{"id":235,"date":"2023-03-13T17:20:28","date_gmt":"2023-03-13T17:20:28","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/chapter\/module-5-2\/"},"modified":"2023-04-28T16:06:22","modified_gmt":"2023-04-28T16:06:22","slug":"module-5-2","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/chapter\/module-5-2\/","title":{"raw":"5.2 Postwar Recovery","rendered":"5.2 Postwar Recovery"},"content":{"raw":"

The Marshall Plan<\/h2>\r\n
\r\n\r\nFor all its importance, the Truman Doctrine didn\u2019t aid Western Europe. There, national treasuries were empty, city streets stood dark, homes lacked heat, people starved, and factories were closed. American diplomats warned that without aid to revive the European economy, communists would seize power in Germany, Italy, and France. If Western Europe fell, the Cold War would be lost.\r\n

In 1947, the United States developed a plan to ensure the recovery of Europe. On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State, and former General, George C. Marshall, spoke at Harvard University, arguing that \u201cthe United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.\u201d1<\/sup><\/a> With the Marshall Plan, the United States invited all European nations, Eastern or Western, to request assistance to rebuild their economies. There was a caveat. The US wanted to make sure the loans being made were sound ones, so they insisted on being able to review the economic plans of those requesting assistance. The Soviet Union refused to allow this as they believed this would undermine the very theory of communism and so neither the Soviet Union, nor any country within its sphere of influence applied for assistance.<\/p>\r\nThe European Recovery Program (ERP), popularly known as the Marshall Plan, pumped enormous sums of capital into Western Europe. From 1948 to 1952 the United States invested $13 billion toward reconstruction while simultaneously loosening trade barriers. To avoid the postwar chaos of World War I, the Marshall Plan was designed to rebuild Western Europe, open markets, and win European support for capitalist democracies. The Soviets countered with their rival Molotov Plan, a symbolic pledge of aid to Eastern Europe. Polish leader J\u00f3zef Cyrankiewicz was rewarded with a five-year, $450 million trade agreement from Russia for boycotting the Marshall Plan. Stalin was jealous of Eastern Europe. When Czechoslovakia received $200 million in American assistance, Stalin summoned Czech foreign minister Jan Masaryk to Moscow. Masaryk later recounted that he \u201cwent to Moscow as the foreign minister of an independent sovereign state\u201d but \u201creturned as a lackey of the Soviet Government.\u201d2<\/sup><\/a> Stalin exercised ever tighter control over Soviet \u201csatellite\u201d countries in central and Eastern Europe.3<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\nThe situation in Germany meanwhile deteriorated. Berlin had been divided into communist and capitalist zones. In June 1948, when U.S., British, and French officials introduced a new currency, the Soviet Union initiated a ground blockade, cutting off rail and road access to West Berlin (landlocked within the Soviet occupation zone) to gain control over the entire city. The United States organized and coordinated a massive airlift that flew essential supplies into the beleaguered city for eleven months, until the Soviets lifted the blockade on May 12, 1949. Germany was officially broken in half. On May 23, the western half of the country was formally renamed the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the eastern Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic (GDR) later that fall. Berlin, which lay squarely within the GDR, was divided into two sections (and, from August 1961 until November 1989, famously separated by physical walls).4<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"700\"]\"Photograph The Berlin Blockade and resultant Allied airlift was one of the first major crises of the Cold War. Here a U.S. Navy Douglas R4D and U.S. Air Force C-47 aircraft unload at Tempelhof Airport in 1948 or 1949. \u202fWikimedia<\/a>.[\/caption]\r\n\r\n \r\n

In the summer of 1949, American officials launched the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a mutual defense pact in which the United States and Canada were joined by England, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. The Soviet Union would formalize its own collective defensive agreement in 1955, the Warsaw Pact, which included Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany.<\/p>\r\nLiberal journalist Walter Lippmann was largely responsible for popularizing the term Cold War<\/em> in his book The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy<\/em>, published in 1947. Lippmann envisioned a prolonged stalemate between the United States and the USSR, a war of words and ideas in which direct shots would not necessarily be fired between the two. Lippmann agreed that the Soviet Union would only be \u201cprevented from expanding\u201d if it were \u201cconfronted with . . . American power,\u201d but he felt \u201cthat the strategical conception and plan\u201d recommended by Mr. X (George Kennan) was \u201cfundamentally unsound,\u201d as it would require having \u201cthe money and the military power always available in sufficient amounts to apply \u2018counter-force\u2019 at constantly shifting points all over the world.\u201d Lippmann cautioned against making far-flung, open-ended commitments, favoring instead a more limited engagement that focused on halting the influence of communism in the \u201cheart\u201d of Europe; he believed that if the Soviet system were successfully restrained on the continent, it could otherwise be left alone to collapse under the weight of its own imperfections.5<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\nA new chapter in the Cold War began on October 1, 1949, when the CCP, led by Mao Zedong, declared victory against Kuomintang nationalists led by the Western-backed Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang retreated to the island of Taiwan and the CCP took over the mainland under the red flag of the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC). Coming so soon after the Soviet Union\u2019s successful test of an atomic bomb, on August 29, the \u201closs of China,\u201d the world\u2019s most populous country, contributed to a sense of panic among American foreign policy makers, whose attention began to shift from Europe to Asia. After Dean Acheson became secretary of state in 1949, Kennan was replaced in the State Department by former investment banker Paul Nitze, whose first task was to help compose, as Acheson later described in his memoir, a document designed to \u201cbludgeon the mass mind of \u2018top government\u2019\u201d into approving a \u201csubstantial increase\u201d in military expenditures.6<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"700\"]\"1950 Global communism was shaped by the relationship between the two largest communist nations\u2014the Soviet Union and the People\u2019s Republic of China. Despite persistent tensions between the two, this 1950 Chinese stamp depicts Joseph Stalin shaking hands with Mao Zedong. Wikimedia<\/a>.[\/caption]\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n\u201cNational Security Memorandum 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,\u201d a national defense memo known as NSC-68, achieved its goal. Issued in April 1950, the nearly sixty-page classified memo warned of \u201cincreasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction,\u201d which served to remind \u201cevery individual\u201d of \u201cthe ever-present possibility of annihilation.\u201d It said that leaders of the USSR and its \u201cinternational communist movement\u201d sought only \u201cto retain and solidify their absolute power.\u201d As the central \u201cbulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion,\u201d America had become \u201cthe principal enemy\u201d that \u201cmust be subverted or destroyed by one means or another.\u201d NSC-68 urged a \u201crapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength\u201d in order to \u201croll back the Kremlin\u2019s drive for world domination.\u201d Such a massive commitment of resources, amounting to more than a threefold increase in the annual defense budget, was necessary because the USSR, \u201cunlike previous aspirants to hegemony,\u201d was \u201canimated by a new fanatic faith,\u201d seeking \u201cto impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.\u201d7<\/sup><\/a> Both Kennan and Lippmann were among a minority in the foreign policy establishment who argued to no avail that such a \u201cmilitarization of containment\u201d was tragically wrongheaded.8<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\nOn June 25, 1950, as U.S. officials were considering the merits of NSC-68\u2019s proposals, including \u201cthe intensification of . . . operations by covert means in the fields of economic . . . political and psychological warfare\u201d designed to foment \u201cunrest and revolt in . . . [Soviet] satellite countries,\u201d fighting erupted in Korea between communists in the north and American-backed anti-communists in the south.9<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\nAfter Japan surrendered in September 1945, a U.S.-Soviet joint occupation had paved the way for the division of Korea. In November 1947, the UN passed a resolution that a united government in Korea should be created, but the Soviet Union refused to cooperate. Only the south held elections. The Republic of Korea (ROK), South Korea, was created three months after the election. A month later, communists in the north established the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both claimed to stand for a unified Korean peninsula. The UN recognized the ROK, but incessant armed conflict broke out between North and South.10<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\nIn the spring of 1950, Stalin hesitantly endorsed North Korean leader Kim Il Sung\u2019s plan to liberate the South by force, a plan heavily influenced by Mao\u2019s recent victory in China. While he did not desire a military confrontation with the United States, Stalin thought correctly that he could encourage his Chinese comrades to support North Korea if the war turned against the DPRK. The North Koreans launched a successful surprise attack and Seoul, the capital of South Korea, fell to the communists on June 28. The UN passed resolutions demanding that North Korea cease hostilities and withdraw its armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel and calling on member states to provide the ROK military assistance to repulse the northern attack.\r\n\r\nThat July, UN forces mobilized under American general Douglas MacArthur. Troops landed at Inchon, a port city about thirty miles from Seoul, and took the city on September 28. They moved on North Korea. On October 1, ROK\/UN forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, and on October 26 they reached the Yalu River, the traditional Korea-China border. They were met by three hundred thousand Chinese troops who broke the advance and rolled up the offensive. On November 30, ROK\/UN forces began a fevered retreat. They returned across the thirty-eighth parallel and abandoned Seoul on January 4, 1951. The United Nations forces regrouped, but the war entered into a stalemate. General MacArthur, growing impatient and wanting to eliminate the communist threats, requested authorization to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and China. Denied, MacArthur publicly denounced Truman. Truman, unwilling to threaten World War III and refusing to tolerate MacArthur\u2019s public insubordination, dismissed the general in April. On June 23, 1951, the Soviet ambassador to the UN suggested a cease-fire, which the U.S. immediately accepted. Peace talks continued for two years.\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"700\"]\"Photograph With the stated policy of \u201ccontaining\u201d communism at home and abroad, the U.S. pressured the United Nations to support the South Koreans and deployed American troops to the Korean Peninsula. Though overshadowed in the annals of American history, the Korean War caused over 30,000 American deaths and 100,000 wounded, leaving an indelible mark on those who served. Wikimedia<\/a>.[\/caption]\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nGeneral Dwight Eisenhower defeated Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 presidential election, and Stalin died in March 1953. The DPRK warmed to peace, and an armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. More than 1.5 million people had died during the conflict.11<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\nComing so soon after World War II and ending without clear victory, Korea became for many Americans a \u201cforgotten war.\u201d Decades later, though, the nation\u2019s other major intervention in Asia would be anything but forgotten. The Vietnam War had deep roots in the Cold War world. Vietnam had been colonized by France and seized by Japan during World War II. The nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh had been backed by the United States during his anti-Japanese insurgency and, following Japan\u2019s surrender in 1945, Viet Minh nationalists, quoting the American Declaration of Independence, created the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Yet France moved to reassert authority over its former colony in Indochina, and the United States sacrificed Vietnamese self-determination for France\u2019s colonial imperatives. Ho Chi Minh turned to the Soviet Union for assistance in waging war against the French colonizers in a protracted war.\r\n\r\nAfter French troops were defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, U.S. officials helped broker a temporary settlement that partitioned Vietnam in two, with a Soviet\/Chinese-backed state in the north and an American-backed state in the south. To stifle communist expansion southward, the United States would send arms, offer military advisors, prop up corrupt politicians, stop elections, and, eventually, send over five hundred thousand troops, of whom nearly sixty thousand would be lost before the communists finally reunified the country.\r\n

Notes<\/h4>\r\n
    \r\n \t
  1. George C. Marshall, \u201cThe \u201cMarshall Plan\u201d Speech at Harvard University, June 5, 1947,\u201d at Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development<\/em>, http:\/\/www.oecd.org\/general\/themarshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.htm.\"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  2. Jan Masaryk, quoted at Frank A. Smitha, \u201cThe Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, to 1948,\u201d Macrohistory<\/em>, 2018, accessed January 27, 2019, http:\/\/www.fsmitha.com\/h2\/ch24cld2b.htm. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  3. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1, Origins<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 189. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  4. Daniel F. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War<\/em> (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2012). \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  5. Walter Lippman, The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy<\/em> (New York: Harper, 1947), 10, 15. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  6. James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World<\/em> (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 441. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  7. Quotes from Curt Cardwell, NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 10\u201312. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  8. John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life<\/em> (New York: Penguin, 2011). \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  9. Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America\u2019s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947\u20131956<\/em> (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 182. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  10. For the Korean War, see especially Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2 vols.<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990); William W. Stueck, The Korean War: An International History<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  11. Elizabeth Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War<\/em> (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 208. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"

    The Marshall Plan<\/h2>\n
    \n

    For all its importance, the Truman Doctrine didn\u2019t aid Western Europe. There, national treasuries were empty, city streets stood dark, homes lacked heat, people starved, and factories were closed. American diplomats warned that without aid to revive the European economy, communists would seize power in Germany, Italy, and France. If Western Europe fell, the Cold War would be lost.<\/p>\n

    In 1947, the United States developed a plan to ensure the recovery of Europe. On June 5, 1947, Secretary of State, and former General, George C. Marshall, spoke at Harvard University, arguing that \u201cthe United States should do whatever it is able to do to assist in the return of normal economic health in the world, without which there can be no political stability and no assured peace. Our policy is directed not against any country or doctrine but against hunger, poverty, desperation, and chaos.\u201d1<\/sup><\/a> With the Marshall Plan, the United States invited all European nations, Eastern or Western, to request assistance to rebuild their economies. There was a caveat. The US wanted to make sure the loans being made were sound ones, so they insisted on being able to review the economic plans of those requesting assistance. The Soviet Union refused to allow this as they believed this would undermine the very theory of communism and so neither the Soviet Union, nor any country within its sphere of influence applied for assistance.<\/p>\n

    The European Recovery Program (ERP), popularly known as the Marshall Plan, pumped enormous sums of capital into Western Europe. From 1948 to 1952 the United States invested $13 billion toward reconstruction while simultaneously loosening trade barriers. To avoid the postwar chaos of World War I, the Marshall Plan was designed to rebuild Western Europe, open markets, and win European support for capitalist democracies. The Soviets countered with their rival Molotov Plan, a symbolic pledge of aid to Eastern Europe. Polish leader J\u00f3zef Cyrankiewicz was rewarded with a five-year, $450 million trade agreement from Russia for boycotting the Marshall Plan. Stalin was jealous of Eastern Europe. When Czechoslovakia received $200 million in American assistance, Stalin summoned Czech foreign minister Jan Masaryk to Moscow. Masaryk later recounted that he \u201cwent to Moscow as the foreign minister of an independent sovereign state\u201d but \u201creturned as a lackey of the Soviet Government.\u201d2<\/sup><\/a> Stalin exercised ever tighter control over Soviet \u201csatellite\u201d countries in central and Eastern Europe.3<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    The situation in Germany meanwhile deteriorated. Berlin had been divided into communist and capitalist zones. In June 1948, when U.S., British, and French officials introduced a new currency, the Soviet Union initiated a ground blockade, cutting off rail and road access to West Berlin (landlocked within the Soviet occupation zone) to gain control over the entire city. The United States organized and coordinated a massive airlift that flew essential supplies into the beleaguered city for eleven months, until the Soviets lifted the blockade on May 12, 1949. Germany was officially broken in half. On May 23, the western half of the country was formally renamed the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG) and the eastern Soviet zone became the German Democratic Republic (GDR) later that fall. Berlin, which lay squarely within the GDR, was divided into two sections (and, from August 1961 until November 1989, famously separated by physical walls).4<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    \"Photograph
    The Berlin Blockade and resultant Allied airlift was one of the first major crises of the Cold War. Here a U.S. Navy Douglas R4D and U.S. Air Force C-47 aircraft unload at Tempelhof Airport in 1948 or 1949. \u202fWikimedia<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

     <\/p>\n

    In the summer of 1949, American officials launched the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), a mutual defense pact in which the United States and Canada were joined by England, France, Belgium, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Italy, Portugal, Norway, Denmark, and Iceland. The Soviet Union would formalize its own collective defensive agreement in 1955, the Warsaw Pact, which included Albania, Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary, Czechoslovakia, Poland, and East Germany.<\/p>\n

    Liberal journalist Walter Lippmann was largely responsible for popularizing the term Cold War<\/em> in his book The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy<\/em>, published in 1947. Lippmann envisioned a prolonged stalemate between the United States and the USSR, a war of words and ideas in which direct shots would not necessarily be fired between the two. Lippmann agreed that the Soviet Union would only be \u201cprevented from expanding\u201d if it were \u201cconfronted with . . . American power,\u201d but he felt \u201cthat the strategical conception and plan\u201d recommended by Mr. X (George Kennan) was \u201cfundamentally unsound,\u201d as it would require having \u201cthe money and the military power always available in sufficient amounts to apply \u2018counter-force\u2019 at constantly shifting points all over the world.\u201d Lippmann cautioned against making far-flung, open-ended commitments, favoring instead a more limited engagement that focused on halting the influence of communism in the \u201cheart\u201d of Europe; he believed that if the Soviet system were successfully restrained on the continent, it could otherwise be left alone to collapse under the weight of its own imperfections.5<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    A new chapter in the Cold War began on October 1, 1949, when the CCP, led by Mao Zedong, declared victory against Kuomintang nationalists led by the Western-backed Chiang Kai-shek. The Kuomintang retreated to the island of Taiwan and the CCP took over the mainland under the red flag of the People\u2019s Republic of China (PRC). Coming so soon after the Soviet Union\u2019s successful test of an atomic bomb, on August 29, the \u201closs of China,\u201d the world\u2019s most populous country, contributed to a sense of panic among American foreign policy makers, whose attention began to shift from Europe to Asia. After Dean Acheson became secretary of state in 1949, Kennan was replaced in the State Department by former investment banker Paul Nitze, whose first task was to help compose, as Acheson later described in his memoir, a document designed to \u201cbludgeon the mass mind of \u2018top government\u2019\u201d into approving a \u201csubstantial increase\u201d in military expenditures.6<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    \"1950
    Global communism was shaped by the relationship between the two largest communist nations\u2014the Soviet Union and the People\u2019s Republic of China. Despite persistent tensions between the two, this 1950 Chinese stamp depicts Joseph Stalin shaking hands with Mao Zedong. Wikimedia<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

     <\/p>\n

    \u201cNational Security Memorandum 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security,\u201d a national defense memo known as NSC-68, achieved its goal. Issued in April 1950, the nearly sixty-page classified memo warned of \u201cincreasingly terrifying weapons of mass destruction,\u201d which served to remind \u201cevery individual\u201d of \u201cthe ever-present possibility of annihilation.\u201d It said that leaders of the USSR and its \u201cinternational communist movement\u201d sought only \u201cto retain and solidify their absolute power.\u201d As the central \u201cbulwark of opposition to Soviet expansion,\u201d America had become \u201cthe principal enemy\u201d that \u201cmust be subverted or destroyed by one means or another.\u201d NSC-68 urged a \u201crapid build-up of political, economic, and military strength\u201d in order to \u201croll back the Kremlin\u2019s drive for world domination.\u201d Such a massive commitment of resources, amounting to more than a threefold increase in the annual defense budget, was necessary because the USSR, \u201cunlike previous aspirants to hegemony,\u201d was \u201canimated by a new fanatic faith,\u201d seeking \u201cto impose its absolute authority over the rest of the world.\u201d7<\/sup><\/a> Both Kennan and Lippmann were among a minority in the foreign policy establishment who argued to no avail that such a \u201cmilitarization of containment\u201d was tragically wrongheaded.8<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    On June 25, 1950, as U.S. officials were considering the merits of NSC-68\u2019s proposals, including \u201cthe intensification of . . . operations by covert means in the fields of economic . . . political and psychological warfare\u201d designed to foment \u201cunrest and revolt in . . . [Soviet] satellite countries,\u201d fighting erupted in Korea between communists in the north and American-backed anti-communists in the south.9<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    After Japan surrendered in September 1945, a U.S.-Soviet joint occupation had paved the way for the division of Korea. In November 1947, the UN passed a resolution that a united government in Korea should be created, but the Soviet Union refused to cooperate. Only the south held elections. The Republic of Korea (ROK), South Korea, was created three months after the election. A month later, communists in the north established the Democratic People\u2019s Republic of Korea (DPRK). Both claimed to stand for a unified Korean peninsula. The UN recognized the ROK, but incessant armed conflict broke out between North and South.10<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    In the spring of 1950, Stalin hesitantly endorsed North Korean leader Kim Il Sung\u2019s plan to liberate the South by force, a plan heavily influenced by Mao\u2019s recent victory in China. While he did not desire a military confrontation with the United States, Stalin thought correctly that he could encourage his Chinese comrades to support North Korea if the war turned against the DPRK. The North Koreans launched a successful surprise attack and Seoul, the capital of South Korea, fell to the communists on June 28. The UN passed resolutions demanding that North Korea cease hostilities and withdraw its armed forces to the thirty-eighth parallel and calling on member states to provide the ROK military assistance to repulse the northern attack.<\/p>\n

    That July, UN forces mobilized under American general Douglas MacArthur. Troops landed at Inchon, a port city about thirty miles from Seoul, and took the city on September 28. They moved on North Korea. On October 1, ROK\/UN forces crossed the thirty-eighth parallel, and on October 26 they reached the Yalu River, the traditional Korea-China border. They were met by three hundred thousand Chinese troops who broke the advance and rolled up the offensive. On November 30, ROK\/UN forces began a fevered retreat. They returned across the thirty-eighth parallel and abandoned Seoul on January 4, 1951. The United Nations forces regrouped, but the war entered into a stalemate. General MacArthur, growing impatient and wanting to eliminate the communist threats, requested authorization to use nuclear weapons against North Korea and China. Denied, MacArthur publicly denounced Truman. Truman, unwilling to threaten World War III and refusing to tolerate MacArthur\u2019s public insubordination, dismissed the general in April. On June 23, 1951, the Soviet ambassador to the UN suggested a cease-fire, which the U.S. immediately accepted. Peace talks continued for two years.<\/p>\n

     <\/p>\n

    \"Photograph
    With the stated policy of \u201ccontaining\u201d communism at home and abroad, the U.S. pressured the United Nations to support the South Koreans and deployed American troops to the Korean Peninsula. Though overshadowed in the annals of American history, the Korean War caused over 30,000 American deaths and 100,000 wounded, leaving an indelible mark on those who served. Wikimedia<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n

     <\/p>\n

    General Dwight Eisenhower defeated Illinois Governor Adlai Stevenson in the 1952 presidential election, and Stalin died in March 1953. The DPRK warmed to peace, and an armistice agreement was signed on July 27, 1953. More than 1.5 million people had died during the conflict.11<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    Coming so soon after World War II and ending without clear victory, Korea became for many Americans a \u201cforgotten war.\u201d Decades later, though, the nation\u2019s other major intervention in Asia would be anything but forgotten. The Vietnam War had deep roots in the Cold War world. Vietnam had been colonized by France and seized by Japan during World War II. The nationalist leader Ho Chi Minh had been backed by the United States during his anti-Japanese insurgency and, following Japan\u2019s surrender in 1945, Viet Minh nationalists, quoting the American Declaration of Independence, created the independent Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV). Yet France moved to reassert authority over its former colony in Indochina, and the United States sacrificed Vietnamese self-determination for France\u2019s colonial imperatives. Ho Chi Minh turned to the Soviet Union for assistance in waging war against the French colonizers in a protracted war.<\/p>\n

    After French troops were defeated at the Battle of Dien Bien Phu in May 1954, U.S. officials helped broker a temporary settlement that partitioned Vietnam in two, with a Soviet\/Chinese-backed state in the north and an American-backed state in the south. To stifle communist expansion southward, the United States would send arms, offer military advisors, prop up corrupt politicians, stop elections, and, eventually, send over five hundred thousand troops, of whom nearly sixty thousand would be lost before the communists finally reunified the country.<\/p>\n

    Notes<\/h4>\n
      \n
    1. George C. Marshall, \u201cThe \u201cMarshall Plan\u201d Speech at Harvard University, June 5, 1947,\u201d at Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development<\/em>, http:\/\/www.oecd.org\/general\/themarshallplanspeechatharvarduniversity5june1947.htm.\"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    2. Jan Masaryk, quoted at Frank A. Smitha, \u201cThe Truman Doctrine and Marshall Plan, to 1948,\u201d Macrohistory<\/em>, 2018, accessed January 27, 2019, http:\/\/www.fsmitha.com\/h2\/ch24cld2b.htm. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    3. Melvyn P. Leffler and Odd Arne Westad, eds., The Cambridge History of the Cold War: Volume 1, Origins<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 189. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    4. Daniel F. Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, the Airlift, and the Early Cold War<\/em> (Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 2012). \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    5. Walter Lippman, The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy<\/em> (New York: Harper, 1947), 10, 15. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    6. James Chace, Acheson: The Secretary of State Who Created the American World<\/em> (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2008), 441. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    7. Quotes from Curt Cardwell, NSC 68 and the Political Economy of the Early Cold War<\/em> (Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press, 2011), 10\u201312. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    8. John Lewis Gaddis, George F. Kennan: An American Life<\/em> (New York: Penguin, 2011). \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    9. Gregory Mitrovich, Undermining the Kremlin: America\u2019s Strategy to Subvert the Soviet Bloc, 1947\u20131956<\/em> (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2000), 182. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    10. For the Korean War, see especially Bruce Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, 2 vols.<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1981, 1990); William W. Stueck, The Korean War: An International History<\/em> (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1995). \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    11. Elizabeth Stanley, Paths to Peace: Domestic Coalition Shifts, War Termination and the Korean War<\/em> (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2009), 208. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":2,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-235","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":34,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/235","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":5,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/235\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":709,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/235\/revisions\/709"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/34"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/235\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=235"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=235"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=235"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=235"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}