{"id":666,"date":"2025-03-13T18:56:35","date_gmt":"2025-03-13T18:56:35","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/5-3-religion-and-ethics-reconsidered\/"},"modified":"2025-03-31T22:34:43","modified_gmt":"2025-03-31T22:34:43","slug":"5-3-religion-and-ethics-reconsidered","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/chapter\/5-3-religion-and-ethics-reconsidered\/","title":{"raw":"5.3 Religion and Ethics Reconsidered","rendered":"5.3 Religion and Ethics Reconsidered"},"content":{"raw":"
\r\n

The conclusion\u00a0of this chapter can be stated simply enough: In spite of the fact that religion often\u00a0expresses\u00a0moral concerns, morality and ethics are\u00a0logically independent\u00a0of religion. As a result we can see why Divine Command Theory had to fail since it asserted the opposite, that without some connection to the divine, either directly or through a divinely ordered nature, ethics would be impossible. Note that this doesn\u2019t mean that in human cultural history religious conceptions of ethics have not come first. Nor is it intended to deny that religion can be a powerful way of teaching ethical principles as it is for many people. It is just intended to mean that revelation is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethics. It is not necessary because people can be ethical without any religious belief. And it is not sufficient because it is possible to have strong religious belief and yet be an awful person from a moral or ethical point of view.<\/p>\r\n

Perhaps the greatest philosophical challenge to Divine Command Theory, however, is the one set forth in Plato\u2019s dialogue Euthyphro<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\r\n

In this dialogue, Socrates meets Euthyphro on the porch of King Archon. Socrates tells him that he is preparing to go to court against the charges of\u00a0Meletus\u00a0on the grounds of\u00a0impiety. Euthyphro tells Socrates that he is going to court himself to prosecute his father for binding a worker in chains and leaving him to die. This has garnered him the ire of his own family who believes his father was in the right. The worker had killed a fellow worker and this they believe, exempts them from liability for leaving him bound in the ditch to starve to death. Since Euthyphro seems assured of himself, Socrates asks him to define piety. His help will clarify Socrates\u2019 case in the courtroom. If Socrates is asked to define piety, he can simply rely on Euthyphro\u2019s definition. This however leads to the main dilemma of the dialogue when the two cannot come to a satisfactory conclusion. Is something pious because God approves of it or does God approve of it because it is pious?<\/p>\r\n\r\n

An Excerpt from Plato's Euthyphro<\/em><\/h2>\r\n
\r\n

In what follows, consider:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n

\r\n
    \r\n \t
  • What is the key idea or term being debated in this dialogue?<\/li>\r\n \t
  • What is Euthyphro\u2019s first definition of the term?<\/li>\r\n \t
  • How does Socrates use questions to persuade Euthyphro this first definition is problematic?<\/li>\r\n \t
  • How does Euthyphro redefine the term?<\/li>\r\n \t
  • What problem does Socrates have with this redefinition?<\/li>\r\n \t
  • In the end, what do you think is the main question of this dialogue?<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n

    PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Euthyphro.<\/p>\r\n

    SCENE: The Porch of the King Archon.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: \u2026 I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offenses against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again\u2014is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting anyone who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime\u2014whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be\u2014that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others: \u2014of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods? \u2014and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety\u2014that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them; and notably, the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: I dare say, and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present, I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is 'piety'? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: And what I said was true, Socrates.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: There are.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea that made the impious \u201cimpious,\u201d and the pious \u201cpious\u201d?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: I remember.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of anyone else and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you if you like.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: I should very much like.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Of course.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: It was.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And well said?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: True.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Very true.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: To be sure.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you describe.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable: there would have been no quarrels among them if there had been no such differences\u2014would there now?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Very true.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,\u2014about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fighting among them.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Very true.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: True.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And upon this view, the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: So I should suppose.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear anyone arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defense.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: No; they do not.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Then they do not argue that the evildoer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evildoer is, and what he did and when?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: True.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And the gods are in the same case if as you assert, they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: That is true, Socrates, in the main.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: But they join issue about the particulars\u2014gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Quite true.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such a one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: It will be a difficult task, but I could make the matter very clear indeed to you.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: 'Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? For granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still, piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.' And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love is pious or holy, and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates?<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, is impious.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: We should enquire, and I believe that the statement will stand the test of inquiry.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. \u2026.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates?<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: Yes.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: True.<\/p>\r\n

    SOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case and that they are quite different from one another. For one (theophiles<\/em>) is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other (osion<\/em>) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus, you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence\u2014the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is impiety?<\/p>\r\n

    EUTHYPHRO: I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from us.<\/p>\r\n

    Here is the dilemma: if the gods (religions) all decide something is good because it is (already) good, then don\u2019t they lack the power to determine goodness, piety, and morality? However, if a thing becomes good because the gods (religions) declare it so, then the term \u201cgood\u201d becomes quite arbitrary and the gods would be free to call anything they wish good. For example, take the divine command \u201cHonor thy father and thy mother.\u201d Is this commandment good because God has decided it is good, or did God decide it is good because God recognized it as good? If the former, could not God just have as easily stated \u201cMurder thy father and thy mother\u201d and declared that good? If God is believed omnipotent (totally in control of everything), the divine command theorist would have to say yes, God has that power and freedom. However, doesn\u2019t this make goodness seem arbitrary, subject to the whim of a divine being? If, on the other hand, we choose the latter position, that gods (religions) declare things good because they are already good, and are only recognized as such by religions, then do we not limit the power of God to decide morality? Moreover, if the gods themselves appeal to some standard of goodness higher than their own opinions when recognizing something as good, then do we really need religion for morality, or could we ourselves determine and employ those same standards?<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"

    \n

    The conclusion\u00a0of this chapter can be stated simply enough: In spite of the fact that religion often\u00a0expresses\u00a0moral concerns, morality and ethics are\u00a0logically independent\u00a0of religion. As a result we can see why Divine Command Theory had to fail since it asserted the opposite, that without some connection to the divine, either directly or through a divinely ordered nature, ethics would be impossible. Note that this doesn\u2019t mean that in human cultural history religious conceptions of ethics have not come first. Nor is it intended to deny that religion can be a powerful way of teaching ethical principles as it is for many people. It is just intended to mean that revelation is neither necessary nor sufficient for ethics. It is not necessary because people can be ethical without any religious belief. And it is not sufficient because it is possible to have strong religious belief and yet be an awful person from a moral or ethical point of view.<\/p>\n

    Perhaps the greatest philosophical challenge to Divine Command Theory, however, is the one set forth in Plato\u2019s dialogue Euthyphro<\/em><\/strong>.<\/p>\n

    In this dialogue, Socrates meets Euthyphro on the porch of King Archon. Socrates tells him that he is preparing to go to court against the charges of\u00a0Meletus\u00a0on the grounds of\u00a0impiety. Euthyphro tells Socrates that he is going to court himself to prosecute his father for binding a worker in chains and leaving him to die. This has garnered him the ire of his own family who believes his father was in the right. The worker had killed a fellow worker and this they believe, exempts them from liability for leaving him bound in the ditch to starve to death. Since Euthyphro seems assured of himself, Socrates asks him to define piety. His help will clarify Socrates\u2019 case in the courtroom. If Socrates is asked to define piety, he can simply rely on Euthyphro\u2019s definition. This however leads to the main dilemma of the dialogue when the two cannot come to a satisfactory conclusion. Is something pious because God approves of it or does God approve of it because it is pious?<\/p>\n

    An Excerpt from Plato’s Euthyphro<\/em><\/h2>\n
    \n
    \n

    In what follows, consider:<\/p>\n<\/header>\n

    \n
      \n
    • What is the key idea or term being debated in this dialogue?<\/li>\n
    • What is Euthyphro\u2019s first definition of the term?<\/li>\n
    • How does Socrates use questions to persuade Euthyphro this first definition is problematic?<\/li>\n
    • How does Euthyphro redefine the term?<\/li>\n
    • What problem does Socrates have with this redefinition?<\/li>\n
    • In the end, what do you think is the main question of this dialogue?<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n

      PERSONS OF THE DIALOGUE: Socrates, Euthyphro.<\/p>\n

      SCENE: The Porch of the King Archon.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: \u2026 I adjure you to tell me the nature of piety and impiety, which you said that you knew so well, and of murder, and of other offenses against the gods. What are they? Is not piety in every action always the same? and impiety, again\u2014is it not always the opposite of piety, and also the same with itself, having, as impiety, one notion which includes whatever is impious?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: To be sure, Socrates.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And what is piety, and what is impiety?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Piety is doing as I am doing; that is to say, prosecuting anyone who is guilty of murder, sacrilege, or of any similar crime\u2014whether he be your father or mother, or whoever he may be\u2014that makes no difference; and not to prosecute them is impiety. And please consider, Socrates, what a notable proof I will give you of the truth of my words, a proof which I have already given to others: \u2014of the principle, I mean, that the impious, whoever he may be, ought not to go unpunished. For do not men regard Zeus as the best and most righteous of the gods? \u2014and yet they admit that he bound his father (Cronos) because he wickedly devoured his sons and that he too had punished his own father (Uranus) for a similar reason, in a nameless manner. And yet when I proceed against my father, they are angry with me. So inconsistent are they in their way of talking when the gods are concerned, and when I am concerned.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: May not this be the reason, Euthyphro, why I am charged with impiety\u2014that I cannot away with these stories about the gods? and therefore I suppose that people think me wrong. But, as you who are well informed about them approve of them, I cannot do better than assent to your superior wisdom. What else can I say, confessing as I do, that I know nothing about them? Tell me, for the love of Zeus, whether you really believe that they are true.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and things more wonderful still, of which the world is in ignorance.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And do you really believe that the gods fought with one another, and had dire quarrels, battles, and the like, as the poets say, and as you may see represented in the works of great artists? The temples are full of them; and notably, the robe of Athene, which is carried up to the Acropolis at the great Panathenaea, is embroidered with them. Are all these tales of the gods true, Euthyphro?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates; and, as I was saying, I can tell you, if you would like to hear them, many other things about the gods which would quite amaze you.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: I dare say, and you shall tell me them at some other time when I have leisure. But just at present, I would rather hear from you a more precise answer, which you have not as yet given, my friend, to the question, What is ‘piety’? When asked, you only replied, Doing as you do, charging your father with murder.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: And what I said was true, Socrates.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: No doubt, Euthyphro; but you would admit that there are many other pious acts?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: There are.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Remember that I did not ask you to give me two or three examples of piety, but to explain the general idea which makes all pious things to be pious. Do you not recollect that there was one idea that made the impious \u201cimpious,\u201d and the pious \u201cpious\u201d?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: I remember.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Tell me what is the nature of this idea, and then I shall have a standard to which I may look, and by which I may measure actions, whether yours or those of anyone else and then I shall be able to say that such and such an action is pious, such another impious.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: I will tell you if you like.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: I should very much like.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Piety, then, is that which is dear to the gods, and impiety is that which is not dear to them.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Very good, Euthyphro; you have now given me the sort of answer which I wanted. But whether what you say is true or not I cannot as yet tell, although I make no doubt that you will prove the truth of your words.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Of course.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Come, then, and let us examine what we are saying. That thing or person which is dear to the gods is pious, and that thing or person which is hateful to the gods is impious, these two being the extreme opposites of one another. Was not that said?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: It was.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And well said?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, I thought so; it was certainly said.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And further, Euthyphro, the gods were admitted to have enmities and hatreds and differences?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes, that was also said.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And what sort of difference creates enmity and anger? Suppose for example that you and I, my good friend, differ about a number; do differences of this sort make us enemies and set us at variance with one another? Do we not go at once to arithmetic, and put an end to them by a sum?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: True.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Or suppose that we differ about magnitudes, do we not quickly end the differences by measuring?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Very true.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And we end a controversy about heavy and light by resorting to a weighing machine?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: To be sure.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: But what differences are there which cannot be thus decided, and which therefore make us angry and set us at enmity with one another? I dare say the answer does not occur to you at the moment, and therefore I will suggest that these enmities arise when the matters of difference are just and unjust, good and evil, honorable and dishonorable. Are not these the points about which men differ, and about which when we are unable satisfactorily to decide our differences, you and I and all of us quarrel, when we do quarrel?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, the nature of the differences about which we quarrel is such as you describe.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And the quarrels of the gods, noble Euthyphro, when they occur, are of a like nature?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Certainly they are.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: They have differences of opinion, as you say, about good and evil, just and unjust, honorable and dishonorable: there would have been no quarrels among them if there had been no such differences\u2014would there now?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: You are quite right.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Does not every man love that which he deems noble and just and good, and hate the opposite of them?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Very true.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: But, as you say, people regard the same things, some as just and others as unjust,\u2014about these they dispute; and so there arise wars and fighting among them.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Very true.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Then the same things are hated by the gods and loved by the gods, and are both hateful and dear to them?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: True.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And upon this view, the same things, Euthyphro, will be pious and also impious?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: So I should suppose.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Then, my friend, I remark with surprise that you have not answered the question which I asked. For I certainly did not ask you to tell me what action is both pious and impious: but now it would seem that what is loved by the gods is also hated by them. And therefore, Euthyphro, in thus chastising your father you may very likely be doing what is agreeable to Zeus but disagreeable to Cronos or Uranus, and what is acceptable to Hephaestus but unacceptable to Here, and there may be other gods who have similar differences of opinion.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: But I believe, Socrates, that all the gods would be agreed as to the propriety of punishing a murderer: there would be no difference of opinion about that.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Well, but speaking of men, Euthyphro, did you ever hear anyone arguing that a murderer or any sort of evil-doer ought to be let off?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: I should rather say that these are the questions which they are always arguing, especially in courts of law: they commit all sorts of crimes, and there is nothing which they will not do or say in their own defense.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: But do they admit their guilt, Euthyphro, and yet say that they ought not to be punished?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: No; they do not.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Then there are some things which they do not venture to say and do: for they do not venture to argue that the guilty are to be unpunished, but they deny their guilt, do they not?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Then they do not argue that the evildoer should not be punished, but they argue about the fact of who the evildoer is, and what he did and when?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: True.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And the gods are in the same case if as you assert, they quarrel about just and unjust, and some of them say while others deny that injustice is done among them. For surely neither God nor man will ever venture to say that the doer of injustice is not to be punished?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: That is true, Socrates, in the main.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: But they join issue about the particulars\u2014gods and men alike; and, if they dispute at all, they dispute about some act which is called in question, and which by some is affirmed to be just, by others to be unjust. Is not that true?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Quite true.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Well then, my dear friend Euthyphro, do tell me, for my better instruction and information, what proof have you that in the opinion of all the gods a servant who is guilty of murder, and is put in chains by the master of the dead man, and dies because he is put in chains before he who bound him can learn from the interpreters of the gods what he ought to do with him, dies unjustly; and that on behalf of such a one a son ought to proceed against his father and accuse him of murder. How would you show that all the gods absolutely agree in approving of his act? Prove to me that they do, and I will applaud your wisdom as long as I live.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: It will be a difficult task, but I could make the matter very clear indeed to you.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: I understand; you mean to say that I am not so quick of apprehension as the judges: for to them you will be sure to prove that the act is unjust, and hateful to the gods.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes indeed, Socrates; at least if they will listen to me.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: But they will be sure to listen if they find that you are a good speaker. There was a notion that came into my mind while you were speaking; I said to myself: ‘Well, and what if Euthyphro does prove to me that all the gods regarded the death of the serf as unjust, how do I know anything more of the nature of piety and impiety? For granting that this action may be hateful to the gods, still, piety and impiety are not adequately defined by these distinctions, for that which is hateful to the gods has been shown to be also pleasing and dear to them.’ And therefore, Euthyphro, I do not ask you to prove this; I will suppose if you like, that all the gods condemn and abominate such an action. But I will amend the definition so far as to say that what all the gods hate is impious, and what they love is pious or holy, and what some of them love and others hate is both or neither. Shall this be our definition of piety and impiety?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Why not, Socrates?<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Why not! certainly, as far as I am concerned, Euthyphro, there is no reason why not. But whether this admission will greatly assist you in the task of instructing me as you promised, is a matter for you to consider.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I should say that what all the gods love is pious and holy, and the opposite which they all hate, is impious.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Ought we to enquire into the truth of this, Euthyphro, or simply to accept the mere statement on our own authority and that of others? What do you say?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: We should enquire, and I believe that the statement will stand the test of inquiry.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: We shall know better, my good friend, in a little while. \u2026.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety, according to your definition, loved by all the gods?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy, nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two different things.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates?<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: Yes.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: True.<\/p>\n

      SOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see that the reverse is the case and that they are quite different from one another. For one (theophiles<\/em>) is of a kind to be loved because it is loved, and the other (osion<\/em>) is loved because it is of a kind to be loved. Thus, you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the essence\u2014the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not (for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is impiety?<\/p>\n

      EUTHYPHRO: I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean. For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them, seem to turn round and walk away from us.<\/p>\n

      Here is the dilemma: if the gods (religions) all decide something is good because it is (already) good, then don\u2019t they lack the power to determine goodness, piety, and morality? However, if a thing becomes good because the gods (religions) declare it so, then the term \u201cgood\u201d becomes quite arbitrary and the gods would be free to call anything they wish good. For example, take the divine command \u201cHonor thy father and thy mother.\u201d Is this commandment good because God has decided it is good, or did God decide it is good because God recognized it as good? If the former, could not God just have as easily stated \u201cMurder thy father and thy mother\u201d and declared that good? If God is believed omnipotent (totally in control of everything), the divine command theorist would have to say yes, God has that power and freedom. However, doesn\u2019t this make goodness seem arbitrary, subject to the whim of a divine being? If, on the other hand, we choose the latter position, that gods (religions) declare things good because they are already good, and are only recognized as such by religions, then do we not limit the power of God to decide morality? Moreover, if the gods themselves appeal to some standard of goodness higher than their own opinions when recognizing something as good, then do we really need religion for morality, or could we ourselves determine and employ those same standards?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":5,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-666","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":874,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/666","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/666\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":1224,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/666\/revisions\/1224"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/874"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/666\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=666"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=666"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=666"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppscphi1012ethics\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=666"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}