{"id":202,"date":"2023-03-13T16:56:00","date_gmt":"2023-03-13T16:56:00","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/chapter\/module-4-12\/"},"modified":"2023-04-27T22:45:19","modified_gmt":"2023-04-27T22:45:19","slug":"module-4-12","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/chapter\/module-4-12\/","title":{"raw":"4.12 The End of the New Deal \u202f","rendered":"4.12 The End of the New Deal \u202f"},"content":{"raw":"[caption id=\"\" align=\"aligncenter\" width=\"450\"]\"Photograph The Hughes Court, 1932\u20131937. Front row: Justices Brandeis<\/a> and Van Devanter<\/a>, Chief Justice Hughes<\/a>, and Justices McReynolds<\/a> and Sutherland<\/a>. Back row: Justices Roberts<\/a>, Butler<\/a>, Stone<\/a>, and Cardozo<\/a>. \"US Supreme Court 1932.\u201d Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain<\/a>.[\/caption]\r\n\r\n
\r\n\r\n \r\n\r\nBy 1936 Roosevelt and his New Deal had won record popularity. In November Roosevelt annihilated his Republican challenger, Governor Alf Landon of Kansas, who lost in every state save Maine and Vermont. The Great Depression had certainly not ended, but it appeared to many to be beating a slow yet steady retreat, and Roosevelt, now safely reelected, appeared ready to take advantage of both his popularity and the improving economic climate to press for even more dramatic changes. But conservative barriers continued to limit the power of his popular support. The Supreme Court, for instance, continued to gut many of his programs.\r\n\r\nIn 1937, concerned that the Court might overthrow social security in an upcoming case, Roosevelt called for legislation allowing him to expand the Court by appointing a new, younger justice for every sitting member over age seventy. Roosevelt argued that the measure would speed up the Court\u2019s ability to handle a growing backlog of cases; however, his \u201ccourt-packing scheme,\u201d as opponents termed it, was clearly designed to allow the president to appoint up to six friendly, pro\u2013New Deal justices to drown the influence of old-time conservatives on the Court. Roosevelt\u2019s \u201cscheme\u201d riled opposition and did not become law, but the chastened Court upheld social security and other pieces of New Deal legislation thereafter. Moreover, Roosevelt was slowly able to appoint more amenable justices as conservatives died or retired. Still, the court-packing scheme damaged the Roosevelt administration, and opposition to the New Deal began to emerge and coalesce.1<\/sup><\/a>\r\n\r\nCompounding his problems, Roosevelt and his advisors made a costly economic misstep. Believing the United States had turned a corner, Roosevelt cut spending in 1937. The American economy plunged nearly to the depths of 1932\u20131933. Roosevelt reversed course and, adopting the approach popularized by the English economist John Maynard Keynes, hoped that countercyclical, compensatory spending would pull the country out of the recession, even at the expense of a growing budget deficit. It was perhaps too late. The Roosevelt Recession of 1937 became fodder for critics. Combined with the court-packing scheme, the recession allowed for significant gains by a conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans. By 1939, Roosevelt struggled to build congressional support for new reforms, let alone maintain existing agencies. Moreover, the growing threat of war in Europe stole the public\u2019s attention and increasingly dominated Roosevelt\u2019s interests. The New Deal slowly receded into the background, outshined by war.2<\/sup><\/a>\r\n

Notes<\/h4>\r\n
    \r\n \t
  1. Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War <\/em>(New York: Knopf, 1995). \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n \t
  2. Ibid. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"
    \"Photograph
    The Hughes Court, 1932\u20131937. Front row: Justices Brandeis<\/a> and Van Devanter<\/a>, Chief Justice Hughes<\/a>, and Justices McReynolds<\/a> and Sutherland<\/a>. Back row: Justices Roberts<\/a>, Butler<\/a>, Stone<\/a>, and Cardozo<\/a>. “US Supreme Court 1932.\u201d Wikimedia Commons. Public Domain<\/a>.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n
    \n

     <\/p>\n

    By 1936 Roosevelt and his New Deal had won record popularity. In November Roosevelt annihilated his Republican challenger, Governor Alf Landon of Kansas, who lost in every state save Maine and Vermont. The Great Depression had certainly not ended, but it appeared to many to be beating a slow yet steady retreat, and Roosevelt, now safely reelected, appeared ready to take advantage of both his popularity and the improving economic climate to press for even more dramatic changes. But conservative barriers continued to limit the power of his popular support. The Supreme Court, for instance, continued to gut many of his programs.<\/p>\n

    In 1937, concerned that the Court might overthrow social security in an upcoming case, Roosevelt called for legislation allowing him to expand the Court by appointing a new, younger justice for every sitting member over age seventy. Roosevelt argued that the measure would speed up the Court\u2019s ability to handle a growing backlog of cases; however, his \u201ccourt-packing scheme,\u201d as opponents termed it, was clearly designed to allow the president to appoint up to six friendly, pro\u2013New Deal justices to drown the influence of old-time conservatives on the Court. Roosevelt\u2019s \u201cscheme\u201d riled opposition and did not become law, but the chastened Court upheld social security and other pieces of New Deal legislation thereafter. Moreover, Roosevelt was slowly able to appoint more amenable justices as conservatives died or retired. Still, the court-packing scheme damaged the Roosevelt administration, and opposition to the New Deal began to emerge and coalesce.1<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    Compounding his problems, Roosevelt and his advisors made a costly economic misstep. Believing the United States had turned a corner, Roosevelt cut spending in 1937. The American economy plunged nearly to the depths of 1932\u20131933. Roosevelt reversed course and, adopting the approach popularized by the English economist John Maynard Keynes, hoped that countercyclical, compensatory spending would pull the country out of the recession, even at the expense of a growing budget deficit. It was perhaps too late. The Roosevelt Recession of 1937 became fodder for critics. Combined with the court-packing scheme, the recession allowed for significant gains by a conservative coalition of southern Democrats and Midwestern Republicans. By 1939, Roosevelt struggled to build congressional support for new reforms, let alone maintain existing agencies. Moreover, the growing threat of war in Europe stole the public\u2019s attention and increasingly dominated Roosevelt\u2019s interests. The New Deal slowly receded into the background, outshined by war.2<\/sup><\/a><\/p>\n

    Notes<\/h4>\n
      \n
    1. Alan Brinkley, The End of Reform: New Deal Liberalism in Recession and War <\/em>(New York: Knopf, 1995). \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n
    2. Ibid. \"image\"<\/a><\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":12,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-202","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry"],"part":32,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/202","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":4,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/202\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":693,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/202\/revisions\/693"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/32"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/202\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=202"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=202"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/ppschis1220ushistsincecivilwar\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=202"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}