{"id":280,"date":"2023-03-13T17:35:28","date_gmt":"2023-03-13T17:35:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/chapter\/module-6-7\/"},"modified":"2023-04-28T20:35:29","modified_gmt":"2023-04-28T20:35:29","slug":"module-6-7","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/chapter\/module-6-7\/","title":{"raw":"6.7 The New Right","rendered":"6.7 The New Right"},"content":{"raw":"<div class=\"container\">\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"700\"]<img class=\"responsive\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/The_Reagans_waving_from_the_limousine_during_the_Inaugural_Parade_1981.jpg#fixme\" alt=\"onald Reagan and his wife, Nancy Reagan, wave from a limousine during the inaugural parade in Washington, D.C., in 1981\" width=\"700\" height=\"553\" \/> Ronald Reagan secured the presidency by appealing to the growing conservatism of much of the country. Here, Ronald Reagan and his wife, Nancy Reagan, wave from a limousine during the inaugural parade in Washington, D.C., in 1981. <a href=\"http:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:The_Reagans_waving_from_the_limousine_during_the_Inaugural_Parade_1981.jpg\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Wikimedia<\/a>.[\/caption]\r\n<p id=\"KC1\">In his first inaugural address Reagan proclaimed that \u201cgovernment is not the solution to the problem, government is the problem.\u201d<a href=\"#Sup1\"><sup id=\"1\">1<\/sup><\/a> In reality, Reagan focused less on eliminating government than on redirecting government to serve new ends. In line with that goal, his administration embraced supply-side economic theories that had recently gained popularity among the New Right. While the postwar gospel of Keynesian economics had focused on stimulating consumer demand, supply-side economics held that lower personal and corporate tax rates would encourage greater private investment and production. Supply-side advocates promised that the resulting wealth would reach\u2014or \u201ctrickle down\u201d to, in the words of critics\u2014lower-income groups through job creation and higher wages. Conservative economist Arthur Laffer predicted that lower tax rates would generate so much economic activity that federal tax revenues would actually increase. The administration touted the so-called Laffer Curve as justification for the tax cut plan that served as the cornerstone of Reagan\u2019s first year in office. Republican congressman Jack Kemp, an early supply-side advocate and co-sponsor of Reagan\u2019s tax bill, promised that it would unleash the \u201ccreative genius that has always invigorated America.\u201d<a href=\"#Sup2\"><sup id=\"2\">2<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"700\"]<img class=\"responsive\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/DF-SN-82-06759.jpg#fixme\" alt=\"This group photograph shows the former hostages in the hospital in 1981 before being released back to the United States\" width=\"700\" height=\"467\" \/> The Iranian hostage crisis ended literally during President Reagan\u2019s inauguration speech. The Reagan administration received credit for bringing the hostages home. This group photograph shows the former hostages in the hospital in 1981 before being released back to the United States. <a href=\"http:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:DF-SN-82-06759.jpg\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Wikimedia<\/a>.[\/caption]\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\nThe tax cut faced early skepticism from Democrats and even some Republicans. Vice president George H. W. Bush had belittled supply-side theory as \u201cvoodoo economics\u201d during the 1980 Republican primaries.<a href=\"#Sup3\"><sup id=\"3\">3<\/sup><\/a> But a combination of skill and serendipity pushed the bill over the top. Reagan aggressively and effectively lobbied individual members of Congress for support on the measure. Then on March 30, 1981, Reagan survived an assassination attempt by a mentally unstable young man named John Hinckley. Public support swelled for the hospitalized president. Congress ultimately approved a $675 billion tax cut in July 1981 with significant Democratic support. The bill reduced overall federal taxes by more than one quarter and lowered the top marginal rate from 70 percent to 50 percent, with the bottom rate dropping from 14 percent to 11 percent. It also slashed the rate on capital gains from 28 percent to 20 percent.<a href=\"#Sup4\"><sup id=\"4\">4<\/sup><\/a> The next month, Reagan scored another political triumph in response to a strike called by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO). During the 1980 campaign, Reagan had wooed organized labor, describing himself as \u201can old union man\u201d (he had led the Screen Actors Guild from 1947 to 1952) who still held Franklin Roosevelt in high regard.<a href=\"#Sup5\"><sup id=\"5\">5<\/sup><\/a> PATCO had been one of the few labor unions to endorse Reagan. Nevertheless, the president ordered the union\u2019s striking air traffic controllers back to work and fired more than eleven thousand who refused. Reagan\u2019s actions crippled PATCO and left the American labor movement reeling. For the rest of the 1980s the economic terrain of the United States\u2014already unfavorable to union organizing\u2014shifted decisively in favor of employers. The unionized portion of the private-sector workforce fell from 20 percent in 1980 to 12 percent in 1990. <a href=\"#Sup6\"><sup id=\"6\">6<\/sup><\/a> Reagan\u2019s tax bill and the defeat of PATCO not only enhanced the economic power of corporations and high-income households, they confirmed that a new conservative age had dawned in American life.\r\n\r\nThe new administration appeared to be flying high in the fall of 1981, but developments challenged the rosy economic forecasts emanating from the White House. As Reagan ratcheted up tension with the Soviet Union, Congress approved his request for $1.2 trillion in new military spending.<a href=\"#Sup7\"><sup id=\"7\">7<\/sup><\/a> The combination of lower taxes and higher defense budgets caused the national debt to balloon. By the end of Reagan\u2019s first term it equaled 53 percent of GDP, as opposed to 33 percent in 1981.<a href=\"#Sup8\"><sup id=\"8\">8<\/sup><\/a> The increase was staggering, especially for an administration that had promised to curb spending. Meanwhile, Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker continued his policy from the Carter years of combating inflation by maintaining high interest rates, which surpassed 20 percent in June 1981.<a href=\"#Sup9\"><sup id=\"9\">9<\/sup><\/a> The Fed\u2019s action increased the cost of borrowing money and stifled economic activity.\r\n\r\nAs a result, the United States experienced a severe economic recession in 1981 and 1982. Unemployment rose to nearly 11 percent, the highest figure since the Great Depression.<a href=\"#Sup10\"><sup id=\"10\">10<\/sup><\/a> Reductions in social welfare spending heightened the impact of the recession on ordinary people. Congress had followed Reagan\u2019s lead by reducing funding for food stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children and removed a half million people from the Supplemental Social Security program for the physically disabled.<a href=\"#Sup11\"><sup id=\"11\">11<\/sup><\/a> The cuts exacted an especially harsh toll on low-income communities of color. The head of the NAACP declared that the administration\u2019s budget cuts had rekindled \u201cwar, pestilence, famine, and death.\u201d<a href=\"#Sup12\"><sup id=\"12\">12<\/sup><\/a> Reagan also received bipartisan rebuke in 1981 after proposing cuts to social security benefits for early retirees. The Senate voted unanimously to condemn the plan, and Democrats framed it as a heartless attack on the elderly. Confronted with recession and harsh public criticism, a chastened White House worked with Democratic House Speaker Tip O\u2019Neill in 1982 on a bill that restored $98 billion of the previous year\u2019s tax cuts.<a href=\"#Sup13\"><sup id=\"13\">13<\/sup><\/a> Despite compromising with the administration on taxes, Democrats railed against the so-called Reagan Recession, arguing that the president\u2019s economic policies favored the most fortunate Americans. This appeal, which Democrats termed the \u201cfairness issue,\u201d helped them win twenty-six House seats in the autumn congressional races.<a href=\"#Sup14\"><sup id=\"14\">14<\/sup><\/a> The New Right appeared to be in trouble.\r\n<h2>Morning in America<\/h2>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"700\"]<img class=\"responsive\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/President-Reagan-in-Minneapolis-19821.jpg#fixme\" alt=\"President Ronald Reagan, a master of the photo op, appears here with a row of American flags at his back at a 1982 rally for Senator David Durenberger in Minneapolis, Minnesota.\" width=\"700\" height=\"393\" \/> President Ronald Reagan, a master of the photo op, appears here with a row of American flags at his back at a 1982 rally for Senator David Durenberger in Minneapolis, Minnesota. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.americanyawp.com\/text\/wp-content\/uploads\/President-Reagan-in-Minneapolis-19821.jpg\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">National Archives<\/a>.[\/caption]\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\nReagan nimbly adjusted to the political setbacks of 1982. Following the rejection of his social security proposals, Reagan appointed a bipartisan panel to consider changes to the program. In early 1983, the commission recommended a onetime delay in cost-of-living increases, a new requirement that government employees pay into the system, and a gradual increase in the retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-seven. The commission also proposed raising state and federal payroll taxes, with the new revenue poured into a trust fund that would transform social security from a pay-as-you-go system to one with significant reserves.<a href=\"#Sup15\"><sup id=\"15\">15<\/sup><\/a>Congress quickly passed the recommendations into law, allowing Reagan to take credit for strengthening a program cherished by most Americans. The president also benefited from an economic rebound. Real disposable income rose 2.5 percent in 1983 and 5.8 percent the following year.<a href=\"#Sup16\"><sup id=\"16\">16<\/sup><\/a>Unemployment dropped to 7.5 percent in 1984.<a href=\"#Sup17\"><sup id=\"17\">17<\/sup><\/a> Meanwhile, the \u201charsh medicine\u201d of high interest rates helped reduce inflation to 3.5 percent.<a href=\"#Sup18\"><sup id=\"18\">18<\/sup><\/a> While campaigning for reelection in 1984, Reagan pointed to the improving economy as evidence that it was \u201cmorning again in America.\u201d<a href=\"#Sup19\"><sup id=\"19\">19<\/sup><\/a> His personal popularity soared. Most conservatives ignored the debt increase and tax hikes of the previous two years and rallied around the president.\r\n\r\nThe Democratic Party, on other hand, stood at an ideological crossroads in 1984. The favorite to win the party\u2019s nomination was Walter Mondale, a staunch ally of organized labor and the civil rights movement as a senator during the 1960s and 1970s. He later served as Jimmy Carter\u2019s vice president. Mondale\u2019s chief rivals were civil rights activist Jesse Jackson and Colorado senator Gary Hart, one of the young Democrats elected to Congress in 1974 following Nixon\u2019s downfall. Hart and other \u201cWatergate babies\u201d still identified themselves as liberals but rejected their party\u2019s faith in activist government and embraced market-based approaches to policy issues. In so doing, they conceded significant political ground to supply-siders and conservative opponents of the welfare state. Many Democrats, however, were not prepared to abandon their New Deal heritage, and so the ideological tension within the party played out in the 1984 primary campaign. Jackson offered a largely progressive program but won only two states. Hart\u2019s platform\u2014economically moderate but socially liberal\u2014inverted the political formula of Mondale\u2019s New Deal\u2013style liberalism. Throughout the primaries, Hart contrasted his \u201cnew ideas\u201d with Mondale\u2019s \u201cold-fashioned\u201d politics. Mondale eventually secured his party\u2019s nomination but suffered a crushing defeat in the general election. Reagan captured forty-nine of fifty states, winning 58.8 percent of the popular vote.<a href=\"#Sup20\"><sup id=\"20\">20<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\nMondale\u2019s loss seemed to confirm that the new breed of moderate Democrats better understood the mood of the American people. The future of the party belonged to post\u2013New Deal liberals like Hart and to the constituency that supported him in the primaries: upwardly mobile, white professionals and suburbanites. In February 1985, a group of centrists formed the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) as a vehicle for distancing the party from organized labor and Keynesian economics while cultivating the business community. Jesse Jackson dismissed the DLC as \u201cDemocrats for the Leisure Class,\u201d but the organization included many of the party\u2019s future leaders, including Arkansas governor Bill Clinton.<a href=\"#Sup21\"><sup id=\"21\">21<\/sup><\/a> The formation of the DLC illustrated the degree to which to the New Right had transformed American politics: New Democrats looked a lot like old Republicans.\r\n\r\nReagan entered his second term with a much stronger mandate than in 1981, but the Grand Old Party (GOP) makeover of Washington, D.C., stalled. The Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1986, and Democratic opposition prevented Reagan from eliminating means-tested social welfare programs, although Congress failed to increase benefit levels for welfare programs or raise the minimum wage, decreasing the real value of those benefits. Democrats and Republicans occasionally fashioned legislative compromises, as with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The bill lowered the top corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent and reduced the highest marginal income tax rate from 50 percent to 28 percent, while also simplifying the tax code and eliminating numerous loopholes.<a href=\"#Sup22\"><sup id=\"22\">22<\/sup><\/a> The steep cuts to the corporate and individual rates certainly benefited wealthy individuals, but the legislation made virtually no net change to federal revenues. In 1986, Reagan also signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act. American policy makers hoped to do two things: deal with the millions of undocumented immigrants already in the United States while simultaneously choking off future unsanctioned migration. The former goal was achieved (nearly three million undocumented workers received legal status) but the latter proved elusive.\r\n\r\nOne of Reagan\u2019s most far-reaching victories occurred through judicial appointments. He named 368 district and federal appeals court judges during his two terms.<a href=\"#Sup23\"><sup id=\"23\">23<\/sup><\/a> Observers noted that almost all of the appointees were white men. (Seven were African American, fifteen were Latino, and two were Asian American.) Reagan also appointed three Supreme Court justices: Sandra Day O\u2019Connor, who to the dismay of the religious right turned out to be a moderate; Anthony Kennedy, a solidly conservative Catholic who occasionally sided with the court\u2019s liberal wing; and archconservative Antonin Scalia. The New Right\u2019s transformation of the judiciary had limits. In 1987, Reagan nominated Robert Bork to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Bork, a federal judge and former Yale University law professor, was a staunch conservative. He had opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, affirmative action, and the Roe v. Wade decision. After acrimonious confirmation hearings, the Senate rejected Bork\u2019s nomination by a vote of 58\u201342.<a href=\"#Sup24\"><sup id=\"24\">24<\/sup><\/a>\r\n<h4>Notes<\/h4>\r\n<ol>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup1\">Ronald Reagan, quoted in Meg Jacobs and Julian Zelizer, <em>Conservatives in Power: The Reagan Years, 1981\u20131989: A Brief History with Documents <\/em>(Boston: Bedford St. Martin\u2019s, 2011), 20. <a href=\"#1\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup2\">Jack Kemp, quoted in Jacobs and Zelizer, <em>Conservatives in Power<\/em>, 21. <a href=\"#2\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup3\">Sean Wilentz, <em>The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974\u20132008<\/em> (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 121. <a href=\"#3\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup4\">Jacobs and Zelizer, <em>Conservatives in Power<\/em>, 25\u201326. <a href=\"#4\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup5\">Ronald Reagan, quoted in Steve Neal, \u201cReagan Assails Carter On Auto Layoffs,\u201d <em>Chicago Tribune<\/em>, October 20, 1980, 5. <a href=\"#5\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup6\">Judith Stein, <em>Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies<\/em> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 267. <a href=\"#6\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup7\">William Chafe, <em>The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II<\/em> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 474. <a href=\"#7\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup8\">James T. Patterson,<em> Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore<\/em> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 159. <a href=\"#8\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup9\">Gil Troy, <em>Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 67. <a href=\"#9\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup10\">Chafe, <em>Unfinished Journey<\/em>, 476. <a href=\"#10\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup11\">Ibid., 474. <a href=\"#11\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup12\">Margaret Bush Wilson, quoted in Troy, <em>Morning in America<\/em>, 93. <a href=\"#12\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup13\">Ibid., 210. <a href=\"#13\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup14\">Ibid., 110. <a href=\"#14\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup15\">Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 163\u2013164. <a href=\"#15\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup16\">Troy, <em>Morning in America<\/em>, 208. <a href=\"#16\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup17\">Chafe, <em>Unfinished Journey<\/em>, 477. <a href=\"#17\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup18\">Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 162. Many people used the term <em>harsh medicine<\/em> to describe Volcker\u2019s action on interest rates; see Art Pine, \u201cLetting Harsh Medicine Work,\u201d <em>Washington Post<\/em>, October 14, 1979, G1. <a href=\"#18\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup19\">Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 189. <a href=\"#19\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup20\">Ibid., 189. <a href=\"#20\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup21\">Ibid., 190\u2013191. <a href=\"#21\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup22\">Troy,<em> Morning in America<\/em>, 210; Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 165. <a href=\"#22\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup23\">Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 173\u2013174. . <a href=\"#23\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n \t<li id=\"Sup24\">Ibid., 171. <a href=\"#24\"><img src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div class=\"container\">\n<figure style=\"width: 700px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"responsive\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/The_Reagans_waving_from_the_limousine_during_the_Inaugural_Parade_1981.jpg#fixme\" alt=\"onald Reagan and his wife, Nancy Reagan, wave from a limousine during the inaugural parade in Washington, D.C., in 1981\" width=\"700\" height=\"553\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-caption-text\">Ronald Reagan secured the presidency by appealing to the growing conservatism of much of the country. Here, Ronald Reagan and his wife, Nancy Reagan, wave from a limousine during the inaugural parade in Washington, D.C., in 1981. <a href=\"http:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:The_Reagans_waving_from_the_limousine_during_the_Inaugural_Parade_1981.jpg\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Wikimedia<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p id=\"KC1\">In his first inaugural address Reagan proclaimed that \u201cgovernment is not the solution to the problem, government is the problem.\u201d<a href=\"#Sup1\"><sup id=\"1\">1<\/sup><\/a> In reality, Reagan focused less on eliminating government than on redirecting government to serve new ends. In line with that goal, his administration embraced supply-side economic theories that had recently gained popularity among the New Right. While the postwar gospel of Keynesian economics had focused on stimulating consumer demand, supply-side economics held that lower personal and corporate tax rates would encourage greater private investment and production. Supply-side advocates promised that the resulting wealth would reach\u2014or \u201ctrickle down\u201d to, in the words of critics\u2014lower-income groups through job creation and higher wages. Conservative economist Arthur Laffer predicted that lower tax rates would generate so much economic activity that federal tax revenues would actually increase. The administration touted the so-called Laffer Curve as justification for the tax cut plan that served as the cornerstone of Reagan\u2019s first year in office. Republican congressman Jack Kemp, an early supply-side advocate and co-sponsor of Reagan\u2019s tax bill, promised that it would unleash the \u201ccreative genius that has always invigorated America.\u201d<a href=\"#Sup2\"><sup id=\"2\">2<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure style=\"width: 700px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"responsive\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/DF-SN-82-06759.jpg#fixme\" alt=\"This group photograph shows the former hostages in the hospital in 1981 before being released back to the United States\" width=\"700\" height=\"467\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-caption-text\">The Iranian hostage crisis ended literally during President Reagan\u2019s inauguration speech. The Reagan administration received credit for bringing the hostages home. This group photograph shows the former hostages in the hospital in 1981 before being released back to the United States. <a href=\"http:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:DF-SN-82-06759.jpg\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">Wikimedia<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>The tax cut faced early skepticism from Democrats and even some Republicans. Vice president George H. W. Bush had belittled supply-side theory as \u201cvoodoo economics\u201d during the 1980 Republican primaries.<a href=\"#Sup3\"><sup id=\"3\">3<\/sup><\/a> But a combination of skill and serendipity pushed the bill over the top. Reagan aggressively and effectively lobbied individual members of Congress for support on the measure. Then on March 30, 1981, Reagan survived an assassination attempt by a mentally unstable young man named John Hinckley. Public support swelled for the hospitalized president. Congress ultimately approved a $675 billion tax cut in July 1981 with significant Democratic support. The bill reduced overall federal taxes by more than one quarter and lowered the top marginal rate from 70 percent to 50 percent, with the bottom rate dropping from 14 percent to 11 percent. It also slashed the rate on capital gains from 28 percent to 20 percent.<a href=\"#Sup4\"><sup id=\"4\">4<\/sup><\/a> The next month, Reagan scored another political triumph in response to a strike called by the Professional Air Traffic Controllers Organization (PATCO). During the 1980 campaign, Reagan had wooed organized labor, describing himself as \u201can old union man\u201d (he had led the Screen Actors Guild from 1947 to 1952) who still held Franklin Roosevelt in high regard.<a href=\"#Sup5\"><sup id=\"5\">5<\/sup><\/a> PATCO had been one of the few labor unions to endorse Reagan. Nevertheless, the president ordered the union\u2019s striking air traffic controllers back to work and fired more than eleven thousand who refused. Reagan\u2019s actions crippled PATCO and left the American labor movement reeling. For the rest of the 1980s the economic terrain of the United States\u2014already unfavorable to union organizing\u2014shifted decisively in favor of employers. The unionized portion of the private-sector workforce fell from 20 percent in 1980 to 12 percent in 1990. <a href=\"#Sup6\"><sup id=\"6\">6<\/sup><\/a> Reagan\u2019s tax bill and the defeat of PATCO not only enhanced the economic power of corporations and high-income households, they confirmed that a new conservative age had dawned in American life.<\/p>\n<p>The new administration appeared to be flying high in the fall of 1981, but developments challenged the rosy economic forecasts emanating from the White House. As Reagan ratcheted up tension with the Soviet Union, Congress approved his request for $1.2 trillion in new military spending.<a href=\"#Sup7\"><sup id=\"7\">7<\/sup><\/a> The combination of lower taxes and higher defense budgets caused the national debt to balloon. By the end of Reagan\u2019s first term it equaled 53 percent of GDP, as opposed to 33 percent in 1981.<a href=\"#Sup8\"><sup id=\"8\">8<\/sup><\/a> The increase was staggering, especially for an administration that had promised to curb spending. Meanwhile, Federal Reserve chairman Paul Volcker continued his policy from the Carter years of combating inflation by maintaining high interest rates, which surpassed 20 percent in June 1981.<a href=\"#Sup9\"><sup id=\"9\">9<\/sup><\/a> The Fed\u2019s action increased the cost of borrowing money and stifled economic activity.<\/p>\n<p>As a result, the United States experienced a severe economic recession in 1981 and 1982. Unemployment rose to nearly 11 percent, the highest figure since the Great Depression.<a href=\"#Sup10\"><sup id=\"10\">10<\/sup><\/a> Reductions in social welfare spending heightened the impact of the recession on ordinary people. Congress had followed Reagan\u2019s lead by reducing funding for food stamps and Aid to Families with Dependent Children and removed a half million people from the Supplemental Social Security program for the physically disabled.<a href=\"#Sup11\"><sup id=\"11\">11<\/sup><\/a> The cuts exacted an especially harsh toll on low-income communities of color. The head of the NAACP declared that the administration\u2019s budget cuts had rekindled \u201cwar, pestilence, famine, and death.\u201d<a href=\"#Sup12\"><sup id=\"12\">12<\/sup><\/a> Reagan also received bipartisan rebuke in 1981 after proposing cuts to social security benefits for early retirees. The Senate voted unanimously to condemn the plan, and Democrats framed it as a heartless attack on the elderly. Confronted with recession and harsh public criticism, a chastened White House worked with Democratic House Speaker Tip O\u2019Neill in 1982 on a bill that restored $98 billion of the previous year\u2019s tax cuts.<a href=\"#Sup13\"><sup id=\"13\">13<\/sup><\/a> Despite compromising with the administration on taxes, Democrats railed against the so-called Reagan Recession, arguing that the president\u2019s economic policies favored the most fortunate Americans. This appeal, which Democrats termed the \u201cfairness issue,\u201d helped them win twenty-six House seats in the autumn congressional races.<a href=\"#Sup14\"><sup id=\"14\">14<\/sup><\/a> The New Right appeared to be in trouble.<\/p>\n<h2>Morning in America<\/h2>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure style=\"width: 700px\" class=\"wp-caption aligncenter\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"responsive\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/President-Reagan-in-Minneapolis-19821.jpg#fixme\" alt=\"President Ronald Reagan, a master of the photo op, appears here with a row of American flags at his back at a 1982 rally for Senator David Durenberger in Minneapolis, Minnesota.\" width=\"700\" height=\"393\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-caption-text\">President Ronald Reagan, a master of the photo op, appears here with a row of American flags at his back at a 1982 rally for Senator David Durenberger in Minneapolis, Minnesota. <a href=\"http:\/\/www.americanyawp.com\/text\/wp-content\/uploads\/President-Reagan-in-Minneapolis-19821.jpg\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener\">National Archives<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>Reagan nimbly adjusted to the political setbacks of 1982. Following the rejection of his social security proposals, Reagan appointed a bipartisan panel to consider changes to the program. In early 1983, the commission recommended a onetime delay in cost-of-living increases, a new requirement that government employees pay into the system, and a gradual increase in the retirement age from sixty-five to sixty-seven. The commission also proposed raising state and federal payroll taxes, with the new revenue poured into a trust fund that would transform social security from a pay-as-you-go system to one with significant reserves.<a href=\"#Sup15\"><sup id=\"15\">15<\/sup><\/a>Congress quickly passed the recommendations into law, allowing Reagan to take credit for strengthening a program cherished by most Americans. The president also benefited from an economic rebound. Real disposable income rose 2.5 percent in 1983 and 5.8 percent the following year.<a href=\"#Sup16\"><sup id=\"16\">16<\/sup><\/a>Unemployment dropped to 7.5 percent in 1984.<a href=\"#Sup17\"><sup id=\"17\">17<\/sup><\/a> Meanwhile, the \u201charsh medicine\u201d of high interest rates helped reduce inflation to 3.5 percent.<a href=\"#Sup18\"><sup id=\"18\">18<\/sup><\/a> While campaigning for reelection in 1984, Reagan pointed to the improving economy as evidence that it was \u201cmorning again in America.\u201d<a href=\"#Sup19\"><sup id=\"19\">19<\/sup><\/a> His personal popularity soared. Most conservatives ignored the debt increase and tax hikes of the previous two years and rallied around the president.<\/p>\n<p>The Democratic Party, on other hand, stood at an ideological crossroads in 1984. The favorite to win the party\u2019s nomination was Walter Mondale, a staunch ally of organized labor and the civil rights movement as a senator during the 1960s and 1970s. He later served as Jimmy Carter\u2019s vice president. Mondale\u2019s chief rivals were civil rights activist Jesse Jackson and Colorado senator Gary Hart, one of the young Democrats elected to Congress in 1974 following Nixon\u2019s downfall. Hart and other \u201cWatergate babies\u201d still identified themselves as liberals but rejected their party\u2019s faith in activist government and embraced market-based approaches to policy issues. In so doing, they conceded significant political ground to supply-siders and conservative opponents of the welfare state. Many Democrats, however, were not prepared to abandon their New Deal heritage, and so the ideological tension within the party played out in the 1984 primary campaign. Jackson offered a largely progressive program but won only two states. Hart\u2019s platform\u2014economically moderate but socially liberal\u2014inverted the political formula of Mondale\u2019s New Deal\u2013style liberalism. Throughout the primaries, Hart contrasted his \u201cnew ideas\u201d with Mondale\u2019s \u201cold-fashioned\u201d politics. Mondale eventually secured his party\u2019s nomination but suffered a crushing defeat in the general election. Reagan captured forty-nine of fifty states, winning 58.8 percent of the popular vote.<a href=\"#Sup20\"><sup id=\"20\">20<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<p>Mondale\u2019s loss seemed to confirm that the new breed of moderate Democrats better understood the mood of the American people. The future of the party belonged to post\u2013New Deal liberals like Hart and to the constituency that supported him in the primaries: upwardly mobile, white professionals and suburbanites. In February 1985, a group of centrists formed the Democratic Leadership Council (DLC) as a vehicle for distancing the party from organized labor and Keynesian economics while cultivating the business community. Jesse Jackson dismissed the DLC as \u201cDemocrats for the Leisure Class,\u201d but the organization included many of the party\u2019s future leaders, including Arkansas governor Bill Clinton.<a href=\"#Sup21\"><sup id=\"21\">21<\/sup><\/a> The formation of the DLC illustrated the degree to which to the New Right had transformed American politics: New Democrats looked a lot like old Republicans.<\/p>\n<p>Reagan entered his second term with a much stronger mandate than in 1981, but the Grand Old Party (GOP) makeover of Washington, D.C., stalled. The Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1986, and Democratic opposition prevented Reagan from eliminating means-tested social welfare programs, although Congress failed to increase benefit levels for welfare programs or raise the minimum wage, decreasing the real value of those benefits. Democrats and Republicans occasionally fashioned legislative compromises, as with the Tax Reform Act of 1986. The bill lowered the top corporate tax rate from 46 percent to 34 percent and reduced the highest marginal income tax rate from 50 percent to 28 percent, while also simplifying the tax code and eliminating numerous loopholes.<a href=\"#Sup22\"><sup id=\"22\">22<\/sup><\/a> The steep cuts to the corporate and individual rates certainly benefited wealthy individuals, but the legislation made virtually no net change to federal revenues. In 1986, Reagan also signed into law the Immigration Reform and Control Act. American policy makers hoped to do two things: deal with the millions of undocumented immigrants already in the United States while simultaneously choking off future unsanctioned migration. The former goal was achieved (nearly three million undocumented workers received legal status) but the latter proved elusive.<\/p>\n<p>One of Reagan\u2019s most far-reaching victories occurred through judicial appointments. He named 368 district and federal appeals court judges during his two terms.<a href=\"#Sup23\"><sup id=\"23\">23<\/sup><\/a> Observers noted that almost all of the appointees were white men. (Seven were African American, fifteen were Latino, and two were Asian American.) Reagan also appointed three Supreme Court justices: Sandra Day O\u2019Connor, who to the dismay of the religious right turned out to be a moderate; Anthony Kennedy, a solidly conservative Catholic who occasionally sided with the court\u2019s liberal wing; and archconservative Antonin Scalia. The New Right\u2019s transformation of the judiciary had limits. In 1987, Reagan nominated Robert Bork to fill a vacancy on the Supreme Court. Bork, a federal judge and former Yale University law professor, was a staunch conservative. He had opposed the 1964 Civil Rights Act, affirmative action, and the Roe v. Wade decision. After acrimonious confirmation hearings, the Senate rejected Bork\u2019s nomination by a vote of 58\u201342.<a href=\"#Sup24\"><sup id=\"24\">24<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n<h4>Notes<\/h4>\n<ol>\n<li id=\"Sup1\">Ronald Reagan, quoted in Meg Jacobs and Julian Zelizer, <em>Conservatives in Power: The Reagan Years, 1981\u20131989: A Brief History with Documents <\/em>(Boston: Bedford St. Martin\u2019s, 2011), 20. <a href=\"#1\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup2\">Jack Kemp, quoted in Jacobs and Zelizer, <em>Conservatives in Power<\/em>, 21. <a href=\"#2\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup3\">Sean Wilentz, <em>The Age of Reagan: A History, 1974\u20132008<\/em> (New York: HarperCollins, 2008), 121. <a href=\"#3\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup4\">Jacobs and Zelizer, <em>Conservatives in Power<\/em>, 25\u201326. <a href=\"#4\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup5\">Ronald Reagan, quoted in Steve Neal, \u201cReagan Assails Carter On Auto Layoffs,\u201d <em>Chicago Tribune<\/em>, October 20, 1980, 5. <a href=\"#5\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup6\">Judith Stein, <em>Pivotal Decade: How the United States Traded Factories for Finance in the Seventies<\/em> (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 2010), 267. <a href=\"#6\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup7\">William Chafe, <em>The Unfinished Journey: America Since World War II<\/em> (New York: Oxford University Press, 1991), 474. <a href=\"#7\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup8\">James T. Patterson,<em> Restless Giant: The United States from Watergate to Bush v. Gore<\/em> (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 159. <a href=\"#8\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup9\">Gil Troy, <em>Morning in America: How Ronald Reagan Invented the 1980s<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 67. <a href=\"#9\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup10\">Chafe, <em>Unfinished Journey<\/em>, 476. <a href=\"#10\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup11\">Ibid., 474. <a href=\"#11\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup12\">Margaret Bush Wilson, quoted in Troy, <em>Morning in America<\/em>, 93. <a href=\"#12\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup13\">Ibid., 210. <a href=\"#13\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup14\">Ibid., 110. <a href=\"#14\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup15\">Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 163\u2013164. <a href=\"#15\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup16\">Troy, <em>Morning in America<\/em>, 208. <a href=\"#16\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup17\">Chafe, <em>Unfinished Journey<\/em>, 477. <a href=\"#17\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup18\">Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 162. Many people used the term <em>harsh medicine<\/em> to describe Volcker\u2019s action on interest rates; see Art Pine, \u201cLetting Harsh Medicine Work,\u201d <em>Washington Post<\/em>, October 14, 1979, G1. <a href=\"#18\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup19\">Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 189. <a href=\"#19\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup20\">Ibid., 189. <a href=\"#20\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup21\">Ibid., 190\u2013191. <a href=\"#21\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup22\">Troy,<em> Morning in America<\/em>, 210; Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 165. <a href=\"#22\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup23\">Patterson, <em>Restless Giant<\/em>, 173\u2013174. . <a href=\"#23\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<li id=\"Sup24\">Ibid., 171. <a href=\"#24\"><img decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/media.ccconline.org\/ccco\/2019Master\/HIS122\/eText\/Sections\/Section6\/..\/..\/Images\/redirect.png#fixme\" alt=\"image\" \/><\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":7,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-280","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":36,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/280","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/280\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":740,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/280\/revisions\/740"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/36"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/280\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=280"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=280"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=280"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=280"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}