Entering a social contract is then just agreeing to abide by a certain set of rules that we can all accept such as agreeing to keep our promises, to tell the truth to each other, not to steal from each other, or endanger each other\u2019s lives for no good reason. These are all the things each of us wants, so these are the kinds of rules we would all accept. And we should all be willing to give up our freedom to violate these rules, because otherwise life would be unbearable for us all.\u00a0 This suggests an argument for Social Contract Theory.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>Life would be unbearable without moral rules.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>So, we have a strong interest in developing and following a set of moral rules.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Hence moral rules are a product of human choices and are grounded in our common self-interest in creating and preserving social order.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">Social rules,\u00a0according to this argument, are thus thoroughly conventional rules that are based on mutual self-interest. They are not based on human nature, God\u2019s commands or the dictates of some cultural tradition or other. Instead, they are put in place to allow us to live together, to engage in cooperative tasks, to own property, and to be assured that others will not infringe on our basic needs. The rules, once enacted, create legally enforceable rights and duties and enable us to depart from the chaos of the state of nature once and for all. Or so it seems at least.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div class=\"6.2\u00a0the-social-contract\">\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\"><em class=\"import-Emphasis\">For Hobbes,<\/em><em>\u00a0<\/em>as for other advocates of Social Contract Theory, the big problem of a life without binding moral rules is that cooperation between individuals is impossible. If I have no reason to keep my promises to you, then, should I be tempted to not deliver what I have promised to deliver, I won\u2019t bother. If I have no reason not to respect your property when I am able to take it for myself, I will just take it. If there is no reason why I should avoid endangering your well-being, when it is to my advantage to do so, I won\u2019t pay any attention to whether my actions hurt or even kill you. Since, however, it is just these failings that would make life in a state of nature unbearable to all of us, it seems like these are the kind of things we\u2019d all be willing to create rules against. Since not keeping promises, stealing and recklessly endangering others are what we\u2019d most like to escape from in a state of nature, then these are the kinds of things that our moral rules should forbid. Entering a social contract is then just agreeing to abide by a certain set of rules that we can all accept such as agreeing to keep our promises, to tell the truth to each other, not to steal from each other, or endanger each other\u2019s lives for no good reason. These are all the things each of us wants, so these are the kinds of rules we would all accept. And we should all be willing to give up our freedom to violate these rules, because otherwise life would be unbearable for us all.\u00a0 This suggests an argument for Social Contract Theory.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<ul>\n<li>Life would be unbearable without moral rules.<\/li>\n<li>So, we have a strong interest in developing and following a set of moral rules.<\/li>\n<li>Hence moral rules are a product of human choices and are grounded in our common self-interest in creating and preserving social order.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;\">Social rules,\u00a0according to this argument, are thus thoroughly conventional rules that are based on mutual self-interest. They are not based on human nature, God\u2019s commands or the dictates of some cultural tradition or other. Instead, they are put in place to allow us to live together, to engage in cooperative tasks, to own property, and to be assured that others will not infringe on our basic needs. The rules, once enacted, create legally enforceable rights and duties and enable us to depart from the chaos of the state of nature once and for all. Or so it seems at least.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":10,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-673","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":886,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/673","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/673\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1225,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/673\/revisions\/1225"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/886"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/673\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=673"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=673"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=673"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=673"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}