{"id":2700,"date":"2022-05-17T02:35:27","date_gmt":"2022-05-17T02:35:27","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/chapter\/3-4-2-deontological-ethics-2\/"},"modified":"2024-08-26T20:48:03","modified_gmt":"2024-08-26T20:48:03","slug":"3-4-2-deontological-ethics-2","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/chapter\/3-4-2-deontological-ethics-2\/","title":{"raw":"3.4.2 Deontological Ethics","rendered":"3.4.2 Deontological Ethics"},"content":{"raw":"<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n\r\n<strong>LEARNING OBJECTIVES<\/strong>\r\n\r\n<hr \/>\r\n\r\nBy the end of this section you will discover:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>The meaning of Deontological Ethics.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Immanuel Kant's approach to Ethics.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Key concepts in Kant's ethics, including:\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>Duty<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The Good Will<\/li>\r\n \t<li>The Categorical Imperative<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Several important formulations of Kant's Categorical Imperative.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Suicide as an example of Kantian thinking.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Strengths and Weaknesses of Kantian Ethics.<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\nIn Normative Ethics <strong>Deontological<\/strong> theories are those that maintain that ethical evaluations are rooted somehow in the action or some feature of the action which would result in a moral duty or obligation. In this approach, the consequences of the action are not generally considered to be morally relevant.\u00a0 Thus, deontological theories often are based on or generate a set of duties. <em>Deon<\/em> is Greek for duty or obligation.\u00a0 What is the source of such duty?\u00a0 Various theories answer that question differently.\u00a0 It could be a deity, natural law, reason, a sense of justice, or one's sense of self.\r\n<h4>Immanuel Kant: The Moral Imperative<\/h4>\r\n[caption id=\"\" align=\"alignright\" width=\"244\"]<img src=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/65\/2022\/05\/image25-2.jpeg\" alt=\"Engraving depicting Emanuel Kant\" width=\"244\" height=\"345\" \/> Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804) from an engraving in the German National Library.[\/caption]\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Konigsberg in East Prussia, where he died in 1804. Kant is famous for revolutionizing how we think about just about every aspect of the world \u2014 including science, art, ethics, religion, the self, and reality. He is one of the most important thinkers of all time, which is even more remarkable given the fact that Kant is a truly awful writer. His sentences are full of technical language, are very long, and incredibly dense. You have been warned!<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Kant is a rationalist writing during the Enlightenment (1685\u20131815). He thinks that we can gain knowledge from our senses and through our rational capacities. This means his general philosophical approach starts by asking what we can know\u00a0<em class=\"import-Emphasis\">a priori<\/em>. This is key to understanding his work but also makes his writing on ethics seem a bit odd. We think the study of ethics \u2014 unlike say math \u2014 ought to direct our eye to what is going on around us in the world. Yet Kant starts by turning his eyes \u201cinward\u201d to thinking about ethical ideas.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Kant believes that in doing this people will come to recognize that certain actions are right and wrong irrespective of how we might feel and irrespective of any consequences. For Kant, actions are right if they respect what he calls the Categorical Imperative. For example, because lying fails to respect the Categorical Imperative it is wrong and is wrong irrespective of how we might feel about lying or what might happen if we did lie; it is actions that are right and wrong rather than consequences. This means that Kant\u2019s theory is deontological rather than teleological. It focuses on our duties rather than our ends\/goals\/consequences.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">There is, however, something intuitive about the idea that morality is based on reason rather than feelings or consequences. Consider my pet cat Spartan. He performs certain actions like scrabbling under bed covers, meowing at birds, and chasing his tail. Now consider my daughter Beth, she performs certain actions like caring for her sister and helping the homeless.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Spartan\u2019s actions are not moral whereas Beth\u2019s actions are. Spartan\u2019s thinking and actions are driven by his desires and inclination. He eats and plays and sleeps when he desires to do so, there is no reasoning on his part. Beth, in contrast, can reflect on the various reasons she has, reasons to care for her sister and the homeless.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">We might think then that humans are moral beings not because we have certain desires but precisely because we are rational. We have the ability to \u201cstand back\u201d and consider what we are doing and why. Kant certainly thought so and he takes this insight as his starting point.<\/p>\r\n<p style=\"text-align: center\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline\"><strong>Kant &amp; Categorical Imperatives: Crash Course Philosophy #35<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\r\n[embed]https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/8bIys6JoEDw[\/embed]\r\n<p style=\"text-align: center\"><strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/8bIys6JoEDw\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Or watch the video here<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n<h4>Some Key Kantian Ideas<\/h4>\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>Duty<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Kant\u2019s main works in ethics are his Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Neither gives practical advice about particular situations but rather through rational reflection, Kant seeks to establish the supreme principle of morality.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">He starts with the notion of \u201cduty\u201d and although this is a rather old-fashioned term, the idea behind it should sound familiar. Imagine, your friend has told you that she is pregnant but asks you to promise to keep her secret. Through the coming weeks, this juicy bit of gossip is on the tip of your tongue, but you do not tell anyone because of your promise. There are things we recognize as being required of us irrespective of what we (really) desire to do. This is what Kant means by duty.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">The Good Will<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">But this raises the question. If it is not our desires that move us to do what is right (even really strong desires), what does? In our example, why is it that we keep our promise despite the strong desire to gossip? Kant\u2019s answer is \u201cthe good will.\u201d\u00a0 For Kant, the good will is something in us that desires to do what is right regardless of the effects or consequences:<\/p>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n<div style=\"padding-left: 40px\"><i>A good\u00a0will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes - because of its fitness for\u00a0attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone - that is, good in itself.<\/i><\/div>\r\n<div><\/div>\r\n<div>It is also good without qualification.<\/div>\r\n<div><\/div>\r\n<div style=\"padding-left: 40px\"><i>It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the. world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.<\/i><\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">What does Kant mean? Well, pick anything you like that you think might make an action good \u2014 for example, happiness, pleasure, courage, and then ask yourself if there are any situations you can think of where an action having those features makes those actions worse.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">It seems there are. For example, imagine someone who is happy when kicking a cat; someone taking pleasure in torture; or a serial killer whose courage allows her to abduct children in broad daylight. In such cases, happiness, pleasure, and courage only serve to make the actions more evil. Kant thinks we can repeat this line of thinking for anything and everything, except one thing \u2014 the good will.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">The good will unlike anything else is good unconditionally. and what makes a good will \u201cgood\u201d is willing alone, not other attitudes, consequences, or characteristics of the agent. Even Kant thinks this sounds like a rather strange idea. So how can he (and we) be confident that the good will even exists?<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Consider<strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Mahatma Gandhi\u2019s (1869\u20131948) non-violent protest for Indian independence. He stood peacefully whilst the British police beat him. Here is a case where there must have been an overwhelming desire to fight back. But he did not. In this type of action, Kant would claim that we \u201csee\u201d the good will \u201cshining like a jewel.\u201d \u00a0Seeing such resilience in the face of such awful violence, we are humbled and can recognize, what Kant calls, its moral worth.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--key-takeaways\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<h2 class=\"textbox__title\">Taking it to the streets...<\/h2>\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\r\n\r\nAsk several friends to share a list of moral actions that are good without qualification, or without considering the consequences.\r\n\r\nTest each friend\u2019s responses by sharing them with the other friends and asking for their feedback. Do they agree with the choices? If not, what is wrong with one or more of them?\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Obviously, not all actions are as significant as Gandhi\u2019s. However, Kant thinks that any acts like this, which are performed despite conflicting desires, are due to the good will. Considering such actions means we can recognize that the good will exists.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>Acting for the Sake of Duty and Acting in Accordance with Duty<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">From what we have said above about the nature of duty and good will, we can see why Kant says that to act from good will is acting for the sake of duty. We act despite our desires to do otherwise. For Kant, this means that acting for the sake of duty is the only way that an action can have moral worth. We will see below what we have to do for our actions to be carried out for the sake of duty. However, before we do this, we need to be really clear on this point about moral worth.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Imagine that you are walking with a friend. You pass someone begging on the street. Your friend starts to weep, fumbles in his wallet and gives the beggar some money, and tells you that he feels such empathy with the poor man that he just has to help him.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">For Kant, your friend\u2019s action has no moral worth because what is moving him to give money is\u00a0<em class=\"import-Emphasis\">empathy rather than duty!<\/em>\u00a0He is acting in accordance with duty. However, Kant does think your friend should be applauded as such an action is something that is of value although it wouldn\u2019t be correct to call it a moral action.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">To make this point clearer, Kant asks us to consider someone who has no sympathy for the suffering of others and no inclination to help them. But despite this:<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">\u2026he nevertheless tears himself from his deadly insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty, then for the first time, his action has genuine moral worth.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">In contrast to our friend, this person is acting for the sake of duty and hence their action is moral. We must be careful though. Kant is not telling us to become emotionally barren robots! He is not saying that before we can act morally we need to get rid of sympathy, empathy, desires, love, and inclinations. This would make Kant\u2019s moral philosophy an absurd non-starter.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Let us see why Kant is not saying this. Consider an action such as giving to others. We should ask whether an action of giving to others would have been performed even if the agent lacked the desire to do so. If the answer is \u201cyes\u201d then the act has moral worth. This though is consistent with the agent actually having those desires. The question for Kant is not whether an agent has desires but what moved the agent to act. If they acted because of those desires, they acted in accordance with duty and their action had no moral worth. If they acted for the sake of duty, and just happened to have those desires, then their action has moral worth.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li>Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">If we agree with Kant and want to act for the sake of duty, what should we do? His answer is that we have to act out of respect for the moral law. He has two examples of how this works in practice: lying and suicide. We look at the former in Chapter 13, we will consider Kant\u2019s example of suicide at the end of this chapter. However, before doing this we need to get a sense of what Kant has in mind when he talks about acting out of respect for the moral law.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">The moral law is what he calls the \u201cCategorical Imperative\u201d. He thinks there are three formulations of this.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<table class=\"lines aligncenter\" style=\"width: 409.5pt;height: 246px\" border=\"0pt none windowtext\" cellpadding=\"5.4pt\">\r\n<thead>\r\n<tr style=\"height: 0\">\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 30px;width: 89.359375px;text-align: center\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Formulation<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 30px;width: 71.296875px;text-align: center\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Shorthand<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 30px;width: 342.234375px;text-align: center;vertical-align: middle\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Imperative<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/thead>\r\n<tbody>\r\n<tr class=\"TableNormal-R\" style=\"height: 46px\">\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 46px;width: 89.359375px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">First Formulation<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 46px;width: 71.296875px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">C-1<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 46px;width: 342.234375px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">\u2026act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr class=\"TableNormal-R\" style=\"height: 109px\">\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #ebebec;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 109px;width: 89.359375px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Second Formulation<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #ebebec;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 109px;width: 71.296875px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">C-2<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #ebebec;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 109px;width: 342.234375px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\" style=\"margin-right: 146.1pt\">So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<tr class=\"TableNormal-R\" style=\"height: 61px\">\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 61px;width: 89.359375px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Third Formulation<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 61px;width: 71.296875px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">C-3<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 61px;width: 342.234375px\">\r\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">\u2026every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends.<\/p>\r\n<\/td>\r\n<\/tr>\r\n<\/tbody>\r\n<\/table>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: left\">We will consider these in turn, showing how they are linked. Consider then, CI-1. Kant\u2019s idea is that we use this \u201ctest\u201d to see what maxims are morally permissible. If we act in accordance with those then we are acting from duty and our actions have moral worth. Let us look at what this means.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Initially, it is worth considering what \u201ccategorical\u201d and \u201cimperative\u201d mean. An imperative is just a command. \u201cClean your room!\u201d is an imperative I give my daughter every Saturday. \u201cDo not park in front of these gates!\u201d is a command on my neighbor\u2019s gate. \u201cLove your God with all your heart, mind and soul\u201d is a command from the Bible.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">What about the \u201ccategorical\u201d part? If a command is categorical then people ought to follow it irrespective of how they feel about following it, irrespective of what consequences might follow, or who may or may not have told them to follow it. For example, the command \u201cdo not peel the skin of babies\u201d is categorical. You ought not to do this and the fact that this might be your life\u2019s ambition, or that you really want to do it, or that your teacher has told you to do it, is completely irrelevant.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Contrast this with Hypothetical Imperatives. If I tell my daughter to clean her room, this is hypothetical. This is because whether she ought to clean her room is dependent on conditions about her and me. If she does not care about a clean room and about what her dad thinks, then it is not true that she ought to clean her room. Most commands are hypothetical. For example, \u201cstudy!\u201d You ought to study only if certain things are true about you; for example, that you care about doing well, that you want to succeed in the test etc.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Kant thinks that moral \u201coughts\u201d \u2014 for example, \u201cyou ought not to lie\u201d \u2014 are categorical. They apply to people irrespective of how they feel about them.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">The next thing we need is the idea of a \u201cmaxim\u201d. This is relatively simple and is best seen through the following examples. Imagine I\u2019m considering whether to make a false promise. Perhaps I think that by falsely promising you that l will pay you back I will be more likely to get a loan from you. In that case, my maxim is something like \u201cwhenever I can benefit from making a false promise I should do so\u201d.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Imagine I decide to exercise because I feel depressed, then I may be said to be acting on the maxim \u201cWhenever I feel depressed, I will exercise\u201d.\u00a0<strong class=\"import-Strong\">A maxim is a general principle or rule upon which we act.<\/strong>\u00a0We do not decide on a set of maxims, perhaps writing them down, and then try to live by them but rather a maxim is the principle or rule that can make sense of an action whether or not we have thought about it in these terms.<\/p>\r\n<strong>The First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative<\/strong>\r\n\r\nLet\u2019s put these bits together in relation to CI-1:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\"><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u2026 act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt\">The \u201ctest\u201d that CI-1 prescribes is the following. Consider the maxim on which you are thinking about acting and ask whether you can either (a) conceive that it becomes a universal law, or (b) will that it become a universal law. If a maxim fails on either (a) or (b) then there is no good reason for you to act on that maxim and it is morally impermissible to do so. If it passes the CI test, then it is morally permissible.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt\">Kant is<em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0not<\/em> saying that the CI-1 test is a way of working out what is and what is not moral. Presumably, we can think of lots of maxims, which are non-moral, which pass the test, for example, \u201cwhenever I am bored, I will watch TV\u201d.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Equally, he is not saying that if a maxim cannot be universalized then it is morally impermissible. Some maxims are just mathematically impossible. For example, \u201cwhenever I am going to <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">exercise,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> I will do it for an above the average amount of time\u201d. This maxim cannot be universalized because we cannot conceive that everyone does something above \u201caverage<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">.<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u201d<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Finally, it is worth remembering that the maxim must be able to be<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0willed<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> as a universal law. This is important because maxims such as \u201cif your name is Jill and you are 5 ft 11, you can lie\u201d will fail to be universalized because you cannot <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u201c<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">will<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u201d<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> that your name is Jill or that your height is 5 ft 11.<\/span> <span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> It has to be possible to will as a universal law and for this to be true it must be at least possible for it actually to come about. This shows that the common concern that we can get any maxim to pass the CI-1 test by simply adding more and more specific details, such as names, heights, or locations,<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0fails<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. This is very abstract<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u2026<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">.<\/span> <span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> Let us consider an example.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<ul>\r\n \t<li><span class=\"import-Hyperlink\">Perfect and Imperfect Duties<\/span><\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Recall the example of making a false promise to secure a loan. The maxim is \u201c<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">whenever I can benefit from doing so, I should make a false promise<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u201d. The question is whether I could conceive or will that this becomes a universal law.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">I could not. If everyone followed this maxim then we would all believe everyone else could make a false promise if it would benefit them to do so. Kant thinks such a situation is not conceivable because the very idea of making a promise relies on trust. But if \u201cwhenever it is of benefit to you, you can make false promises\u201d was to become a universal law then there would be no trust and hence no promising. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">So,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> by simply thinking about the idea of promising and lying we see the maxim will fail the test and because we cannot universalize the maxim, then making a false promise becomes morally impermissible. This is true universally for all people in all circumstances for anyone can, in principle, go through the same line of reasoning.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">A maxim failing at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">a<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) is what Kant calls a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0contradiction in conception<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">, and failing at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">a<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) means we are dealing with what Kant calls a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0perfect duty<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. In our example, we have shown we have a perfect duty not to make false promises.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Consider another example. Imagine that someone in need asks us for money but we decide not to help them. In this case, our maxim is \u201cwhenever someone is in need and asks for money do not give them money\u201d. Does this pass the CI-1 test?<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">No,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> it fails the CI-1 test. Although it is true that the maxim passes (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">a<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) not giving to the needy does not threaten<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0the very idea<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0of giving money away. Kant thinks that anyone thinking about this will see that that maxim will fail at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">b<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) and hence it is morally impermissible. Here is why.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">You cannot know if you will be in need in the future and presumably you would want to be helped if you were in need. In which case you are being inconsistent if you willed that \u201cpeople should not help those in need\u201d should become a universal law. For you might want people to help those in need in the future, namely,<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0you<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">So,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> we cannot will the maxim \u201cwhenever someone is in need do not help them\u201d to become a universal moral law. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Again,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> this is a thought process that<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0anyone<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0can go <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">through,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and it means that this moral claim is true universally for all people in all circumstances. Failing at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">b<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) is what Kant calls a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0contradiction in will<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">, and failing at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">b<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) means we are dealing with what Kant calls an<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0imperfect duty<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--exercises\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<h2 class=\"textbox__title\">Ponder if you will...<\/h2>\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\r\n\r\n<span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Can it ever be moral from Kant\u2019s point of view for lawmakers to create laws from which they are exempt? For instance, can a moral maxim ever state, \u201cEveryone with blonde hair must pay twice the tax of any other citizen unless that person is a member of the Senate--that person is exempt from all taxes?\u201d <\/span>\r\n\r\n<span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Could a person reasonably \u201cwill\u201d that this would be true?<\/span>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">It is absolutely key to recognize that CI-1 is not simply asking \u201cwhat if everyone did that?\u201d CI-1 is<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0not a form of Utilitarianism<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. Kant is not saying that it is wrong to make false promises because if people did then the world would be a horrible place. Rather Kant is asking whether we can<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0conceive or will<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> the maxim become a universal law.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<strong><span class=\"import-Hyperlink\">Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative<\/span><\/strong>\r\n\r\nThe second formulation (CI-2) is the following:\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px\"><i>So act that\u00a0you use\u00a0humanity, in your own person as well as\u00a0in the person of any other, always\u00a0at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.<\/i><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Kant thinks that CI-1 and CI-2 are two sides of the same coin, though precisely how they are related is a matter of scholarly debate. Put very simply CI-2 says you should not use people because if you do, you are failing to treat them as rational <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">agents,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and this is morally wrong.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">For example, if I use your essay without your knowledge then I have not treated you as a rational agent like I would have done had I asked you for your essay and you had freely chosen to let me have it. But given that I did not ask you, I was, in a sense,<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0making choices on your behalf<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and thus did not treat you as a rational agent. So according to Kant, I should always treat you <strong>as an end,<\/strong> never as a means. I should always treat you as a free rational agent.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--key-takeaways\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<h2 class=\"textbox__title\">Taking it to the streets...<\/h2>\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\r\n\r\n<span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Ask a few friends the question \u201cIs it ever right to use another person without their consent?\u201d <\/span>\r\n\r\n<span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">What kinds of answers do they offer?<\/span>\r\n\r\n<span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">If they say no, can you suggest to them times when indeed it might be? <\/span>\r\n\r\n<span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">For example, people convicted of crimes do not give consent to be imprisoned, yet society puts them there anyway. Or, more benignly, someone might tell a white lie so as not to hurt another person\u2019s feelings. <\/span>\r\n\r\n<span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">What would Kant say about these choices?<\/span>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Kant\u2019s theory then has a way of respecting the<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0dignity<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> of people. We should treat people with respect and with dignity purely on the basis that they are rational agents, and not because of their race, gender, education, upbringing, etc. From this, you can also see that Kant\u2019s theory allows us to speak about \u201crights\u201d. If someone has a right then they have this right irrespective of gender, education, upbringing, etc. For example, Jill has a right to free speech because she is a person, consequently that right will not disappear if she changes her location, personal circumstances, relationship status, political viewpoint, etc. After all, she does not stop being a person.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Importantly, CI-2 does not say that you<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0either<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0treat someone as a means<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0or<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0an end. I could treat someone as an end<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0by<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0treating them as a means. Suppose that you have freely decided to become a taxi driver. If I use you as a means by asking you to take me to the <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">airport,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> I am also treating you as an end. But Kant does not believe this to be morally wrong because I am respecting you as a rational agent; after all, you<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0chose<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0to be a taxi driver. Of course, if I get into your car and point a gun at your head and ask to be taken to the airport then I am not treating you as an end but rather solely as a means, which is wrong.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<span class=\"import-Hyperlink\"><strong>The Third Formulation of the Categorical Imperative<\/strong> <\/span>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">The final formulation of the Categorical Imperative is a combination of CI-1 and CI-2. It asks us to imagine a kingdom that consists of only those people who act on CI-1. They never act on a maxim that cannot become a universal law. In such a kingdom people would treat people as <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">ends <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u2026<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px\"><i>... every\u00a0rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends.<\/i><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">In summary, we have seen that Kant thinks that acts have moral worth only if they are carried out for the sake of duty. Agents act for the sake of duty if they act out of respect for the moral law, which they do by following the Categorical Imperative in one of its formulations.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Consequently, Kant thinks that acts are wrong and right universally, irrespective of consequences and desires. If lying is <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">wrong,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> then it is wrong in all instances. From all this, it follows that we cannot be taught a set of moral rules for each and every situation, and Kant believes that it is up to us to work it out for ourselves by thinking rationally.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">There have been, and continue to be, many books and journal articles written about Kant\u2019s ethics. He has a profound and deep insight into the nature of <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">morality,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and he raises some fundamental questions about what it is to be human. Kant\u2019s moral theory is radically<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0Egalitarian<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0as his theory is blind to individual personal circumstances, race, <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">gender,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and ethnicity. Everyone is equal before the moral law!<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Related to this, his theory respects the rights of individuals and, relatedly, their dignity. Any theory that is to have a hope of capturing our notion of rights needs to be able to respect the thought that a right is not something that disappears if circumstances change. Jill has a right to life, period; we do not say Jill has a right to life \u201cif\u2026\u201d and then have to fill in the blanks. This is precisely something that Kant\u2019s theory can give us. CI-1 generates maxims that do not have exceptions and CI-2 tells us that we should<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0always<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0treat everyone as an end in themselves and<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0never<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0solely as a means to an end. It tells us, for example, that we ought not to kill Jill, and this holds true in all circumstances.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">There are, though, a number of tough questions that Kant\u2019s work raises. We consider some of these below. However, as with all the philosophical ideas we discuss in this book, Kant\u2019s work is still very much alive and has defenders across the world. Before we turn to these worries, we work through an example that Kant gives regarding suicide.<\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<h4>An example of Kantian Ethical Reasoning: Suicide<\/h4>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Kant is notoriously stingy with examples. One he does mention is suicide. This is an <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">emotional<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> topic and linked to questions about mental health and religion. An attraction of Kant\u2019s view is the ability to apply his Categorical Imperatives in a dispassionate way. His framework should allow us to \u201cplug in\u201d the issue and \u201cget out\u201d an answer. Let\u2019s see how this might work.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Kant thinks that suicide is always wrong and has very harsh words for someone who attempts suicide<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-citation\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify;margin-left: 36pt\"><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">He who so behaves, who has no respect for human nature and makes a thing of himself, becomes for everyone an Object of free will. We are free to treat him as a beast, as a thing, and to use him for our sport as we do a horse or a dog, for he is no longer a human being; he has made a thing of himself, and, having himself discarded his humanity, he cannot expect that others should respect humanity in him.<\/em><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">But why does he think this? How does this fit with Kant\u2019s Categorical Imperatives? We will look at the first two formulations.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Fundamental to remember is that for Kant the motive that drives<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0all<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0suicide is \u201cavoid evil\u201d. By which he means avoiding suffering, pain, and other negative outcomes in one\u2019s life. All suicide attempts are due to the fact that we love ourselves and thus want to \u201cavoid evils\u201d that may befall us.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Imagine then that I decide to commit suicide. Given what we have just said about my motives this means I will be acting on this maxim: \u201cFrom self\u2010love, I make as my principle to shorten my life when its continued duration threatens more evil than it promises satisfaction\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Following CI-1 the question then is whether it is possible to <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">universalize<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> this maxim. Kant thinks not. For him, it is unclear how we could<\/span> <span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">will it that all rational agents as the result of<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0self-love<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0can<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0destroy themselves<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0when their continued existence threatens more evil than it promises satisfaction. For Kant self-love leading to the destruction of the self is a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0contradiction<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Thus,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> he thinks that we have a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0perfect<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0(rather than an imperfect) duty to ourselves not to commit suicide. To do so is morally wrong. This is how Kant puts it:<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-citation\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify;margin-left: 36pt\"><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">One sees at once a contradiction in a system of nature whose law would destroy life [suicide] by means of the very same feeling that acts so as to stimulate the furtherance of life [self-love], and hence there could be no existence as a system of nature. Therefore, such a maxim cannot possibly hold as a universal law of nature and is, consequently, wholly opposed to the supreme principle of all duty.<\/em><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Notice a few odd things here in relation to CI-1. The point about <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">universalization<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> seems irrelevant. Kant could have just said it is a contradiction to will from self-love the destruction of oneself. It seems that there is nothing added by asking us to consider this point <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">universalized<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. It does not add weight to the claim that it is a contradiction.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Second, it is not really a \u201ccontradiction\u201d at all! It is different from the lying promise example. In this, it seems that the very concept of a promise relies on trust, which lying would destroy. In contrast in the suicide case, the \u201ccontradiction\u201d seems more like a by-product of Kant\u2019s assumption regarding the motivation of suicidal people. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">So,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> we can avoid the \u201ccontradiction\u201d if we allow for the possibility that suicide need not be driven by self-love. If this were <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">true,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> then there would be no \u201ccontradiction\u201d. Hence, it seems wrong to call the duty not to kill oneself \u2014 if such a duty exists \u2014 a \u201cperfect\u201d duty. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">So,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> the first formulation does not give Kant the conclusion that suicide is morally wrong.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Moving to the second formulation. This helps us understand Kant\u2019s harsh assessment of people attempting suicide. Remember he calls such people \u201cobjects\u201d or \u201cbeasts\u201d or \u201cthings\u201d. So, what is the difference between beasts or objects or things, and humans? The answer is that we are<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0rational<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. Recall, that for Kant our rationality is of fundamental value. If anyone\u2019s actions do not recognize someone else\u2019s <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">rationality,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> then they have done something morally wrong. This amounts to treating them merely as means to our own end. Given all this, you can see what Kant is getting at. For him committing suicide is treating yourself as a mere means to some end \u2014 namely the end of avoiding pain and suffering etc. \u2014 and not an end in itself. You are treating yourself as a \u201cbeast\u201d a \u201cthing\u201d an \u201cobject\u201d, not as a human being with the gift of reason. This is morally wrong.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Moreover, if you do this, then others treating you with respect<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0as a rational person<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0can conclude that you also want others to treat you in this way. Because if you are rational then you must think that it is OK to <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">universalize<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> the maxim that we can treat others as objects, beasts, and things. They can thus treat you as a beast, object, and thing and still be treating you with respect as a rational agent. With regard to attempting suicide, your action is wrong because you have ignored your own rationality. You have treated yourself as a mere means to an end.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">But, like the first formulation, this is very weak. It is unclear why in attempting suicide you are treating yourself as a mere means to an end. You might think you are respecting your rationality<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0by<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> considering suicide. Recall that Kant says that it is sometimes fine to treat people as a means to an end, <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">e.g.,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> a taxi driver. It is fine when people have given consent for you to treat them that way. In that case, suicide might be like the taxi driver's case. We have freely decided to treat ourselves as a means to an end. We are, then, treating ourselves as rational agents and not doing something morally wrong by committing suicide.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">There are some other things that Kant says about the wrongness of suicide that do not link to the Categorical Imperatives. For example, he talks about humans being the property of God and hence our lives not being something we can choose to extinguish. However, we need not discuss this here.<\/span><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">There is a consensus among Kantian scholars that, as it stands, Kant\u2019s argument against suicide fails. There are some though who use Kant\u2019s ideas as a starting point for a more convincing argument against suicide. <\/span><\/p>\r\n\r\n<h5>Excerpts from Kant\u2019s <em>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/em><\/h5>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt\"><em>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/em> (1785; German: <em>Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten<\/em>) is the first of Immanuel Kant's mature works on moral philosophy. In the following selections, see if you can find:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What does Kant suggest is a characteristic unique to rational beings?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognized as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What does Kant mean by an \u201cimperative\u201d?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an Imperative.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for everyone. \u2026<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What are the two kinds of Imperatives? How do they differ?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and, on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical\u2026.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Accordingly, the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual. \u2026. [while] the categorical imperative declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose\u2026.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">And thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one\u2019s own happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as means to another purpose.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be called that of Morality\u2026.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">Which kind of imperative is appropriate for a moral law?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">We shall therefore have to investigate \u00e0 priori the possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of a practical Law: all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law\u2026.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What is Kant\u2019s first formulation of the Categorial Imperative?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: <em>Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law<\/em>.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature<strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">In these four examples, how does Kant say we should employ the Categorical Imperative?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: \u201cFrom self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.\u201d It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: \u201cIs it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?\u201d Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: \u201cWhen I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so.\u201d Now this principle of self-love or of one\u2019s own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, \u201cIs it right?\u201d I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: \u201cHow would it be if my maxim were a universal law?\u201d Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: \u201cWhat concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!\u201d Now, no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and goodwill, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so. \u2026<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">How do we recognize duties from mere options?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove <em>\u00e0 priori<\/em> that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a practical law which commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse, and that the following of this law is duty.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">With the view of attaining to this, it is of extreme importance to remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all), and for this reason only be also a law for all human wills. \u2026<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What does Kant mean by saying that the human being is an \u201cend\u201d?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Now I say: man, and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations, themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus, the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature\u2019s, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">How does he use this idea to restate the Categorical Imperative into a Second Formulation?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: So <em>act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only<\/em>. We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">How does Kant reconsider the earlier four examples in light of this new formulation?<\/div>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">\u00a0To abide by the previous examples:<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e.g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.)<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The natural end that all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all, this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if everyone does not also endeavor, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also if that conception is to have its full effect with me.<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every man\u2019s freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly, because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything about them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end to men (subjectively), that is as an object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective ends, let them be what we will; it must therefore spring from pure reason. In fact the objective principle of all practical legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say, e.g., a law of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end; now by the second principle, the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will. (Dimock and Fischer, Ch. 4)<\/p>\r\n\r\n<h4>Strengths and Weaknesses of Kant\u2019s Deontology<\/h4>\r\n<p class=\"whitespace-pre-wrap\">Here are some of the main strengths and weaknesses attributed to the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant:<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"whitespace-pre-wrap\">Strengths:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol class=\"list-decimal pl-8 space-y-2\">\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">Kant's theory emphasizes moral absolute duties that are not contingent on particular circumstances or consequences. This strictness appeals to our moral intuition.\u00a0 Kantian ethics gives us a great tool to keep us from justifying our actions in order to come to some predetermined conclusion.<\/li>\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">Kant rightly points out that consequences are a dangerous consideration in ethics because they are ultimately unknown.<\/li>\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">It values all rational beings as \"ends in themselves\u201d due moral respect, and rejects the idea that persons can be used as means to an end.<\/li>\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">It derives duties rationally through consistent tests like universalization, aligning obligation with reason and autonomy.\u00a0 Kantian ethics has the strength of providing a logical path to moral decisions that can be discovered by religious and non-religious alike. By using the universalizing process anyone can determine the right action based on Good Will.<\/li>\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">It explains the objective necessity and authority we attribute to moral commands.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<p class=\"whitespace-pre-wrap\">Weaknesses:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol class=\"list-decimal pl-8 space-y-2\">\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">Kant has been accused of undue rigidity in advocating rule-based obligations, and of lacking flexibility when confronted by situational factors in decision-making.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>If acting purely from duty a person may be found guilty of a form of play-acting. For instance, an acquaintance might help you move and stays at the task all day long. You may think your acquaintance is acting like a good friend and perhaps he likes you better than you previously thought. At the end of the move, you say to him, \u201cThanks for helping me move. You acted as a great friend.\u201d He replies, \u201cWell, we all have duties to help others when we can. I was invited to play golf today, but I realized you had no one to help and it was my duty to help you, so I passed on playing golf.\u201d Suddenly you realize he is serious. He does not care for you, he is only interested in doing his cold, sober duty.<\/li>\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">Kant overemphasizes reason and thereby diminishes other moral faculties like emotions, care, and relationships.<\/li>\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">The universalizability test struggles with complex conflicts of duties and exceptions in application.\u00a0 Very often duties conflict with each other and Kant offers no way of knowing which duty is the more important in such cases. For example, one day you hear a knock on the door. You open the door and the Nazi officer bursts in and shouts, \u201cWhere are the Jews?\u201d You know quite well that the Jews are hidden in the attic. Now, you have two absolute duties vying for your attention: the duty to uphold one\u2019s promises (in this case, to the Jews) and the duty to tell the truth (to the Nazis). It seems you cannot perform your duty to one without violating the other. What do you do?<\/li>\r\n \t<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">There seems to be no clear duty in Kant's thinking to maximize overall welfare or prefer the most ethical option.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n<div>\r\n<p style=\"text-align: center\" align=\"center\"><strong>Works Cited<\/strong><\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Bause, Johann Friedrich. \u201cBildnis-Des-Immanuel-Kant-Johann-Friedrich-Bause-Verlagsort-Leipzig-1791-Berlin-Staatsbibliothek-Zu-Berlin.\u201d<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>Wikimedia Commons<\/i>, Wikimedia Commons, 12 Sept. 2016, https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Bildnis-des-immanuel-kant-johann-friedrich-bause-verlagsort-leipzig-1791-berlin-staatsbibliothek-zu-berlin.jpeg. Accessed 5 Apr. 2022.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div>\r\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">CrashCourse.<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>Kant &amp; Categorical Imperatives: Crash Course Philosophy #35<\/i>.<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>YouTube<\/i>, YouTube, 14 Nov. 2016, https:\/\/youtu.be\/8bIys6JoEDw. Accessed 5 Apr. 2022.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p><strong>LEARNING OBJECTIVES<\/strong><\/p>\n<hr \/>\n<p>By the end of this section you will discover:<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>The meaning of Deontological Ethics.<\/li>\n<li>Immanuel Kant&#8217;s approach to Ethics.<\/li>\n<li>Key concepts in Kant&#8217;s ethics, including:\n<ul>\n<li>Duty<\/li>\n<li>The Good Will<\/li>\n<li>The Categorical Imperative<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/li>\n<li>Several important formulations of Kant&#8217;s Categorical Imperative.<\/li>\n<li>Suicide as an example of Kantian thinking.<\/li>\n<li>Strengths and Weaknesses of Kantian Ethics.<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>In Normative Ethics <strong>Deontological<\/strong> theories are those that maintain that ethical evaluations are rooted somehow in the action or some feature of the action which would result in a moral duty or obligation. In this approach, the consequences of the action are not generally considered to be morally relevant.\u00a0 Thus, deontological theories often are based on or generate a set of duties. <em>Deon<\/em> is Greek for duty or obligation.\u00a0 What is the source of such duty?\u00a0 Various theories answer that question differently.\u00a0 It could be a deity, natural law, reason, a sense of justice, or one&#8217;s sense of self.<\/p>\n<h4>Immanuel Kant: The Moral Imperative<\/h4>\n<figure style=\"width: 244px\" class=\"wp-caption alignright\"><img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" src=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/65\/2022\/05\/image25-2.jpeg\" alt=\"Engraving depicting Emanuel Kant\" width=\"244\" height=\"345\" \/><figcaption class=\"wp-caption-text\">Immanuel Kant (1724- 1804) from an engraving in the German National Library.<\/figcaption><\/figure>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 in Konigsberg in East Prussia, where he died in 1804. Kant is famous for revolutionizing how we think about just about every aspect of the world \u2014 including science, art, ethics, religion, the self, and reality. He is one of the most important thinkers of all time, which is even more remarkable given the fact that Kant is a truly awful writer. His sentences are full of technical language, are very long, and incredibly dense. You have been warned!<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Kant is a rationalist writing during the Enlightenment (1685\u20131815). He thinks that we can gain knowledge from our senses and through our rational capacities. This means his general philosophical approach starts by asking what we can know\u00a0<em class=\"import-Emphasis\">a priori<\/em>. This is key to understanding his work but also makes his writing on ethics seem a bit odd. We think the study of ethics \u2014 unlike say math \u2014 ought to direct our eye to what is going on around us in the world. Yet Kant starts by turning his eyes \u201cinward\u201d to thinking about ethical ideas.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Kant believes that in doing this people will come to recognize that certain actions are right and wrong irrespective of how we might feel and irrespective of any consequences. For Kant, actions are right if they respect what he calls the Categorical Imperative. For example, because lying fails to respect the Categorical Imperative it is wrong and is wrong irrespective of how we might feel about lying or what might happen if we did lie; it is actions that are right and wrong rather than consequences. This means that Kant\u2019s theory is deontological rather than teleological. It focuses on our duties rather than our ends\/goals\/consequences.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">There is, however, something intuitive about the idea that morality is based on reason rather than feelings or consequences. Consider my pet cat Spartan. He performs certain actions like scrabbling under bed covers, meowing at birds, and chasing his tail. Now consider my daughter Beth, she performs certain actions like caring for her sister and helping the homeless.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Spartan\u2019s actions are not moral whereas Beth\u2019s actions are. Spartan\u2019s thinking and actions are driven by his desires and inclination. He eats and plays and sleeps when he desires to do so, there is no reasoning on his part. Beth, in contrast, can reflect on the various reasons she has, reasons to care for her sister and the homeless.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">We might think then that humans are moral beings not because we have certain desires but precisely because we are rational. We have the ability to \u201cstand back\u201d and consider what we are doing and why. Kant certainly thought so and he takes this insight as his starting point.<\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center\"><span style=\"text-decoration: underline\"><strong>Kant &amp; Categorical Imperatives: Crash Course Philosophy #35<\/strong><\/span><\/p>\n<p><iframe loading=\"lazy\" id=\"oembed-1\" title=\"Kant &amp; Categorical Imperatives: Crash Course Philosophy #35\" width=\"500\" height=\"281\" src=\"https:\/\/www.youtube.com\/embed\/8bIys6JoEDw?feature=oembed&#38;rel=0&#38;rel=0\" frameborder=\"0\" allowfullscreen=\"allowfullscreen\"><\/iframe><\/p>\n<p style=\"text-align: center\"><strong><strong>\u00a0<\/strong><\/strong><a href=\"https:\/\/youtu.be\/8bIys6JoEDw\" target=\"_blank\" rel=\"noopener noreferrer\">Or watch the video here<\/a><\/p>\n<h4>Some Key Kantian Ideas<\/h4>\n<ul>\n<li>Duty<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Kant\u2019s main works in ethics are his Metaphysics of Morals (1797) and the Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals (1785). Neither gives practical advice about particular situations but rather through rational reflection, Kant seeks to establish the supreme principle of morality.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">He starts with the notion of \u201cduty\u201d and although this is a rather old-fashioned term, the idea behind it should sound familiar. Imagine, your friend has told you that she is pregnant but asks you to promise to keep her secret. Through the coming weeks, this juicy bit of gossip is on the tip of your tongue, but you do not tell anyone because of your promise. There are things we recognize as being required of us irrespective of what we (really) desire to do. This is what Kant means by duty.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">The Good Will<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">But this raises the question. If it is not our desires that move us to do what is right (even really strong desires), what does? In our example, why is it that we keep our promise despite the strong desire to gossip? Kant\u2019s answer is \u201cthe good will.\u201d\u00a0 For Kant, the good will is something in us that desires to do what is right regardless of the effects or consequences:<\/p>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div style=\"padding-left: 40px\"><i>A good\u00a0will is good not because of what it effects or accomplishes &#8211; because of its fitness for\u00a0attaining some proposed end: it is good through its willing alone &#8211; that is, good in itself.<\/i><\/div>\n<div><\/div>\n<div>It is also good without qualification.<\/div>\n<div><\/div>\n<div style=\"padding-left: 40px\"><i>It is impossible to conceive anything at all in the. world, or even out of it, which can be taken as good without qualification, except a good will.<\/i><\/div>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">What does Kant mean? Well, pick anything you like that you think might make an action good \u2014 for example, happiness, pleasure, courage, and then ask yourself if there are any situations you can think of where an action having those features makes those actions worse.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">It seems there are. For example, imagine someone who is happy when kicking a cat; someone taking pleasure in torture; or a serial killer whose courage allows her to abduct children in broad daylight. In such cases, happiness, pleasure, and courage only serve to make the actions more evil. Kant thinks we can repeat this line of thinking for anything and everything, except one thing \u2014 the good will.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">The good will unlike anything else is good unconditionally. and what makes a good will \u201cgood\u201d is willing alone, not other attitudes, consequences, or characteristics of the agent. Even Kant thinks this sounds like a rather strange idea. So how can he (and we) be confident that the good will even exists?<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Consider<strong>\u00a0<\/strong>Mahatma Gandhi\u2019s (1869\u20131948) non-violent protest for Indian independence. He stood peacefully whilst the British police beat him. Here is a case where there must have been an overwhelming desire to fight back. But he did not. In this type of action, Kant would claim that we \u201csee\u201d the good will \u201cshining like a jewel.\u201d \u00a0Seeing such resilience in the face of such awful violence, we are humbled and can recognize, what Kant calls, its moral worth.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--key-takeaways\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<h2 class=\"textbox__title\">Taking it to the streets&#8230;<\/h2>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\n<p>Ask several friends to share a list of moral actions that are good without qualification, or without considering the consequences.<\/p>\n<p>Test each friend\u2019s responses by sharing them with the other friends and asking for their feedback. Do they agree with the choices? If not, what is wrong with one or more of them?<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Obviously, not all actions are as significant as Gandhi\u2019s. However, Kant thinks that any acts like this, which are performed despite conflicting desires, are due to the good will. Considering such actions means we can recognize that the good will exists.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Acting for the Sake of Duty and Acting in Accordance with Duty<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">From what we have said above about the nature of duty and good will, we can see why Kant says that to act from good will is acting for the sake of duty. We act despite our desires to do otherwise. For Kant, this means that acting for the sake of duty is the only way that an action can have moral worth. We will see below what we have to do for our actions to be carried out for the sake of duty. However, before we do this, we need to be really clear on this point about moral worth.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Imagine that you are walking with a friend. You pass someone begging on the street. Your friend starts to weep, fumbles in his wallet and gives the beggar some money, and tells you that he feels such empathy with the poor man that he just has to help him.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">For Kant, your friend\u2019s action has no moral worth because what is moving him to give money is\u00a0<em class=\"import-Emphasis\">empathy rather than duty!<\/em>\u00a0He is acting in accordance with duty. However, Kant does think your friend should be applauded as such an action is something that is of value although it wouldn\u2019t be correct to call it a moral action.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">To make this point clearer, Kant asks us to consider someone who has no sympathy for the suffering of others and no inclination to help them. But despite this:<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">\u2026he nevertheless tears himself from his deadly insensibility and performs the action without any inclination at all, but solely from duty, then for the first time, his action has genuine moral worth.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">In contrast to our friend, this person is acting for the sake of duty and hence their action is moral. We must be careful though. Kant is not telling us to become emotionally barren robots! He is not saying that before we can act morally we need to get rid of sympathy, empathy, desires, love, and inclinations. This would make Kant\u2019s moral philosophy an absurd non-starter.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Let us see why Kant is not saying this. Consider an action such as giving to others. We should ask whether an action of giving to others would have been performed even if the agent lacked the desire to do so. If the answer is \u201cyes\u201d then the act has moral worth. This though is consistent with the agent actually having those desires. The question for Kant is not whether an agent has desires but what moved the agent to act. If they acted because of those desires, they acted in accordance with duty and their action had no moral worth. If they acted for the sake of duty, and just happened to have those desires, then their action has moral worth.<\/p>\n<ul>\n<li>Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">If we agree with Kant and want to act for the sake of duty, what should we do? His answer is that we have to act out of respect for the moral law. He has two examples of how this works in practice: lying and suicide. We look at the former in Chapter 13, we will consider Kant\u2019s example of suicide at the end of this chapter. However, before doing this we need to get a sense of what Kant has in mind when he talks about acting out of respect for the moral law.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">The moral law is what he calls the \u201cCategorical Imperative\u201d. He thinks there are three formulations of this.<\/p>\n<table class=\"lines aligncenter\" style=\"width: 409.5pt;height: 246px\" cellpadding=\"5.4pt\">\n<thead>\n<tr style=\"height: 0\">\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 30px;width: 89.359375px;text-align: center\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Formulation<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 30px;width: 71.296875px;text-align: center\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Shorthand<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 30px;width: 342.234375px;text-align: center;vertical-align: middle\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Imperative<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/thead>\n<tbody>\n<tr class=\"TableNormal-R\" style=\"height: 46px\">\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 46px;width: 89.359375px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">First Formulation<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 46px;width: 71.296875px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">C-1<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 46px;width: 342.234375px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">\u2026act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"TableNormal-R\" style=\"height: 109px\">\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #ebebec;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 109px;width: 89.359375px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Second Formulation<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #ebebec;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 109px;width: 71.296875px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">C-2<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #ebebec;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 109px;width: 342.234375px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\" style=\"margin-right: 146.1pt\">So act that you use humanity, in your own person as well as in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<tr class=\"TableNormal-R\" style=\"height: 61px\">\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 61px;width: 89.359375px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\"><strong class=\"import-Strong\">Third Formulation<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 61px;width: 71.296875px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">C-3<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<td class=\"border\" style=\"background-color: #f5f5f5;vertical-align: middle;padding: 5.4pt;border: 0pt none windowtext;height: 61px;width: 342.234375px\">\n<p class=\"import-Normal\">\u2026every rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends.<\/p>\n<\/td>\n<\/tr>\n<\/tbody>\n<\/table>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: left\">We will consider these in turn, showing how they are linked. Consider then, CI-1. Kant\u2019s idea is that we use this \u201ctest\u201d to see what maxims are morally permissible. If we act in accordance with those then we are acting from duty and our actions have moral worth. Let us look at what this means.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Initially, it is worth considering what \u201ccategorical\u201d and \u201cimperative\u201d mean. An imperative is just a command. \u201cClean your room!\u201d is an imperative I give my daughter every Saturday. \u201cDo not park in front of these gates!\u201d is a command on my neighbor\u2019s gate. \u201cLove your God with all your heart, mind and soul\u201d is a command from the Bible.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">What about the \u201ccategorical\u201d part? If a command is categorical then people ought to follow it irrespective of how they feel about following it, irrespective of what consequences might follow, or who may or may not have told them to follow it. For example, the command \u201cdo not peel the skin of babies\u201d is categorical. You ought not to do this and the fact that this might be your life\u2019s ambition, or that you really want to do it, or that your teacher has told you to do it, is completely irrelevant.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Contrast this with Hypothetical Imperatives. If I tell my daughter to clean her room, this is hypothetical. This is because whether she ought to clean her room is dependent on conditions about her and me. If she does not care about a clean room and about what her dad thinks, then it is not true that she ought to clean her room. Most commands are hypothetical. For example, \u201cstudy!\u201d You ought to study only if certain things are true about you; for example, that you care about doing well, that you want to succeed in the test etc.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Kant thinks that moral \u201coughts\u201d \u2014 for example, \u201cyou ought not to lie\u201d \u2014 are categorical. They apply to people irrespective of how they feel about them.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">The next thing we need is the idea of a \u201cmaxim\u201d. This is relatively simple and is best seen through the following examples. Imagine I\u2019m considering whether to make a false promise. Perhaps I think that by falsely promising you that l will pay you back I will be more likely to get a loan from you. In that case, my maxim is something like \u201cwhenever I can benefit from making a false promise I should do so\u201d.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-NormalWeb\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff\">Imagine I decide to exercise because I feel depressed, then I may be said to be acting on the maxim \u201cWhenever I feel depressed, I will exercise\u201d.\u00a0<strong class=\"import-Strong\">A maxim is a general principle or rule upon which we act.<\/strong>\u00a0We do not decide on a set of maxims, perhaps writing them down, and then try to live by them but rather a maxim is the principle or rule that can make sense of an action whether or not we have thought about it in these terms.<\/p>\n<p><strong>The First Formulation of the Categorical Imperative<\/strong><\/p>\n<p>Let\u2019s put these bits together in relation to CI-1:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\"><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u2026 act only according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it become a universal law<\/em>.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt\">The \u201ctest\u201d that CI-1 prescribes is the following. Consider the maxim on which you are thinking about acting and ask whether you can either (a) conceive that it becomes a universal law, or (b) will that it become a universal law. If a maxim fails on either (a) or (b) then there is no good reason for you to act on that maxim and it is morally impermissible to do so. If it passes the CI test, then it is morally permissible.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt\">Kant is<em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0not<\/em> saying that the CI-1 test is a way of working out what is and what is not moral. Presumably, we can think of lots of maxims, which are non-moral, which pass the test, for example, \u201cwhenever I am bored, I will watch TV\u201d.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Equally, he is not saying that if a maxim cannot be universalized then it is morally impermissible. Some maxims are just mathematically impossible. For example, \u201cwhenever I am going to <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">exercise,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> I will do it for an above the average amount of time\u201d. This maxim cannot be universalized because we cannot conceive that everyone does something above \u201caverage<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">.<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u201d<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Finally, it is worth remembering that the maxim must be able to be<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0willed<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> as a universal law. This is important because maxims such as \u201cif your name is Jill and you are 5 ft 11, you can lie\u201d will fail to be universalized because you cannot <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u201c<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">will<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u201d<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> that your name is Jill or that your height is 5 ft 11.<\/span> <span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> It has to be possible to will as a universal law and for this to be true it must be at least possible for it actually to come about. This shows that the common concern that we can get any maxim to pass the CI-1 test by simply adding more and more specific details, such as names, heights, or locations,<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0fails<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. This is very abstract<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u2026<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">.<\/span> <span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> Let us consider an example.<\/span><\/p>\n<ul>\n<li><span class=\"import-Hyperlink\">Perfect and Imperfect Duties<\/span><\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Recall the example of making a false promise to secure a loan. The maxim is \u201c<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">whenever I can benefit from doing so, I should make a false promise<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u201d. The question is whether I could conceive or will that this becomes a universal law.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">I could not. If everyone followed this maxim then we would all believe everyone else could make a false promise if it would benefit them to do so. Kant thinks such a situation is not conceivable because the very idea of making a promise relies on trust. But if \u201cwhenever it is of benefit to you, you can make false promises\u201d was to become a universal law then there would be no trust and hence no promising. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">So,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> by simply thinking about the idea of promising and lying we see the maxim will fail the test and because we cannot universalize the maxim, then making a false promise becomes morally impermissible. This is true universally for all people in all circumstances for anyone can, in principle, go through the same line of reasoning.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">A maxim failing at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">a<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) is what Kant calls a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0contradiction in conception<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">, and failing at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">a<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) means we are dealing with what Kant calls a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0perfect duty<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. In our example, we have shown we have a perfect duty not to make false promises.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Consider another example. Imagine that someone in need asks us for money but we decide not to help them. In this case, our maxim is \u201cwhenever someone is in need and asks for money do not give them money\u201d. Does this pass the CI-1 test?<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">No,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> it fails the CI-1 test. Although it is true that the maxim passes (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">a<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) not giving to the needy does not threaten<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0the very idea<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0of giving money away. Kant thinks that anyone thinking about this will see that that maxim will fail at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">b<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) and hence it is morally impermissible. Here is why.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">You cannot know if you will be in need in the future and presumably you would want to be helped if you were in need. In which case you are being inconsistent if you willed that \u201cpeople should not help those in need\u201d should become a universal law. For you might want people to help those in need in the future, namely,<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0you<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">So,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> we cannot will the maxim \u201cwhenever someone is in need do not help them\u201d to become a universal moral law. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Again,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> this is a thought process that<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0anyone<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0can go <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">through,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and it means that this moral claim is true universally for all people in all circumstances. Failing at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">b<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) is what Kant calls a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0contradiction in will<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">, and failing at (<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">b<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">) means we are dealing with what Kant calls an<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0imperfect duty<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">.<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--exercises\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<h2 class=\"textbox__title\">Ponder if you will&#8230;<\/h2>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\n<p><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Can it ever be moral from Kant\u2019s point of view for lawmakers to create laws from which they are exempt? For instance, can a moral maxim ever state, \u201cEveryone with blonde hair must pay twice the tax of any other citizen unless that person is a member of the Senate&#8211;that person is exempt from all taxes?\u201d <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Could a person reasonably \u201cwill\u201d that this would be true?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">It is absolutely key to recognize that CI-1 is not simply asking \u201cwhat if everyone did that?\u201d CI-1 is<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0not a form of Utilitarianism<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. Kant is not saying that it is wrong to make false promises because if people did then the world would be a horrible place. Rather Kant is asking whether we can<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0conceive or will<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> the maxim become a universal law.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><strong><span class=\"import-Hyperlink\">Second Formulation of the Categorical Imperative<\/span><\/strong><\/p>\n<p>The second formulation (CI-2) is the following:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px\"><i>So act that\u00a0you use\u00a0humanity, in your own person as well as\u00a0in the person of any other, always\u00a0at the same time as an end, never merely as a means.<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Kant thinks that CI-1 and CI-2 are two sides of the same coin, though precisely how they are related is a matter of scholarly debate. Put very simply CI-2 says you should not use people because if you do, you are failing to treat them as rational <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">agents,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and this is morally wrong.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">For example, if I use your essay without your knowledge then I have not treated you as a rational agent like I would have done had I asked you for your essay and you had freely chosen to let me have it. But given that I did not ask you, I was, in a sense,<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0making choices on your behalf<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and thus did not treat you as a rational agent. So according to Kant, I should always treat you <strong>as an end,<\/strong> never as a means. I should always treat you as a free rational agent.<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--key-takeaways\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<h2 class=\"textbox__title\">Taking it to the streets&#8230;<\/h2>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\n<p><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Ask a few friends the question \u201cIs it ever right to use another person without their consent?\u201d <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">What kinds of answers do they offer?<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">If they say no, can you suggest to them times when indeed it might be? <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">For example, people convicted of crimes do not give consent to be imprisoned, yet society puts them there anyway. Or, more benignly, someone might tell a white lie so as not to hurt another person\u2019s feelings. <\/span><\/p>\n<p><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">What would Kant say about these choices?<\/span><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Kant\u2019s theory then has a way of respecting the<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0dignity<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> of people. We should treat people with respect and with dignity purely on the basis that they are rational agents, and not because of their race, gender, education, upbringing, etc. From this, you can also see that Kant\u2019s theory allows us to speak about \u201crights\u201d. If someone has a right then they have this right irrespective of gender, education, upbringing, etc. For example, Jill has a right to free speech because she is a person, consequently that right will not disappear if she changes her location, personal circumstances, relationship status, political viewpoint, etc. After all, she does not stop being a person.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Importantly, CI-2 does not say that you<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0either<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0treat someone as a means<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0or<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0an end. I could treat someone as an end<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0by<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0treating them as a means. Suppose that you have freely decided to become a taxi driver. If I use you as a means by asking you to take me to the <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">airport,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> I am also treating you as an end. But Kant does not believe this to be morally wrong because I am respecting you as a rational agent; after all, you<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0chose<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0to be a taxi driver. Of course, if I get into your car and point a gun at your head and ask to be taken to the airport then I am not treating you as an end but rather solely as a means, which is wrong.<\/span><\/p>\n<p><span class=\"import-Hyperlink\"><strong>The Third Formulation of the Categorical Imperative<\/strong> <\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">The final formulation of the Categorical Imperative is a combination of CI-1 and CI-2. It asks us to imagine a kingdom that consists of only those people who act on CI-1. They never act on a maxim that cannot become a universal law. In such a kingdom people would treat people as <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">ends <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u2026<\/span><\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<p style=\"padding-left: 40px\"><i>&#8230; every\u00a0rational being must so act as if he were through his maxim always a lawmaking member in the universal kingdom of ends.<\/i><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">In summary, we have seen that Kant thinks that acts have moral worth only if they are carried out for the sake of duty. Agents act for the sake of duty if they act out of respect for the moral law, which they do by following the Categorical Imperative in one of its formulations.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Consequently, Kant thinks that acts are wrong and right universally, irrespective of consequences and desires. If lying is <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">wrong,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> then it is wrong in all instances. From all this, it follows that we cannot be taught a set of moral rules for each and every situation, and Kant believes that it is up to us to work it out for ourselves by thinking rationally.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">There have been, and continue to be, many books and journal articles written about Kant\u2019s ethics. He has a profound and deep insight into the nature of <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">morality,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and he raises some fundamental questions about what it is to be human. Kant\u2019s moral theory is radically<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0Egalitarian<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0as his theory is blind to individual personal circumstances, race, <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">gender,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> and ethnicity. Everyone is equal before the moral law!<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Related to this, his theory respects the rights of individuals and, relatedly, their dignity. Any theory that is to have a hope of capturing our notion of rights needs to be able to respect the thought that a right is not something that disappears if circumstances change. Jill has a right to life, period; we do not say Jill has a right to life \u201cif\u2026\u201d and then have to fill in the blanks. This is precisely something that Kant\u2019s theory can give us. CI-1 generates maxims that do not have exceptions and CI-2 tells us that we should<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0always<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0treat everyone as an end in themselves and<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0never<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0solely as a means to an end. It tells us, for example, that we ought not to kill Jill, and this holds true in all circumstances.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">There are, though, a number of tough questions that Kant\u2019s work raises. We consider some of these below. However, as with all the philosophical ideas we discuss in this book, Kant\u2019s work is still very much alive and has defenders across the world. Before we turn to these worries, we work through an example that Kant gives regarding suicide.<\/span><\/p>\n<h4>An example of Kantian Ethical Reasoning: Suicide<\/h4>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Kant is notoriously stingy with examples. One he does mention is suicide. This is an <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">emotional<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> topic and linked to questions about mental health and religion. An attraction of Kant\u2019s view is the ability to apply his Categorical Imperatives in a dispassionate way. His framework should allow us to \u201cplug in\u201d the issue and \u201cget out\u201d an answer. Let\u2019s see how this might work.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Kant thinks that suicide is always wrong and has very harsh words for someone who attempts suicide<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-citation\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify;margin-left: 36pt\"><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">He who so behaves, who has no respect for human nature and makes a thing of himself, becomes for everyone an Object of free will. We are free to treat him as a beast, as a thing, and to use him for our sport as we do a horse or a dog, for he is no longer a human being; he has made a thing of himself, and, having himself discarded his humanity, he cannot expect that others should respect humanity in him.<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">But why does he think this? How does this fit with Kant\u2019s Categorical Imperatives? We will look at the first two formulations.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Fundamental to remember is that for Kant the motive that drives<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0all<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0suicide is \u201cavoid evil\u201d. By which he means avoiding suffering, pain, and other negative outcomes in one\u2019s life. All suicide attempts are due to the fact that we love ourselves and thus want to \u201cavoid evils\u201d that may befall us.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Imagine then that I decide to commit suicide. Given what we have just said about my motives this means I will be acting on this maxim: \u201cFrom self\u2010love, I make as my principle to shorten my life when its continued duration threatens more evil than it promises satisfaction\u201d.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Following CI-1 the question then is whether it is possible to <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">universalize<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> this maxim. Kant thinks not. For him, it is unclear how we could<\/span> <span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">will it that all rational agents as the result of<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0self-love<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0can<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0destroy themselves<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0when their continued existence threatens more evil than it promises satisfaction. For Kant self-love leading to the destruction of the self is a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0contradiction<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Thus,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> he thinks that we have a<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0perfect<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0(rather than an imperfect) duty to ourselves not to commit suicide. To do so is morally wrong. This is how Kant puts it:<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-citation\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify;margin-left: 36pt\"><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">One sees at once a contradiction in a system of nature whose law would destroy life [suicide] by means of the very same feeling that acts so as to stimulate the furtherance of life [self-love], and hence there could be no existence as a system of nature. Therefore, such a maxim cannot possibly hold as a universal law of nature and is, consequently, wholly opposed to the supreme principle of all duty.<\/em><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Notice a few odd things here in relation to CI-1. The point about <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">universalization<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> seems irrelevant. Kant could have just said it is a contradiction to will from self-love the destruction of oneself. It seems that there is nothing added by asking us to consider this point <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">universalized<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. It does not add weight to the claim that it is a contradiction.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Second, it is not really a \u201ccontradiction\u201d at all! It is different from the lying promise example. In this, it seems that the very concept of a promise relies on trust, which lying would destroy. In contrast in the suicide case, the \u201ccontradiction\u201d seems more like a by-product of Kant\u2019s assumption regarding the motivation of suicidal people. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">So,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> we can avoid the \u201ccontradiction\u201d if we allow for the possibility that suicide need not be driven by self-love. If this were <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">true,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> then there would be no \u201ccontradiction\u201d. Hence, it seems wrong to call the duty not to kill oneself \u2014 if such a duty exists \u2014 a \u201cperfect\u201d duty. <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">So,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> the first formulation does not give Kant the conclusion that suicide is morally wrong.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Moving to the second formulation. This helps us understand Kant\u2019s harsh assessment of people attempting suicide. Remember he calls such people \u201cobjects\u201d or \u201cbeasts\u201d or \u201cthings\u201d. So, what is the difference between beasts or objects or things, and humans? The answer is that we are<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0rational<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">. Recall, that for Kant our rationality is of fundamental value. If anyone\u2019s actions do not recognize someone else\u2019s <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">rationality,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> then they have done something morally wrong. This amounts to treating them merely as means to our own end. Given all this, you can see what Kant is getting at. For him committing suicide is treating yourself as a mere means to some end \u2014 namely the end of avoiding pain and suffering etc. \u2014 and not an end in itself. You are treating yourself as a \u201cbeast\u201d a \u201cthing\u201d an \u201cobject\u201d, not as a human being with the gift of reason. This is morally wrong.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">Moreover, if you do this, then others treating you with respect<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0as a rational person<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0can conclude that you also want others to treat you in this way. Because if you are rational then you must think that it is OK to <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">universalize<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> the maxim that we can treat others as objects, beasts, and things. They can thus treat you as a beast, object, and thing and still be treating you with respect as a rational agent. With regard to attempting suicide, your action is wrong because you have ignored your own rationality. You have treated yourself as a mere means to an end.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">But, like the first formulation, this is very weak. It is unclear why in attempting suicide you are treating yourself as a mere means to an end. You might think you are respecting your rationality<\/span><em class=\"import-Emphasis\" lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">\u00a0by<\/em><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> considering suicide. Recall that Kant says that it is sometimes fine to treat people as a means to an end, <\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">e.g.,<\/span><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\"> a taxi driver. It is fine when people have given consent for you to treat them that way. In that case, suicide might be like the taxi driver&#8217;s case. We have freely decided to treat ourselves as a means to an end. We are, then, treating ourselves as rational agents and not doing something morally wrong by committing suicide.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">There are some other things that Kant says about the wrongness of suicide that do not link to the Categorical Imperatives. For example, he talks about humans being the property of God and hence our lives not being something we can choose to extinguish. However, we need not discuss this here.<\/span><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-texte\" style=\"background-color: #ffffff;text-align: justify\"><span lang=\"en\" xml:lang=\"en\">There is a consensus among Kantian scholars that, as it stands, Kant\u2019s argument against suicide fails. There are some though who use Kant\u2019s ideas as a starting point for a more convincing argument against suicide. <\/span><\/p>\n<h5>Excerpts from Kant\u2019s <em>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/em><\/h5>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 0pt\"><em>Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals<\/em> (1785; German: <em>Grundlegung zur Metaphysik der Sitten<\/em>) is the first of Immanuel Kant&#8217;s mature works on moral philosophy. In the following selections, see if you can find:<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What does Kant suggest is a characteristic unique to rational beings?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Everything in nature works according to laws. Rational beings alone have the faculty of acting according to the conception of laws, that is according to principles, i.e., have a will. Since the deduction of actions from principles requires reason, the will is nothing but practical reason. If reason infallibly determines the will, then the actions of such a being which are recognized as objectively necessary are subjectively necessary also, i.e., the will is a faculty to choose that only which reason independent of inclination recognizes as practically necessary, i.e., as good. But if reason of itself does not sufficiently determine the will, if the latter is subject also to subjective conditions (particular impulses) which do not always coincide with the objective conditions; in a word, if the will does not in itself completely accord with reason (which is actually the case with men), then the actions which objectively are recognized as necessary are subjectively contingent, and the determination of such a will according to objective laws is obligation, that is to say, the relation of the objective laws to a will that is not thoroughly good is conceived as the determination of the will of a rational being by principles of reason, but which the will from its nature does not of necessity follow.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What does Kant mean by an \u201cimperative\u201d?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">The conception of an objective principle, in so far as it is obligatory for a will, is called a command (of reason), and the formula of the command is called an Imperative.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">All imperatives are expressed by the word ought [or shall], and thereby indicate the relation of an objective law of reason to a will, which from its subjective constitution is not necessarily determined by it (an obligation). They say that something would be good to do or to forbear, but they say it to a will which does not always do a thing because it is conceived to be good to do it. That is practically good, however, which determines the will by means of the conceptions of reason, and consequently not from subjective causes, but objectively, that is on principles which are valid for every rational being as such. It is distinguished from the pleasant, as that which influences the will only by means of sensation from merely subjective causes, valid only for the sense of this or that one, and not as a principle of reason, which holds for everyone. \u2026<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What are the two kinds of Imperatives? How do they differ?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Now all imperatives command either hypothetically or categorically. The former represent the practical necessity of a possible action as means to something else that is willed (or at least which one might possibly will). The categorical imperative would be that which represented an action as necessary of itself without reference to another end, i.e., as objectively necessary.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Since every practical law represents a possible action as good and, on this account, for a subject who is practically determinable by reason, necessary, all imperatives are formulae determining an action which is necessary according to the principle of a will good in some respects. If now the action is good only as a means to something else, then the imperative is hypothetical; if it is conceived as good in itself and consequently as being necessarily the principle of a will which of itself conforms to reason, then it is categorical\u2026.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Accordingly, the hypothetical imperative only says that the action is good for some purpose, possible or actual. \u2026. [while] the categorical imperative declares an action to be objectively necessary in itself without reference to any purpose\u2026.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">And thus the imperative which refers to the choice of means to one\u2019s own happiness, i.e., the precept of prudence, is still always hypothetical; the action is not commanded absolutely, but only as means to another purpose.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Finally, there is an imperative which commands a certain conduct immediately, without having as its condition any other purpose to be attained by it. This imperative is Categorical. It concerns not the matter of the action, or its intended result, but its form and the principle of which it is itself a result; and what is essentially good in it consists in the mental disposition, let the consequence be what it may. This imperative may be called that of Morality\u2026.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">Which kind of imperative is appropriate for a moral law?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">We shall therefore have to investigate \u00e0 priori the possibility of a categorical imperative, as we have not in this case the advantage of its reality being given in experience, so that [the elucidation of] its possibility should be requisite only for its explanation, not for its establishment. In the meantime it may be discerned beforehand that the categorical imperative alone has the purport of a practical Law: all the rest may indeed be called principles of the will but not laws, since whatever is only necessary for the attainment of some arbitrary purpose may be considered as in itself contingent, and we can at any time be free from the precept if we give up the purpose; on the contrary, the unconditional command leaves the will no liberty to choose the opposite; consequently it alone carries with it that necessity which we require in a law\u2026.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">When I conceive a hypothetical imperative, in general I do not know beforehand what it will contain until I am given the condition. But when I conceive a categorical imperative, I know at once what it contains. For as the imperative contains besides the law only the necessity that the maxims shall conform to this law, while the law contains no conditions restricting it, there remains nothing but the general statement that the maxim of the action should conform to a universal law, and it is this conformity alone that the imperative properly represents as necessary.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What is Kant\u2019s first formulation of the Categorial Imperative?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">There is therefore but one categorical imperative, namely, this: <em>Act only on that maxim whereby thou canst at the same time will that it should become a universal law<\/em>.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Now if all imperatives of duty can be deduced from this one imperative as from their principle, then, although it should remain undecided what is called duty is not merely a vain notion, yet at least we shall be able to show what we understand by it and what this notion means.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Since the universality of the law according to which effects are produced constitutes what is properly called nature in the most general sense (as to form), that is the existence of things so far as it is determined by general laws, the imperative of duty may be expressed thus: Act as if the maxim of thy action were to become by thy will a Universal Law of Nature<strong>.<\/strong><\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">We will now enumerate a few duties, adopting the usual division of them into duties to ourselves and ourselves and to others, and into perfect and imperfect duties.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">In these four examples, how does Kant say we should employ the Categorical Imperative?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">A man reduced to despair by a series of misfortunes feels wearied of life but is still so far in possession of his reason that he can ask himself whether it would not be contrary to his duty to himself to take his own life. Now he inquires whether the maxim of his action could become a universal law of nature. His maxim is: \u201cFrom self-love I adopt it as a principle to shorten my life when its longer duration is likely to bring more evil than satisfaction.\u201d It is asked then simply whether this principle founded on self-love can become a universal law of nature. Now we see at once that a system of nature of which it should be a law to destroy life by means of the very feeling whose special nature it is to impel to the improvement of life would contradict itself and, therefore, could not exist as a system of nature; hence that maxim cannot possibly exist as a universal law of nature and, consequently, would be wholly inconsistent with the supreme principle of all duty.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Another finds himself forced by necessity to borrow money. He knows that he will not be able to repay it but sees also that nothing will be lent to him unless he promises stoutly to repay it in a definite time. He desires to make this promise, but he has still so much conscience as to ask himself: \u201cIs it not unlawful and inconsistent with duty to get out of a difficulty in this way?\u201d Suppose however that he resolves to do so: then the maxim of his action would be expressed thus: \u201cWhen I think myself in want of money, I will borrow money and promise to repay it, although I know that I never can do so.\u201d Now this principle of self-love or of one\u2019s own advantage may perhaps be consistent with my whole future welfare; but the question now is, \u201cIs it right?\u201d I change then the suggestion of self-love into a universal law, and state the question thus: \u201cHow would it be if my maxim were a universal law?\u201d Then I see at once that it could never hold as a universal law of nature but would necessarily contradict itself. For supposing it to be a universal law that everyone when he thinks himself in a difficulty should be able to promise whatever he pleases, with the purpose of not keeping his promise, the promise itself would become impossible, as well as the end that one might have in view in it, since no one would consider that anything was promised to him but would ridicule all such statements as vain pretenses.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">A third finds in himself a talent which with the help of some culture might make him a useful man in many respects. But he finds himself in comfortable circumstances and prefers to indulge in pleasure rather than to take pains in enlarging and improving his happy natural capacities. He asks, however, whether his maxim of neglect of his natural gifts, besides agreeing with his inclination to indulgence, agrees also with what is called duty. He sees then that a system of nature could indeed subsist with such a universal law although men (like the South Sea islanders) should let their talents rest and resolve to devote their lives merely to idleness, amusement, and propagation of their species- in a word, to enjoyment; but he cannot possibly will that this should be a universal law of nature or be implanted in us as such by a natural instinct. For, as a rational being, he necessarily wills that his faculties be developed, since they serve him and have been given him, for all sorts of possible purposes.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">A fourth, who is in prosperity, while he sees that others have to contend with great wretchedness and that he could help them, thinks: \u201cWhat concern is it of mine? Let everyone be as happy as Heaven pleases, or as he can make himself; I will take nothing from him nor even envy him, only I do not wish to contribute anything to his welfare or to his assistance in distress!\u201d Now, no doubt if such a mode of thinking were a universal law, the human race might very well subsist and doubtless even better than in a state in which everyone talks of sympathy and goodwill, or even takes care occasionally to put it into practice, but, on the other side, also cheats when he can, betrays the rights of men, or otherwise violates them. But although it is possible that a universal law of nature might exist in accordance with that maxim, it is impossible to will that such a principle should have the universal validity of a law of nature. For a will which resolved this would contradict itself, inasmuch as many cases might occur in which one would have need of the love and sympathy of others, and in which, by such a law of nature, sprung from his own will, he would deprive himself of all hope of the aid he desires.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">These are a few of the many actual duties, or at least what we regard as such, which obviously fall into two classes on the one principle that we have laid down. We must be able to will that a maxim of our action should be a universal law. This is the canon of the moral appreciation of the action generally. Some actions are of such a character that their maxim cannot without contradiction be even conceived as a universal law of nature, far from it being possible that we should will that it should be so. \u2026<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">How do we recognize duties from mere options?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">We have thus established at least this much, that if duty is a conception which is to have any import and real legislative authority for our actions, it can only be expressed in categorical and not at all in hypothetical imperatives. We have also, which is of great importance, exhibited clearly and definitely for every practical application the content of the categorical imperative, which must contain the principle of all duty if there is such a thing at all. We have not yet, however, advanced so far as to prove <em>\u00e0 priori<\/em> that there actually is such an imperative, that there is a practical law which commands absolutely of itself and without any other impulse, and that the following of this law is duty.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">With the view of attaining to this, it is of extreme importance to remember that we must not allow ourselves to think of deducing the reality of this principle from the particular attributes of human nature. For duty is to be a practical, unconditional necessity of action; it must therefore hold for all rational beings (to whom an imperative can apply at all), and for this reason only be also a law for all human wills. \u2026<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">What does Kant mean by saying that the human being is an \u201cend\u201d?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Now I say: man, and generally any rational being exists as an end in himself, not merely as a means to be arbitrarily used by this or that will, but in all his actions, whether they concern himself or other rational beings, must be always regarded at the same time as an end. All objects of the inclinations have only a conditional worth, for if the inclinations and the wants founded on them did not exist, then their object would be without value. But the inclinations, themselves being sources of want, are so far from having an absolute worth for which they should be desired that on the contrary it must be the universal wish of every rational being to be wholly free from them. Thus, the worth of any object which is to be acquired by our action is always conditional. Beings whose existence depends not on our will but on nature\u2019s, have nevertheless, if they are irrational beings, only a relative value as means, and are therefore called things; rational beings, on the contrary, are called persons, because their very nature points them out as ends in themselves, that is as something which must not be used merely as means, and so far therefore restricts freedom of action (and is an object of respect). These, therefore, are not merely subjective ends whose existence has a worth for us as an effect of our action, but objective ends, that is, things whose existence is an end in itself; an end moreover for which no other can be substituted, which they should subserve merely as means, for otherwise nothing whatever would possess absolute worth; but if all worth were conditioned and therefore contingent, then there would be no supreme practical principle of reason whatever.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">How does he use this idea to restate the Categorical Imperative into a Second Formulation?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">If then there is a supreme practical principle or, in respect of the human will, a categorical imperative, it must be one which, being drawn from the conception of that which is necessarily an end for everyone because it is an end in itself, constitutes an objective principle of will, and can therefore serve as a universal practical law. The foundation of this principle is: rational nature exists as an end in itself. Man necessarily conceives his own existence as being so; so far then this is a subjective principle of human actions. But every other rational being regards its existence similarly, just on the same rational principle that holds for me: so that it is at the same time an objective principle, from which as a supreme practical law all laws of the will must be capable of being deduced. Accordingly, the practical imperative will be as follows: So <em>act as to treat humanity, whether in thine own person or in that of any other, in every case as an end withal, never as means only<\/em>. We will now inquire whether this can be practically carried out.<\/p>\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">How does Kant reconsider the earlier four examples in light of this new formulation?<\/div>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">\u00a0To abide by the previous examples:<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Firstly, under the head of necessary duty to oneself: He who contemplates suicide should ask himself whether his action can be consistent with the idea of humanity as an end in itself. If he destroys himself in order to escape from painful circumstances, he uses a person merely as a means to maintain a tolerable condition up to the end of life. But a man is not a thing, that is to say, something which can be used merely as means, but must in all his actions be always considered as an end in himself. I cannot, therefore, dispose in any way of a man in my own person so as to mutilate him, to damage or kill him. (It belongs to ethics proper to define this principle more precisely, so as to avoid all misunderstanding, e.g., as to the amputation of the limbs in order to preserve myself, as to exposing my life to danger with a view to preserve it, etc. This question is therefore omitted here.)<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Secondly, as regards necessary duties, or those of strict obligation, towards others: He who is thinking of making a lying promise to others will see at once that he would be using another man merely as a mean, without the latter containing at the same time the end in himself. For he whom I propose by such a promise to use for my own purposes cannot possibly assent to my mode of acting towards him and, therefore, cannot himself contain the end of this action. This violation of the principle of humanity in other men is more obvious if we take in examples of attacks on the freedom and property of others. For then it is clear that he who transgresses the rights of men intends to use the person of others merely as a means, without considering that as rational beings they ought always to be esteemed also as ends, that is, as beings who must be capable of containing in themselves the end of the very same action.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Thirdly, as regards contingent (meritorious) duties to oneself: It is not enough that the action does not violate humanity in our own person as an end in itself, it must also harmonize with it. Now there are in humanity capacities of greater perfection, which belong to the end that nature has in view in regard to humanity in ourselves as the subject: to neglect these might perhaps be consistent with the maintenance of humanity as an end in itself, but not with the advancement of this end.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">Fourthly, as regards meritorious duties towards others: The natural end that all men have is their own happiness. Now humanity might indeed subsist, although no one should contribute anything to the happiness of others, provided he did not intentionally withdraw anything from it; but after all, this would only harmonize negatively not positively with humanity as an end in itself, if everyone does not also endeavor, as far as in him lies, to forward the ends of others. For the ends of any subject which is an end in himself ought as far as possible to be my ends also if that conception is to have its full effect with me.<\/p>\n<p class=\"import-OER\" style=\"margin-left: 36pt\">This principle, that humanity and generally every rational nature is an end in itself (which is the supreme limiting condition of every man\u2019s freedom of action), is not borrowed from experience, firstly, because it is universal, applying as it does to all rational beings whatever, and experience is not capable of determining anything about them; secondly, because it does not present humanity as an end to men (subjectively), that is as an object which men do of themselves actually adopt as an end; but as an objective end, which must as a law constitute the supreme limiting condition of all our subjective ends, let them be what we will; it must therefore spring from pure reason. In fact the objective principle of all practical legislation lies (according to the first principle) in the rule and its form of universality which makes it capable of being a law (say, e.g., a law of nature); but the subjective principle is in the end; now by the second principle, the subject of all ends is each rational being, inasmuch as it is an end in itself. Hence follows the third practical principle of the will, which is the ultimate condition of its harmony with universal practical reason, viz.: the idea of the will of every rational being as a universally legislative will. (Dimock and Fischer, Ch. 4)<\/p>\n<h4>Strengths and Weaknesses of Kant\u2019s Deontology<\/h4>\n<p class=\"whitespace-pre-wrap\">Here are some of the main strengths and weaknesses attributed to the deontological ethics of Immanuel Kant:<\/p>\n<p class=\"whitespace-pre-wrap\">Strengths:<\/p>\n<ol class=\"list-decimal pl-8 space-y-2\">\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">Kant&#8217;s theory emphasizes moral absolute duties that are not contingent on particular circumstances or consequences. This strictness appeals to our moral intuition.\u00a0 Kantian ethics gives us a great tool to keep us from justifying our actions in order to come to some predetermined conclusion.<\/li>\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">Kant rightly points out that consequences are a dangerous consideration in ethics because they are ultimately unknown.<\/li>\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">It values all rational beings as &#8220;ends in themselves\u201d due moral respect, and rejects the idea that persons can be used as means to an end.<\/li>\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">It derives duties rationally through consistent tests like universalization, aligning obligation with reason and autonomy.\u00a0 Kantian ethics has the strength of providing a logical path to moral decisions that can be discovered by religious and non-religious alike. By using the universalizing process anyone can determine the right action based on Good Will.<\/li>\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">It explains the objective necessity and authority we attribute to moral commands.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p class=\"whitespace-pre-wrap\">Weaknesses:<\/p>\n<ol class=\"list-decimal pl-8 space-y-2\">\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">Kant has been accused of undue rigidity in advocating rule-based obligations, and of lacking flexibility when confronted by situational factors in decision-making.<\/li>\n<li>If acting purely from duty a person may be found guilty of a form of play-acting. For instance, an acquaintance might help you move and stays at the task all day long. You may think your acquaintance is acting like a good friend and perhaps he likes you better than you previously thought. At the end of the move, you say to him, \u201cThanks for helping me move. You acted as a great friend.\u201d He replies, \u201cWell, we all have duties to help others when we can. I was invited to play golf today, but I realized you had no one to help and it was my duty to help you, so I passed on playing golf.\u201d Suddenly you realize he is serious. He does not care for you, he is only interested in doing his cold, sober duty.<\/li>\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">Kant overemphasizes reason and thereby diminishes other moral faculties like emotions, care, and relationships.<\/li>\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">The universalizability test struggles with complex conflicts of duties and exceptions in application.\u00a0 Very often duties conflict with each other and Kant offers no way of knowing which duty is the more important in such cases. For example, one day you hear a knock on the door. You open the door and the Nazi officer bursts in and shouts, \u201cWhere are the Jews?\u201d You know quite well that the Jews are hidden in the attic. Now, you have two absolute duties vying for your attention: the duty to uphold one\u2019s promises (in this case, to the Jews) and the duty to tell the truth (to the Nazis). It seems you cannot perform your duty to one without violating the other. What do you do?<\/li>\n<li class=\"whitespace-normal\">There seems to be no clear duty in Kant&#8217;s thinking to maximize overall welfare or prefer the most ethical option.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<div>\n<p style=\"text-align: center; text-align: center;\"><strong>Works Cited<\/strong><\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">Bause, Johann Friedrich. \u201cBildnis-Des-Immanuel-Kant-Johann-Friedrich-Bause-Verlagsort-Leipzig-1791-Berlin-Staatsbibliothek-Zu-Berlin.\u201d<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>Wikimedia Commons<\/i>, Wikimedia Commons, 12 Sept. 2016, https:\/\/commons.wikimedia.org\/wiki\/File:Bildnis-des-immanuel-kant-johann-friedrich-bause-verlagsort-leipzig-1791-berlin-staatsbibliothek-zu-berlin.jpeg. Accessed 5 Apr. 2022.<\/p>\n<div>\n<p class=\"hanging-indent\">CrashCourse.<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>Kant &amp; Categorical Imperatives: Crash Course Philosophy #35<\/i>.<span class=\"apple-converted-space\">\u00a0<\/span><i>YouTube<\/i>, YouTube, 14 Nov. 2016, https:\/\/youtu.be\/8bIys6JoEDw. Accessed 5 Apr. 2022.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n","protected":false},"author":101,"menu_order":8,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":"cc-by-nc"},"chapter-type":[48],"contributor":[62,63],"license":[55],"class_list":["post-2700","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless","contributor-daniel-g-shaw","contributor-ph-d","license-cc-by-nc"],"part":2675,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/2700","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/101"}],"version-history":[{"count":3,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/2700\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":3057,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/2700\/revisions\/3057"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/2675"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/2700\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=2700"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=2700"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=2700"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/introtophilosophy\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=2700"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}