{"id":2794,"date":"2022-05-17T15:42:36","date_gmt":"2022-05-17T15:42:36","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/chapter\/6-2-3-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god-2\/"},"modified":"2024-01-15T17:08:40","modified_gmt":"2024-01-15T17:08:40","slug":"6-2-3-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god-2","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/chapter\/6-2-3-the-ontological-argument-for-the-existence-of-god-2\/","title":{"raw":"6.2.3 The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God","rendered":"6.2.3 The Ontological Argument for the Existence of God"},"content":{"raw":"<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n<strong>LEARNING OBJECTIVES<\/strong>\r\n\r\n<hr \/>\r\n\r\nBy the end of this section you will discover:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>The nature of an ontological argument.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Anselms famous ontological argument and attempts to refute it.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Strenghts and weaknesses of the ontological proof for God.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">\u201c<em><strong>Ontos<\/strong><\/em>\u201d is the Greek word for \"foundation, \u201cbeing,\u201d or \u201cexistence.\u201d An ontological argument then attempts to prove the existence of God by exploring the concept of being.\u00a0 The <strong class=\"import-bold\">ontological<\/strong> <strong>argument<\/strong> is unusual in that it has no empirical premises at all; God is not called upon as an explanation for anything. Rather, God\u2019s existence is proven by reflection on the concept of God itself.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\" style=\"text-align: center;\"><ins><strong><strong>Anselm &amp; the Argument for God: Crash Course Philosophy #9<\/strong><\/strong><\/ins><\/p>\r\n[embed]https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/FmTsS5xFA6k[\/embed]\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\" style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=FmTsS5xFA6k&amp;list=PLUHoo4L8qXthO958RfdrAL8XAHvk5xuu9&amp;index=9&amp;t=217s\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Or watch the video here<\/a><\/p>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"alignright\" width=\"166\"]<img src=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/65\/2022\/05\/image59-2.jpeg\" alt=\"Statue of Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, from the exterior of Canterbury Cathedral\" width=\"166\" height=\"309\" \/> Anselm (1033-1109)[\/caption]\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">The argument\u2019s first proponent was Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). It\u2019s a familiar idea that God is great, the greatest, in fact, so great one cannot think of anything greater. Anselm draws on this familiar idea in his <em class=\"import-italic\">Proslogion<\/em>. There, Anselm characterizes God as <em>\u201ca being than which nothing greater can be conceived.<\/em><em>\u201d<\/em> In more modern language, Anselm is saying that God is the greatest conceivable being, that it is part of the concept of God that it is impossible to conceive of any being greater than God.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">It seems that existence is greater than nonexistence. So, if we conceive of God as nonexistent, then we can conceive of something greater than God: e.g., [an existing] shoe, a flea. But God is the greatest conceivable being, so our assumption of God\u2019s nonexistence must have been false, and God must exist.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Another way of putting this is that Anselm anticipates Hume\u2019s objection that no being\u2019s existence is necessary (since any being\u2019s nonexistence can be conceived without contradiction). Anselm insists that in this case the idea of God, properly understood, does give rise to contradiction if we suppose his non-existence. \u201cThe being which must exist does not exist\u201d seems like a contradiction.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">From the outset, the ontological argument has had difficulties heaped upon it. For one thing, although it may seem intuitively right that existence is greater than nonexistence, what does \u201cgreater\u201d mean? Better than? Preferable to? More real than? A satisfying characterization is hard to find.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Another early objection comes from Gaunilo of Marmoutier (994-1083), who makes the satirical suggestion of an island that is the greatest island that can be conceived. If such an island is to be greater than, say, Corsica, it must exist. Must we then say that such an island exists? Surely not. The difficulty raised by Gaunilo is that it seems that the predicate of existence can be bolted onto any concept illicitly.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A <strong>predicate<\/strong> is an attribute or characteristic of a thing.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A <strong>contingent<\/strong> being is a being that could logically not exist as well as exist. This applies to everything in the physical universe.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A <strong>necessary being<\/strong> is a being that cannot \u201cnot\u201d exist. It must exist.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Anselm responds, however, that his argument applies uniquely to the greatest <em class=\"import-italic\">being<\/em> that can be conceived (not a given, limited kind of being like an island), since although the imagined island would indeed be greater if it existed, it is not part of the concept of anything <em>except<\/em> the greatest being that can be conceived that it be greater than everything else, and so for it alone can we infer its existence from its concept.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A similar response is that contingency is part of the concept of an island (or dog, or horse, or any other specific, limited kind of being which we are acquainted with), so that a necessarily existing island would simply be a contradiction. Only with the non-specific concept of \u201ca being\u201d in general would contingency not just be included in the concept.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">The most historically influential criticism of the ontological argument, however, comes from Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In his <em class=\"import-italic\">Critique of Pure Reason<\/em>, Kant argues that existence is not a predicate (Kant 1781). Think about the concept of a banana. We can attribute certain predicates to it, such as \u201cyellowness\u201d and \u201csweetness.\u201d As time goes by, we might add further predicates to the concept, e.g., \u201cnutritional potassium source.\u201d Now think about what happens to the concept of a banana when you suppose that bananas exist. It seems that the concept is not changed at all. To say something exists is not to say anything about the concept of it, only that the concept is instantiated in reality. But if existence cannot be part of a concept, then it cannot be part of the concept of God and cannot be found therein by any sort of analysis.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Kant\u2019s argument was widely taken to be calamitous to the ontological argument. However, in the 1960s, the argument was rejuvenated, in a form that (perhaps) avoids Kant\u2019s criticism, by Norman Malcolm (1911-1990). Malcolm suggests that although existence may not be a predicate, <em>necessary<\/em> existence is a predicate. As contingent beings, we are the sort of things that can come into and go out of existence. But if God exists, then he is a necessary being rather than a contingent being. So, if he exists, he cannot go out of existence. This is a predicate God enjoys, even if existence per se is not a predicate (Malcolm 1960). Intuitively, \u201cindestructibility\u201d and \u201cimmortality\u201d are predicates that alter the concept of a thing.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Another modern version of an Anselmian ontological argument is offered by Lynne Rudder Baker (1944-2017). Baker\u2019s version avoids the claim that existence is a predicate (as well as several other traditional difficulties). Instead, Baker notes that individuals who do not exist have mediated causal powers, that is, they cause effects but only because individuals who do exist have thoughts and beliefs about them: Santa Claus has the mediated causal power to get children to leave cookies out for him, children who themselves have unmediated causal powers. In short, to have unmediated causal powers is intuitively greater than having mediated causal powers, so given that God is the greatest being that can be conceived of, God must have unmediated causal powers, and so he must exist (Baker 2013).<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A final difficulty that we may mention for these three theistic proofs is whether they prove the existence of \u2026the God of classical theism \u2026 \u2014 which it is the concern of most theistic philosophers to do. The teleological argument may show a designer, which corresponds tolerably well to the creator-hood of God but seems to fall short of showing God\u2019s other attributes, like omnibenevolence. Similarly, the world-cause or necessary being purportedly shown by the cosmological and ontological arguments may seem far distant from a personal God who is interested in our affairs. One theistic response is that these arguments may work in combination, or be supplemented by the evidence of revelations, religious experiences, and miracles\u2026, or we may be able to find ways in which one divine attribute implies the others. Bear in mind also that there are many less well-known theistic arguments beyond these three traditional ones\u2026 (Ibid, Hunt, in Branson, I<em>ntroduction to Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion<\/em>, Chapter 2: Reasons to Believe--Theoretical Arguments).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--key-takeaways\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<h2 class=\"textbox__title\">Taking it to the Streets...<\/h2>\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">Find 6-8 people who identify as theists and believe in God. Ask them to explain their reasons for their belief. Take note of their answers. What commonalities do you notice among the responses? Which response stands out to you as the strongest? Which response is the weakest?<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">Ask these same people the following question and take note of their responses:<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\u201cIf you wanted to prove the existence of God, how would you go about it? What do you think is the best way to prove the existence of God without appealing to scripture?\u201d<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">Again, take note of any commonalities in people\u2019s answers. Which approaches to proving God\u2019s existence are most common? Are there any unique approaches in your responses? What role do reason and evidence play in people\u2019s ideas of how to prove God?<\/div>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">In any of your responses did you notice aspects of the Cosmological, Teleological or Ontological arguments being utilized? Did any of your respondents really struggle to answer these questions or seem incapable of providing answers? Why do you think that might be?<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<h4>Strengths and Weaknesses of the Ontological Argument.<\/h4>\r\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">A strength of an a priori argument is that as a deductive argument if you accept the premises then the conclusion must be true as it is logically necessary. Thus, God must, by definition, exist. To accept as true on the one hand that God is 'that than which no greater can be conceived and then to say that God doesn't exist is to make a logical error.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">Also, the argument avoids the objections to cosmological arguments that infer (weakly) from a part to the whole and from the universe to something outside the universe.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">However, scientists would have trouble with the notion of a necessarily existing thing. For them, necessary existence is not a coherent concept as existence can only be contingent.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">Also, there seems to be no reason that perfection entails existence. In fact, it might be argued that existence adds limits to the idea of perfection. Such an idea, if it must exist, cannot, therefore \u201cnot exist.\u201d A limitation?<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">We can use Anselm\u2019s logic to prove the existence of all kinds of things that don\u2019t actually exist \u2013 leprechauns, unicorns\u2014only the concept exists. So, by this logic, the Ontological argument only shows us ideas, it does not prove actual existence.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">The argument in no way establishes the existence of a personal being or of the Biblical God.<\/p>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n&nbsp;\r\n<div>\r\n<p style=\"text-align: center;\" align=\"center\"><strong>Works Cited<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">CrashCourse.<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>Anselm &amp; the Argument for God: Crash Course Philosophy #9<\/i>.<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>YouTube<\/i>, YouTube, 4 Apr. 2016, https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=FmTsS5xFA6k&amp;list=PLUHoo4L8qXthO958RfdrAL8XAHvk5xuu9&amp;index=9&amp;t=217s. Accessed 12 Apr. 2022.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Ealdgyth. \u201cAnselm statue canterbury cathedral outside.\u201d<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>Wikimedia Commons<\/i>, Wikimedia Commons, 31 May 2010, https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Anselmstatuecanterburycathedraloutside.jpg. Accessed 12 Apr. 2022.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p><strong>LEARNING OBJECTIVES<\/strong><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>By the end of this section you will discover:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The nature of an ontological argument.<\/li>\n<li>Anselms famous ontological argument and attempts to refute it.<\/li>\n<li>Strenghts and weaknesses of the ontological proof for God.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">\u201c<em><strong>Ontos<\/strong><\/em>\u201d is the Greek word for &#8220;foundation, \u201cbeing,\u201d or \u201cexistence.\u201d An ontological argument then attempts to prove the existence of God by exploring the concept of being.\u00a0 The <strong class=\"import-bold\">ontological<\/strong> <strong>argument<\/strong> is unusual in that it has no empirical premises at all; God is not called upon as an explanation for anything. Rather, God\u2019s existence is proven by reflection on the concept of God itself.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\" style=\"text-align: center;\"><ins><strong><strong>Anselm &amp; the Argument for God: Crash Course Philosophy #9<\/strong><\/strong><\/ins><\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" id=\"oembed-1\" title=\"Anselm &amp; the Argument for God: Crash Course Philosophy #9\" width=\"500\" height=\"281\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/FmTsS5xFA6k?feature=oembed&#38;rel=0&#38;rel=0\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\" style=\"text-align: center;\"><a href=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=FmTsS5xFA6k&amp;list=PLUHoo4L8qXthO958RfdrAL8XAHvk5xuu9&amp;index=9&amp;t=217s\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Or watch the video here<\/a><\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<figure style=\"width: 166px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/65\/2022\/05\/image59-2.jpeg\" alt=\"Statue of Anselm, Archbishop of Canterbury, from the exterior of Canterbury Cathedral\" width=\"166\" height=\"309\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-caption-text\">Anselm (1033-1109)<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">The argument\u2019s first proponent was Anselm of Canterbury (1033-1109). It\u2019s a familiar idea that God is great, the greatest, in fact, so great one cannot think of anything greater. Anselm draws on this familiar idea in his <em class=\"import-italic\">Proslogion<\/em>. There, Anselm characterizes God as <em>\u201ca being than which nothing greater can be conceived.<\/em><em>\u201d<\/em> In more modern language, Anselm is saying that God is the greatest conceivable being, that it is part of the concept of God that it is impossible to conceive of any being greater than God.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">It seems that existence is greater than nonexistence. So, if we conceive of God as nonexistent, then we can conceive of something greater than God: e.g., [an existing] shoe, a flea. But God is the greatest conceivable being, so our assumption of God\u2019s nonexistence must have been false, and God must exist.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Another way of putting this is that Anselm anticipates Hume\u2019s objection that no being\u2019s existence is necessary (since any being\u2019s nonexistence can be conceived without contradiction). Anselm insists that in this case the idea of God, properly understood, does give rise to contradiction if we suppose his non-existence. \u201cThe being which must exist does not exist\u201d seems like a contradiction.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">From the outset, the ontological argument has had difficulties heaped upon it. For one thing, although it may seem intuitively right that existence is greater than nonexistence, what does \u201cgreater\u201d mean? Better than? Preferable to? More real than? A satisfying characterization is hard to find.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Another early objection comes from Gaunilo of Marmoutier (994-1083), who makes the satirical suggestion of an island that is the greatest island that can be conceived. If such an island is to be greater than, say, Corsica, it must exist. Must we then say that such an island exists? Surely not. The difficulty raised by Gaunilo is that it seems that the predicate of existence can be bolted onto any concept illicitly.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A <strong>predicate<\/strong> is an attribute or characteristic of a thing.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A <strong>contingent<\/strong> being is a being that could logically not exist as well as exist. This applies to everything in the physical universe.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A <strong>necessary being<\/strong> is a being that cannot \u201cnot\u201d exist. It must exist.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Anselm responds, however, that his argument applies uniquely to the greatest <em class=\"import-italic\">being<\/em> that can be conceived (not a given, limited kind of being like an island), since although the imagined island would indeed be greater if it existed, it is not part of the concept of anything <em>except<\/em> the greatest being that can be conceived that it be greater than everything else, and so for it alone can we infer its existence from its concept.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A similar response is that contingency is part of the concept of an island (or dog, or horse, or any other specific, limited kind of being which we are acquainted with), so that a necessarily existing island would simply be a contradiction. Only with the non-specific concept of \u201ca being\u201d in general would contingency not just be included in the concept.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">The most historically influential criticism of the ontological argument, however, comes from Immanuel Kant (1724-1804). In his <em class=\"import-italic\">Critique of Pure Reason<\/em>, Kant argues that existence is not a predicate (Kant 1781). Think about the concept of a banana. We can attribute certain predicates to it, such as \u201cyellowness\u201d and \u201csweetness.\u201d As time goes by, we might add further predicates to the concept, e.g., \u201cnutritional potassium source.\u201d Now think about what happens to the concept of a banana when you suppose that bananas exist. It seems that the concept is not changed at all. To say something exists is not to say anything about the concept of it, only that the concept is instantiated in reality. But if existence cannot be part of a concept, then it cannot be part of the concept of God and cannot be found therein by any sort of analysis.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Kant\u2019s argument was widely taken to be calamitous to the ontological argument. However, in the 1960s, the argument was rejuvenated, in a form that (perhaps) avoids Kant\u2019s criticism, by Norman Malcolm (1911-1990). Malcolm suggests that although existence may not be a predicate, <em>necessary<\/em> existence is a predicate. As contingent beings, we are the sort of things that can come into and go out of existence. But if God exists, then he is a necessary being rather than a contingent being. So, if he exists, he cannot go out of existence. This is a predicate God enjoys, even if existence per se is not a predicate (Malcolm 1960). Intuitively, \u201cindestructibility\u201d and \u201cimmortality\u201d are predicates that alter the concept of a thing.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">Another modern version of an Anselmian ontological argument is offered by Lynne Rudder Baker (1944-2017). Baker\u2019s version avoids the claim that existence is a predicate (as well as several other traditional difficulties). Instead, Baker notes that individuals who do not exist have mediated causal powers, that is, they cause effects but only because individuals who do exist have thoughts and beliefs about them: Santa Claus has the mediated causal power to get children to leave cookies out for him, children who themselves have unmediated causal powers. In short, to have unmediated causal powers is intuitively greater than having mediated causal powers, so given that God is the greatest being that can be conceived of, God must have unmediated causal powers, and so he must exist (Baker 2013).<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">A final difficulty that we may mention for these three theistic proofs is whether they prove the existence of \u2026the God of classical theism \u2026 \u2014 which it is the concern of most theistic philosophers to do. The teleological argument may show a designer, which corresponds tolerably well to the creator-hood of God but seems to fall short of showing God\u2019s other attributes, like omnibenevolence. Similarly, the world-cause or necessary being purportedly shown by the cosmological and ontological arguments may seem far distant from a personal God who is interested in our affairs. One theistic response is that these arguments may work in combination, or be supplemented by the evidence of revelations, religious experiences, and miracles\u2026, or we may be able to find ways in which one divine attribute implies the others. Bear in mind also that there are many less well-known theistic arguments beyond these three traditional ones\u2026 (Ibid, Hunt, in Branson, I<em>ntroduction to Philosophy, Philosophy of Religion<\/em>, Chapter 2: Reasons to Believe&#8211;Theoretical Arguments).<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--key-takeaways\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<h2 class=\"textbox__title\">Taking it to the Streets&#8230;<\/h2>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">Find 6-8 people who identify as theists and believe in God. Ask them to explain their reasons for their belief. Take note of their answers. What commonalities do you notice among the responses? Which response stands out to you as the strongest? Which response is the weakest?<\/div>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">Ask these same people the following question and take note of their responses:<\/div>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\u201cIf you wanted to prove the existence of God, how would you go about it? What do you think is the best way to prove the existence of God without appealing to scripture?\u201d<\/div>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">Again, take note of any commonalities in people\u2019s answers. Which approaches to proving God\u2019s existence are most common? Are there any unique approaches in your responses? What role do reason and evidence play in people\u2019s ideas of how to prove God?<\/div>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">In any of your responses did you notice aspects of the Cosmological, Teleological or Ontological arguments being utilized? Did any of your respondents really struggle to answer these questions or seem incapable of providing answers? Why do you think that might be?<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<h4>Strengths and Weaknesses of the Ontological Argument.<\/h4>\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">A strength of an a priori argument is that as a deductive argument if you accept the premises then the conclusion must be true as it is logically necessary. Thus, God must, by definition, exist. To accept as true on the one hand that God is &#8216;that than which no greater can be conceived and then to say that God doesn&#8217;t exist is to make a logical error.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">Also, the argument avoids the objections to cosmological arguments that infer (weakly) from a part to the whole and from the universe to something outside the universe.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">However, scientists would have trouble with the notion of a necessarily existing thing. For them, necessary existence is not a coherent concept as existence can only be contingent.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">Also, there seems to be no reason that perfection entails existence. In fact, it might be argued that existence adds limits to the idea of perfection. Such an idea, if it must exist, cannot, therefore \u201cnot exist.\u201d A limitation?<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">We can use Anselm\u2019s logic to prove the existence of all kinds of things that don\u2019t actually exist \u2013 leprechauns, unicorns\u2014only the concept exists. So, by this logic, the Ontological argument only shows us ideas, it does not prove actual existence.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-BodyText\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt;\">The argument in no way establishes the existence of a personal being or of the Biblical God.<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div>\n<p style=\"text-align: center; text-align: center;\"><strong>Works Cited<\/strong><\/p>\n<div>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">CrashCourse.<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>Anselm &amp; the Argument for God: Crash Course Philosophy #9<\/i>.<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>YouTube<\/i>, YouTube, 4 Apr. 2016, https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/watch?v=FmTsS5xFA6k&amp;list=PLUHoo4L8qXthO958RfdrAL8XAHvk5xuu9&amp;index=9&amp;t=217s. Accessed 12 Apr. 2022.<\/p>\n<div>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Ealdgyth. \u201cAnselm statue canterbury cathedral outside.\u201d<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>Wikimedia Commons<\/i>, Wikimedia Commons, 31 May 2010, https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Anselmstatuecanterburycathedraloutside.jpg. Accessed 12 Apr. 2022.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":5,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":"cc-by-nc"},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[62,63],"license":[55],"class_list":["post-2794","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless","contributor-daniel-g-shaw","contributor-ph-d","license-cc-by-nc"],"part":2780,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/2794","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":2,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/2794\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":2952,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/2794\/revisions\/2952"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/2780"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/2794\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2794"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=2794"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=2794"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=2794"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}