21 Moral, Militant, or Necessary?

Buildings destroyed. Thousands dead. The world in shock. It was the scene of devastation at Hiroshima on August 6, 1945. Justifications and criticisms for the use of atomic bombs to end World War II (WWII) have been circulating for decades, balancing questions of moral statutes, military prerogatives, and possible motivations. When I first considered this issue, I believed it would be relatively simple to find out whether or not the atomic bombs were the most moral way to end WWII, but I could not have been more misguided. After hours of research about different opinions on why the bombs were used, I realized that this simple question required a much more complex answer. Undoubtedly, no person could argue that dropping atomic bombs on civilians was a moral action; however, I came to the conclusion that few morally plausible options were available at the time. Considering the numerous relevant factors that comprise this issue, I believe that the final decision of dropping the atomic bombs was the most moral means of ending WWII.

Before I could begin seriously determining my stance on this issue, I needed to understand what exactly I meant by the term “moral” and how this definition should be applied to the atomic bombings. I eventually created this definition: morality is the action that most fiercely defends the value of human life, treats all humans as equally valuable, avoids as much loss of human life as possible, and, if punishment must occur, ensures that it occurs in the most humane way possible. After conducting additional research, I realized that morality during a war must be different than morality during a time of peace because of the different objectives and circumstances that exist during a war.  Wartime morality—a title I fashioned for this idea—is the action that, still accomplishing the goal (e.g., capturing a military base), avoids unnecessary loss of life, treats all human beings as equally valuable, and ensures that casualties occur in the most humane way possible. This definition provided me with the ability to evaluate actions in war, specifically the atomic bombs, from a moral standpoint.

When I initially began my research, I found many suggestions that were presented as alternatives for using the atomic bombs, as well as many arguments that were made against the bombings. All of these criticisms made it difficult for me to regard the atomic bombs as the most moral way of ending the war. For example, in his book The United States at War, 1941-1945, Hess mentioned several alternatives, such as dropping only one atomic bomb or simply performing a demonstration of the bomb to Japanese leaders. However, I realized that both of these options were not plausible. Unfortunately, even after dropping both the atomic bombs, in addition to military action by the Soviets, the Japanese were hesitant to surrender (Miscamble 112). Thus, in my opinion, suggesting that they would have surrendered after only one bombing is completely unrealistic. My research also yielded many inconsistencies regarding a demonstration of the bomb. First, the United States only had three atomic bombs at that point (Hess). Second, the possibility of the bomb not detonating could have been an incentive for the Japanese not to surrender and might have caused the United States to be censured by the other Allied nations (Hess). Third, as I mentioned before, the Japanese hesitated to surrender after two of their cities were bombed. Why would they surrender after simply seeing a demonstration of one bomb? Another option considered to end the war was invading the Japanese homeland. However, this would have resulted in more Allied casualties—including many prisoners of war being held by the Japanese—and likely even more Japanese casualties than those incurred in the bombings (Miscamble 113-114). Thus far in my research, my favorable opinion about the atomic bombs was upheld.

However, while some suggestions may have been unreasonable, I found several plausible arguments as well. One such argument that concerned me was the selection of targets for the atomic bomb. Even President Harry Truman realized that Hiroshima and Nagasaki were not simply military targets (Miscamble 117). This led me to the belief that, while the atomic bombs were necessary, their necessity would have been more strongly supported by morality if they had been dropped on almost exclusively military targets. However, after reading many recorded discussions held between individuals involved in understanding this decision, I recognized the multitude of factors that comprised the selection of a target for the atomic bombs. For example, the targets needed to be able to fully demonstrate the destructive potential of the bomb, and thus, they could not have already been overly damaged by conventional bombs (“Notes on Initial Meeting” 1, 5). In addition, many recommendations were made regarding the first use of the bomb, including that it should be dropped without prior warning on an area that was not predominantly civilian but that would have a large psychological impact (Arneson 13, 14). Another meeting of individuals noted that the bomb, if it were to be used against a military target, should be used against a military target located within “a much larger area subject to blast damage” to prevent the bomb completely missing its target (Derry and Ramsey 6). All of these factors and many more significantly limited which targets could be chosen. The last quote specifically illustrated at least one reason why strictly military objects were not chosen as targets for the atomic bombs. Although this concern could be explained somewhat reasonably, another point where the atomic bombs failed to meet my standards of wartime morality was the way in which the casualties of the bombs occurred.  At Hiroshima, the number of deaths reported was anywhere from 70,000 to 200,000 with the same number wounded; and at Nagasaki, as many as 60,000 deaths occurred (Farrell 2; Walker 80). When considering the descriptions of the injuries caused by the atomic bombs, I was both astounded and horrified. Many people were “[b]linded by the flash, burned and blistered by the heat, cut beyond recognition by flying glass…. It was not uncommon to see people whose skin was hanging off their bodies,” not to mention the deaths caused by radiation exposure (Walker 78). None of these descriptions can be classified as the most humane way of incurring casualties in a war. However, I was once again reminded of the fact that the Allies had no other reasonable alternatives to this event. This action was terrible, but everything that happens in war is terrible. The duty of those directing the war is to ensure that their orders uphold the standards of humane and just conflict; and I believe that, although the deaths and injuries of the atomic bombs were horrendous, the atomic bombs did present the clearest direction for upholding these standards. Thus, although I cannot view the atomic bombs in their entirety as a moral option, I believe that there were few other options available to the United States’ leaders at that point.

Unfortunately, by the inherent definition of war, people are going to die. Thus, while no one could argue that dropping the atomic bombs was strictly moral, I believe that the other options for ending the war were even less moral. When considering this fact, I believe it is important to note that, “All the alternate scenarios to secure victory would have meant significantly greater Allied casualties and much higher Japanese civilian and military casualties” (Miscamble 113). This quote illustrates how my definition of wartime morality applied to the atomic bombings. The war had to be ended; that was our, the Allies’, goal. The atomic bombing accomplished this goal, while still having the least number of casualties, not only on our side, but also on the Japanese side. This also upholds the clause that all human beings should still be treated as equal. Another point that had considerable weight with me was the knowledge of the civilian deaths that were occurring outside of the Allied and Japanese sphere. Throughout the course of the war, the Japanese committed unspeakable crimes against other Asian civilians, including raping, killing, and forcing others into their army and into work camps (Okihiro). In fact, Newman declares, “It is plausible to hold that upward of 250,000 people, mostly Asian but some Westerners, would have died each month the Japanese Empire struggled in its death throes beyond July 1945” (qtd. in Miscamble 114-115, italics in original). Thus, in ending the war with the atomic bombs, the Allies actually saved other innocent civilians from dying as well. While these facts cannot justify the killing of tens of thousands of Japanese civilians, I believe they provide rational reasoning about why the atomic bombs were necessary, even from a moral point of view.

Over the course of my research for this argument, I found my opinion shifting from one side of the continuum to the other quite often. My numerous discussions with other individuals continually led me back to rationalizations for the atomic bombings, but my research would inevitably provide me with new points of view to consider. I eventually reached the conclusion I did with the understanding that the morality of such a weighty question could never be fully explained. The question of the atomic bombs will continually be debated because genuine pursuits of truth, honor, and ethics are represented on both sides of the argument. My opinion, as imperfect as it may be, represents what I believe to be an honest pursuit of the value of human life seen through the lens of world circumstances at the time of WWII. As we consider the morality of dropping the atomic bombs, we remember to keep the horrors of WWII as a reminder of the responsibility we all bear to ensure that the virtues of justice, honor, and the value of human life will never again be put into question by another Hiroshima and Nagasaki.

Works Cited

Arneson, R. Gordon. “Notes of the Interim Committee Meeting Thursday, 31 May 1945, 10:00 A.M. to 1:15 P.M. – 2:15 P.M. to 4:15 P.M.” The National Security Archive, nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm. Memo.

Derry, J. A., and N. F. Ramsey. “Summary of Target Committee Meetings on 10 and 11 May 1945.” Received by L. R. Groves, 12 May 1945. The National Security Archive, nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm. Memo.

Farrell. Telegram to L. R. Groves. 10 Sept. 1945. The National Security Archive, nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm.

Hess, Gary R. “Hiroshima and Nagasaki: The Lingering Questions.” The United States at War, 1941 – 1945, 3rd ed., Harlan Davidson, 2020. American History, libdb.ppcc.edu/login?url=https://online.infobase.com/Auth/Index?aid=237803&itemid=WE52&articleId=404758.

Miscamble, Wilson D. “Necessary, But Was It Right?” The Most Controversial Decision: Truman, the Atomic Bombs, and the Defeat of Japan. Cambridge University Press, 2011, pp. 112-24. Cambridge Essential Histories. EBSCO eBook Collection, libdb.ppcc.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=366268&site=ehost-live&scope=site&ebv=EB&ppid=pp_Cover.

“Notes on Initial Meeting of Target Committee.” 2 May 1945. The National Security Archive, nsarchive2.gwu.edu//NSAEBB/NSAEBB162/index.htm. Memo.

Okihiro, Gary Y. “World War II.” American History Unbound: Asians and Pacific Islanders, University of California Press, 2017. American History, online.infobase.com/Auth/Index?aid=237803&itemid=WE52&articleId=485613.

Walker, J. Samuel. “Hiroshima and Nagasaki.” Prompt and Utter Destruction : Truman and the Use of Atomic Bombs Against Japan, University of North Carolina Press, 1997, pp. 76-97. EBSCO eBook Collection, libdb.ppcc.edu/login?url=http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=nlebk&AN=13977&site=ehost-live&scope=site&ebv=EB&ppid=pp_COVER.