{"id":220,"date":"2018-06-14T19:04:30","date_gmt":"2018-06-14T19:04:30","guid":{"rendered":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch06-5\/"},"modified":"2026-02-16T16:43:28","modified_gmt":"2026-02-16T16:43:28","slug":"ch06-5","status":"publish","type":"chapter","link":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch06-5\/","title":{"raw":"6.5 Competing When Network Effects Matter","rendered":"6.5 Competing When Network Effects Matter"},"content":{"raw":"<div id=\"slug-6-5-competing-when-network-effects-matter-2\" class=\"chapter standard\">\r\n<div class=\"ugc chapter-ugc\">\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--learning-objectives\"><header class=\"textbox__header\">\r\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Learning Objectives<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/header>\r\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_p01\" class=\"nonindent para\">After studying this section you should be able to do the following:<\/p>\r\n\r\n<ol id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\r\n \t<li>Plot strategies for competing in markets where network effects are present, both from the perspective of the incumbent firm and the new market entrant.<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Give examples of how firms have leveraged these strategies to compete effectively.<\/li>\r\n<\/ol>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_p02\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Why do you care whether networks are one-sided, two-sided, or some sort of hybrid? Well, when crafting your plan for market dominance, it\u2019s critical to know if network effects exist, how strong they might be, where they come from, and how they might be harnessed to your benefit. Here\u2019s a quick rundown of the tools at your disposal when competing in the presence of network effects.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Strategies for Competing in Markets with Network Effects (Examples in Parentheses)<\/h4>\r\n<ul id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_l02\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\r\n \t<li>Move early (Yahoo! Auctions in Japan)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Subsidize product adoption (PayPal)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Leverage viral promotion (Skype; Facebook feeds)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Expand by redefining the market to bring in new categories of users (Nintendo Wii) or through convergence (iPhone).<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Form alliances and partnerships (NYCE vs. Citibank)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Establish distribution channels (Java with Netscape; Microsoft bundling Media Player with Windows)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Seed the market with complements (Blu-ray; Nintendo)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Encourage the development of complementary goods\u2014this can include offering resources, subsidies, reduced fees, market research, development kits, venture capital (Facebook fbFund).<\/li>\r\n \t<li>Maintain backward compatibility (Apple\u2019s Mac OS X Rosetta translation software for PowerPC to Intel)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>For rivals, be compatible with larger networks (Apple\u2019s move to Intel; Live Search Maps)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>For incumbents, constantly innovate to create a moving target and block rival efforts to access your network (Apple\u2019s efforts to block access to its own systems)<\/li>\r\n \t<li>For large firms with well-known followers, make preannouncements (Microsoft)<\/li>\r\n<\/ul>\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Move Early<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">In the world of network effects, this is a biggie. Being first allows your firm to start the network effects snowball rolling in your direction. In Japan, worldwide auction leader eBay showed up just five months after Yahoo! launched its Japanese auction service. But eBay was never able to mount a credible threat and ended up pulling out of the market. Being just five months late cost eBay billions in lost sales, and the firm eventually retreated, acknowledging it could never unseat Yahoo!\u2019s network effects lead.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Another key lesson from the loss of eBay Japan? Exchange depends on the ability to communicate! EBay\u2019s huge network effects in the United States and elsewhere didn\u2019t translate to Japan because most Japanese aren\u2019t comfortable with English, and most English speakers don\u2019t know Japanese. The language barrier made Japan a \u201cgreenfield\u201d market with no dominant player, and Yahoo!\u2019s early move provided the catalyst for victory.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_p03\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Timing is often critical in the video game console wars, too. Sony\u2019s PlayStation 2 enjoyed an eighteen-month lead over the technically superior Xbox (as well as Nintendo\u2019s GameCube). That time lead helped to create what for years was the single most profitable division at Sony. By contrast, the technically superior PS3 showed up months after Xbox 360 and at roughly the same time as the Nintendo Wii, and has struggled in its early years, racking up multibillion-dollar losses for Sony (Null, 2008).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">What If Microsoft Threw a Party and No One Showed Up?<\/h4>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_p04\" class=\"nonindent para\">Microsoft launched the Zune media player with features that should be subject to network effects\u2014the ability to share photos and music by wirelessly \u201csquirting\u201d content to other Zune users. The firm even promoted Zune with the tagline \u201cWelcome to the Social.\u201d Problem was the Zune Social was a party no one wanted to attend. The late-arriving Zune garnered a market share of just 3 percent, and users remained hard pressed to find buddies to leverage these neat social features (Walker, 2008). A cool idea does not make a network effect happen.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Subsidize Adoption<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Starting a network effect can be tough\u2014there\u2019s little incentive to join a network if there\u2019s no one in the system to communicate with. In one admittedly risky strategy, firms may offer to subsidize initial adoption in hopes that network effects might kick in shortly after. Subsidies to adopters might include a price reduction, rebate, or other giveaways. PayPal, a service that allows users to pay one another using credit cards, gave users a modest rebate as a sign-up incentive to encourage adoption of its new effort (in one early promotion, users got back fifteen dollars when spending their first thirty dollars). This brief subsidy paid to early adopters paid off handsomely. EBay later tried to enter the market with a rival effort, but as a late mover its effort was never able to overcome PayPal\u2019s momentum. PayPal was eventually purchased by eBay for $1.5 billion, and the business unit is now considered one of eBay\u2019s key drivers of growth and profit.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">When Even Free Isn\u2019t Good Enough<\/h4>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p02\" class=\"nonindent para\">Subsidizing adoption after a rival has achieved dominance can be an uphill battle, and sometimes even offering a service for free isn\u2019t enough to combat the dominant firm. When Yahoo! introduced a U.S. auction service to compete with eBay, it initially didn\u2019t charge sellers at all (sellers typically pay eBay a small percentage of each completed auction). The hope was that with the elimination of seller fees, enough sellers would jump from eBay to Yahoo! helping the late-mover catch up in the network effect game.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p03\" class=\"indent para\">But eBay sellers were reluctant to leave for two reasons. First, there weren\u2019t enough buyers on Yahoo! to match the high bids they earned on much-larger eBay. Some savvy sellers played an arbitrage game where they\u2019d buy items on Yahoo!\u2019s auction service at lower prices and resell them on eBay, where more users bid prices higher.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p04\" class=\"indent para\">Second, any established seller leaving eBay would give up their valuable \u201cseller ratings,\u201d and would need to build their Yahoo! reputation from scratch. Seller ratings represent a critical switching cost, as many users view a high rating as a method for reducing the risk of getting scammed or receiving lower-quality goods.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p05\" class=\"indent para\">Auctions work best for differentiated goods. While Amazon has had some success in peeling away eBay sellers who provide commodity products (a real danger as eBay increasingly relies on fixed-price sales), eBay\u2019s dominant share of the online auction market still towers over all rivals (Stone, 2008). While there\u2019s no magic in the servers used to create eBay, the early use of technology allowed the firm to create both network effects and switching costs\u2014a dual strategic advantage that has given it a hammerlock on auctions even as others have attempted to mimic its service and undercut its pricing model.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s03\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Leverage Viral Promotion<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s03_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Since all products and services foster some sort of exchange, it\u2019s often possible to leverage a firm\u2019s customers to promote the product or service. Internet calling service Skype has over five hundred million registered users yet has spent almost nothing on advertising. Most Skype users were recruited by others who shared the word on free and low-cost Internet calls. Within Facebook, feeds help activities to spread virally (see <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch08\/\">Chapter 8 \u201cFacebook: Building a Business from the Social Graph\u201d<\/a>). Feeds blast updates on user activities on the site, acting as a catalyst for friends to join groups and load applications that their buddies have already signed up for.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Expand by Redefining the Market<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">If a big market attracts more users (and in two-sided markets, more complements), why not redefine the space to bring in more users? Nintendo did this when launching the Wii. While Sony and Microsoft focused on the graphics and raw processing power favored by hard-core male gamers, Nintendo chose to develop a machine to appeal to families, women, and age groups that normally shunned alien shoot-\u2019em ups. By going after a bigger, redefined market, Nintendo was able to rack up sales that exceeded the Xbox 360, even though it followed the system by twelve months (Sanchanta, 2007).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Seeking the Blue Ocean<\/h4>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p02\" class=\"nonindent para\">Reggie Fils-Aim\u00e9, the President of Nintendo of America, describes the Wii Strategy as a Blue Ocean effort (Fils-Aim\u00e9, 2009). The concept of <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">blue ocean strategy<\/a><\/span> was popularized by European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD) professors W. Chan Kim and Ren\u00e9e Mauborgne (authors of a book with the same title) (Kim &amp; Mauborgne, 2005). The idea\u2014instead of competing in <em class=\"emphasis\">blood-red<\/em> waters where the sharks of highly competitive firms vie for every available market scrap, firms should seek the <em class=\"emphasis\">blue waters<\/em> of uncontested, new market spaces.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p03\" class=\"indent para\">For Nintendo, the granny gamers, moms, and partygoers who flocked to the Wii represented an undiscovered feast in the Blue Ocean. Talk about new markets! Consider that the best-selling video game at the start of 2009 was Wii Fit\u2014a genre-busting title that comes with a scale so you can weigh yourself each time you play! That\u2019s a far cry from Grand Theft Auto IV, the title ranking fifth in 2008 sales, and trailing four Wii-only exclusives.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p04\" class=\"indent para\">Blue ocean strategy often works best when combined with strategic positioning described in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch02\/\">Chapter 2 \u201cStrategy and Technology: Concepts and Frameworks for Understanding What Separates Winners from Losers\u201d<\/a>. If an early mover into a blue ocean can use this lead to create defensible assets for sustainable advantage, late moving rivals may find markets unresponsive to their presence.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p05\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Market expansion sometimes puts rivals who previously did not compete on a collision course as markets undergo <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">convergence<\/a><\/span> (when two or more markets, once considered distinctly separate, begin to offer similar features and capabilities). Consider the market for portable electronic devices. Separate product categories for media players, cameras, gaming devices, phones, and global positioning systems (GPS) are all starting to merge. Rather than cede its dominance as a media player, Apple leveraged a strategy known as <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">envelopment<\/a><\/span>, where a firm seeks to make an existing market a subset of its product offering. Apple deftly morphed the iPod into the iPhone, a device that captures all of these product categories in one device. But the firm went further; the iPhone is Wi-Fi capable, offers browsing, e-mail, and an application platform based on a scaled-down version of the same OS X operating system used in Macintosh computers. As a \u201cPocket Mac,\u201d the appeal of the device broadened beyond just the phone or music player markets, and within two quarters of launch, iPhone become the second-leading smartphone in North America\u2014outpacing Palm, Microsoft, Motorola and every other rival, except RIM\u2019s BlackBerry (Kim, 2007).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Alliances and Partnerships<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Firms can also use partnerships to grow market share for a network. Sometimes these efforts bring rivals together to take out a leader. In a classic example, consider ATM networks. Citibank was the first major bank in New York City to offer a large ATM network. But the Citi network was initially proprietary, meaning customers of other banks couldn\u2019t take advantage of Citi ATMs. Citi\u2019s innovation was wildly popular and being a pioneer in rolling out cash machines helped the firm grow deposits fourfold in just a few years. Competitors responded with a partnership. Instead of each rival bank offering another incompatible network destined to trail Citi\u2019s lead, competing banks agreed to share their ATM operations through NYCE (New York Cash Exchange). While Citi\u2019s network was initially the biggest, after the NYCE launch a Chase bank customer could use ATMs at a host of other banks that covered a geography far greater than Citi offered alone. Network effects in ATMs shifted to the rival bank alliance, Citi eventually joined NYCE and today, nearly every ATM in the United States carries a NYCE sticker.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Google has often pushed an approach to encourage rivals to cooperate to challenge a leader. Its Open Social standard for social networking (endorsed by MySpace, LinkedIn, Bebo, Yahoo! and others) is targeted at offering a larger alternative to Facebook\u2019s more closed efforts (see <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch08\/\">Chapter 8 \u201cFacebook: Building a Business from the Social Graph\u201d<\/a>), while its Android open source mobile phone operating system has gained commitments from many handset makers that collectively compete with Apple\u2019s iPhone.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Share or Stay Proprietary?<\/h4>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05_p03\" class=\"nonindent para\">Defensive moves like the ones above are often meant to diffuse the threat of a proprietary rival. Sometimes firms decide from the start to band together to create a new, more open standard, realizing that collective support is more likely to jumpstart a network than if one firm tried to act with a closed, proprietary offering. Examples of this include the coalitions of firms that have worked together to advance standards like Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. While no single member firm gains a direct profit from the sale of devices using these standards, the standard\u2019s backers benefit when the market for devices expands as products become more useful because they are more interoperable.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Leverage Distribution Channels<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Firms can also think about novel ways to distribute a product or service to consumers. Sun faced a challenge when launching the Java programming language\u2014no computers could run it. In order for Java to work, computers need a little interpreter program called the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Most users weren\u2019t willing to download the JVM if there were no applications written in Java, and no developers were willing to write in Java if no one could run their code. Sun broke the logjam when it <em class=\"emphasis\">bundled<\/em> the JVM with Netscape\u2019s browser. When millions of users downloaded Netscape, Sun\u2019s software snuck in, almost instantly creating a platform of millions for would-be Java developers. Today, even though Netscape has failed, Sun\u2019s Java remains one of the world\u2019s most popular programming languages. Indeed, Java was cited as one of the main reasons for Oracle\u2019s 2009 acquisition of Sun, with Oracle\u2019s CEO saying the language represented \u201cthe single most important software asset we have ever acquired\u201d (Ricadela, 2009).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">As mentioned in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch02\/\">Chapter 2 \u201cStrategy and Technology: Concepts and Frameworks for Understanding What Separates Winners from Losers\u201d<\/a>, Microsoft is in a particularly strong position to leverage this approach. The firm often bundles its new products into its operating systems, Office suite, Internet Explorer browser, and other offerings. The firm used this tactic to transform once market-leader Real Networks into an also-ran in streaming audio. Within a few years of bundling Windows Media Player (WMP) with its other products, WMP grabbed the majority of the market, while Real\u2019s share had fallen to below 10 percent<sup>1<\/sup> (Eisenmann et. al., 2006).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_p03\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Caution is advised, however. Regional antitrust authorities may consider product bundling by dominant firms to be anticompetitive. European regulators have forced Microsoft to unbundle Windows Media Player from its operating system and to provide a choice of browsers alongside Internet Explorer.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Antitrust: Real Versus Microsoft<\/h4>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_p04\" class=\"nonindent para\">From October 2001 to March 2003, Microsoft\u2019s bundling of Windows Media Player in versions of its operating system ensured that the software came preinstalled on nearly all of the estimated 207 million new PCs shipped during that period. By contrast, Real Networks\u2019 digital media player was preinstalled on less than 2 percent of PCs. But here\u2019s the kicker that got to regulators (and Real): Microsoft\u2019s standard contract with PC manufacturers \u201cprevented them not only from removing the Windows Media Player, but even [from] providing a desktop icon for Real Networks\u201d (Hansen &amp; Becker, 2003; Eisenmann et. al., 2006). While network effects create monopolies, governments may balk at allowing a firm to leverage its advantages in ways that are designed to deliberately keep rivals from the market.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s07\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Seed the Market<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s07_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">When Sony launched the PS3, it subsidized each console by selling at a price estimated at three hundred dollars below unit cost (Null, 2008). Subsidizing consoles is a common practice in the video game industry\u2014game player manufacturers usually make most of their money through royalties paid by game developers. But Sony\u2019s subsidy had an additional benefit for the firm\u2014it helped sneak a Blu-ray player into every home buying a PS3 (Sony was backing the Blu-ray standard over the rival HD DVD effort). Since Sony is also a movie studio and manufacturer of DVD players and other consumer electronics, it had a particularly strong set of assets to leverage to encourage the adoption of Blu-ray over rival HD DVD.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s07_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Giving away products for half of a two-sided market is an extreme example of this kind of behavior, but it\u2019s often used. In two-sided markets, you charge the one who will pay. Adobe gives away the Acrobat reader to build a market for the sale of software that creates Acrobat files. Firms with Yellow Page directories give away countless copies of their products, delivered straight to your home, in order to create a market for selling advertising. And Google does much the same by providing free, ad-supported search.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s08\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Encourage the Development of Complementary Goods<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s08_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">There are several ways to motivate others to create complementary goods for your network. These efforts often involve some form of developer subsidy or other free or discounted service. A firm may charge lower royalties or offer a period of royalty-free licensing. It can also offer free software development kits (SDKs), training programs, co-marketing dollars, or even start-up capital to potential suppliers. Microsoft and Apple both allow developers to sell their products online through Xbox LIVE Marketplace and iTunes, respectively. This channel lowers developer expenses by eliminating costs associated with selling physical inventory in brick-and-mortar stores and can provide a free way to reach millions of potential consumers without significant promotional spending.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s08_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Venture funds can also prompt firms to create complementary goods. Facebook announced it would spur development for the site in part by administering the fbFund, which initially pledged $10 million in start-up funding (in allotments of up to $250,000 each) to firms writing applications for its platform.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s09\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Leverage Backward Compatibility<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s09_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Those firms that control a standard would also be wise to ensure that new products have <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">backward compatibility<\/a><\/span> with earlier offerings. If not, they reenter a market at installed-base zero and give up a major source of advantage\u2014the switching costs built up by prior customers. For example, when Nintendo introduced its 16-bit Super Nintendo system, it was incompatible with the firm\u2019s highly successful prior generation 8-bit model. Rival Sega, which had entered the 16-bit market two years prior to Nintendo, had already built up a large library of 16-bit games for its system. Nintendo entered with only its debut titles, and no ability to play games owned by customers of its previous system, so there was little incentive for existing Nintendo fans to stick with the firm (Schilling, 2003).<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s09_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Backward compatibility was the centerpiece of Apple\u2019s strategy to revitalize the Macintosh through its move to the Intel microprocessor. Intel chips aren\u2019t compatible with the instruction set used by the PowerPC processor used in earlier Mac models. Think of this as two entirely different languages\u2014Intel speaks French, PowerPC speaks Urdu. To ease the transition, Apple included a free software-based <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">[pb_glossary id=\"659\"]adaptor[\/pb_glossary]<\/a><\/span>, called Rosetta, that automatically emulated the functionality of the old chip on all new Macs (a sort of Urdu to French translator). By doing so, all new Intel Macs could use the base of existing software written for the old chip; owners of PowerPC Macs were able to upgrade while preserving their investment in old software; and software firms could still sell older programs while they rewrote applications for new Intel-based Macs.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s09_p03\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Even more significant, since Intel is the same standard used by Windows, Apple developed a free software [pb_glossary id=\"659\"]adaptor[\/pb_glossary] called Boot Camp that allowed Windows to be installed on Macs. Boot Camp (and similar solutions by other vendors) dramatically lowered the cost for Windows users to switch to Macs. Within two years of making the switch, Mac sales skyrocketed to record levels. Apple now boasts a commanding lead in notebook sales to the education market (Seitz, 2008), and a survey by Yankee Group found that 87 percent of corporations were using at least some Macintosh computers, up from 48 percent at the end of the PowerPC era two years earlier (Burrows, 2008).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s10\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rivals: Be Compatible with the Leading Network<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s10_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Companies will want to consider making new products compatible with the leading standard. Microsoft\u2019s Live Maps and Virtual Earth 3D arrived late to the Internet mapping game. Users had already put in countless hours building resources that meshed with Google Maps and Google Earth. But by adopting the same keyhole markup language (KML) standard used by Google, Microsoft could, as TechCrunch put it, \u201cdrink from Google\u2019s milkshake.\u201d Any work done by users for Google in KML could be used by Microsoft. Voil\u00e0, an instant base of add-on content!<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s11\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Incumbents: Close Off Rival Access and Constantly Innovate<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s11_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Oftentimes firms that control dominant networks will make compatibility difficult for rivals who try to connect with their systems. AOL has been reluctant to open up its instant messaging tool to rivals, and Skype for years had been similarly closed to non-Skype clients.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s11_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Firms that constantly innovate make it particularly difficult for competitors to become compatible. Again, we can look to Apple as an example of these concepts in action. While Macs run Windows, Windows computers can\u2019t run Mac programs. Apple has embedded key software in Mac hardware, making it tough for rivals to write a software emulator like Boot Camp that would let Windows PCs drink from the Mac milkshake. And if any firm gets close to cloning Mac hardware, Apple sues. The firm also modifies software on other products like the iPhone and iTunes each time wily hackers tap into closed aspects of its systems. And Apple has regularly moved to block third-party hardware, such as Palm\u2019s mobile phones, from plugging into iTunes. Even if firms create adaptors that emulate a standard, a firm that constantly innovates creates a moving target that\u2019s tough for others to keep up with.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s11_p03\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Apple has been far more aggressive than Microsoft in introducing new versions of its software. Since the firm never stays still, would-be cloners never get enough time to create a reliable emulator that runs the latest Apple software.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12\" class=\"section\">\r\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Large, Well-Known Followers: Preannouncements<\/h2>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Large firms that find new markets attractive but don\u2019t yet have products ready for delivery might <em class=\"emphasis\">preannounce<\/em> efforts in order to cause potential adaptors to sit on the fence, delaying a purchasing decision until the new effort rolls out. Preannouncements only work if a firm is large enough to pose a credible threat to current market participants. Microsoft, for example, can cause potential customers to hold off on selecting a rival because users see that the firm has the resources to beat most players (suggesting staying power). Statements from start-ups, however, often lack credibility to delay user purchases. The tech industry acronym for the impact firms try to impart on markets through preannouncements is <em class=\"emphasis\">FUD<\/em> for fear, uncertainty, and doubt.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">The Osborne Effect<\/h4>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p02\" class=\"nonindent para\">Preannouncers, beware. Announce an effort too early and a firm may fall victim to what\u2019s known as \u201c<span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">The Osborne Effect<\/a><\/span>.\u201d It\u2019s been suggested that portable computer manufacturer Osborne Computer announced new models too early. Customers opted to wait for the new models, so sales of the firm\u2019s current offerings plummeted. While evidence suggests that Osborne\u2019s decline had more to do with rivals offering better products, the negative impact of preannouncements has hurt a host of other firms (Orlowski, 2005). Among these, Sega, which exited the video game console market entirely after preannouncements of a next-generation system killed enthusiasm for its Saturn console (Schilling, 2003).<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\r\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\r\n<h4 class=\"title\">Too Much of a Good Thing?<\/h4>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p03\" class=\"nonindent para\">When network effects are present, more users attract more users. That\u2019s a good thing as long as a firm can earn money from this virtuous cycle. But sometimes a network effect attracts too many users and a service can be so overwhelmed it becomes unusable. These so-called <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">congestion effects<\/a><\/span> occur when increasing numbers of users lower the value of a product or service. This most often happens when a key resource becomes increasingly scarce. Users of the game Ultima were disappointed in an early online version that launched without enough monsters to fight or server power to handle the crush of fans. Twitter\u2019s early infrastructure was often unable to handle the demands of a service in hypergrowth (leading to the frequent appearance of a not-in-service graphic known in the Twitter community as the \u201cfail whale\u201d). Facebook users with a large number of friends may also find their attention is a limited resource, as feeds push so much content that it becomes difficult to separate interesting information from the noise of friend actions.<\/p>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p04\" class=\"indent para\">And while network effects can attract positive complementary products, a dominant standard may also be the first place where virus writers and malicious hackers choose to strike.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div style=\"text-align: center; font-size: .8em; max-width: 786px;\">\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_f01\" class=\"figure large\">\r\n<p class=\"nonindent title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 6.2<\/span> The Twitter Fail Whale<\/p>\r\n<p class=\"indent\"><a>\r\n<img class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-219\" src=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/324\/2018\/06\/6.5.0.jpg\" alt=\"The Twitter Fail Whale\" width=\"786\" height=\"601\" \/>\r\n<\/a><\/p>\r\n\r\n<div class=\"copyright\">\r\n<p class=\"nonindent para\">Michael Porter \u2013 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/libraryman\/2528892623\/in\/photolist-4RteEX-5CRpK5-6dzkSR-7DNWPQ-5H7R9E-8hWNmc-6ThstR-56vWBJ-8vsfs1-6bPuXk-7vp82S-5895WQ-veyBTC-6AoFVD-5U9NvG-5SNns3-62smc1-6fkCR5-73VBj6-51TCNN-56TJJr-8K21fz-8eAb8A-6b1YoX-4ZrafF-6ErGFi-aVwkvP-6bAKfw-558vSj-6Soowg-55366r-6b692J-8Dd9D6-7UY816-86LLSP-5cob7c-6MGfVW-629R69-5fWFcs-52jyZF-52KX94-gAAgGd-5QZmBB-9sXdkg-5R1no7-azBEtf-8eYehU-6UNrBA-6cmK7y-5ZR4uz\">twitter whale error image<\/a> \u2013 CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.<\/p>\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n&nbsp;\r\n\r\n<\/div>\r\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p05\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Feel confident! Now you\u2019ve got a solid grounding in network effects, the key resource leveraged by some of the most dominant firms in technology. And these concepts apply beyond the realm of tech, too. Network effects can explain phenomena ranging from why some stock markets are more popular than others to why English is so widely spoken, even among groups of nonnative speakers. On top of that, the strategies explored in the last half of the chapter show how to use these principles to sniff out, create, and protect this key strategic asset. Go forth, tech pioneer\u2014opportunity awaits!<\/p>\r\n\r\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_n04\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\"><\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>\r\n<\/div>","rendered":"<div id=\"slug-6-5-competing-when-network-effects-matter-2\" class=\"chapter standard\">\n<div class=\"ugc chapter-ugc\">\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox textbox--learning-objectives\">\n<header class=\"textbox__header\">\n<p class=\"textbox__title\">Learning Objectives<\/p>\n<\/header>\n<div class=\"textbox__content\">\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_p01\" class=\"nonindent para\">After studying this section you should be able to do the following:<\/p>\n<ol id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_l01\" class=\"orderedlist\">\n<li>Plot strategies for competing in markets where network effects are present, both from the perspective of the incumbent firm and the new market entrant.<\/li>\n<li>Give examples of how firms have leveraged these strategies to compete effectively.<\/li>\n<\/ol>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_p02\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Why do you care whether networks are one-sided, two-sided, or some sort of hybrid? Well, when crafting your plan for market dominance, it\u2019s critical to know if network effects exist, how strong they might be, where they come from, and how they might be harnessed to your benefit. Here\u2019s a quick rundown of the tools at your disposal when competing in the presence of network effects.<\/p>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Strategies for Competing in Markets with Network Effects (Examples in Parentheses)<\/h4>\n<ul id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_l02\" class=\"itemizedlist\">\n<li>Move early (Yahoo! Auctions in Japan)<\/li>\n<li>Subsidize product adoption (PayPal)<\/li>\n<li>Leverage viral promotion (Skype; Facebook feeds)<\/li>\n<li>Expand by redefining the market to bring in new categories of users (Nintendo Wii) or through convergence (iPhone).<\/li>\n<li>Form alliances and partnerships (NYCE vs. Citibank)<\/li>\n<li>Establish distribution channels (Java with Netscape; Microsoft bundling Media Player with Windows)<\/li>\n<li>Seed the market with complements (Blu-ray; Nintendo)<\/li>\n<li>Encourage the development of complementary goods\u2014this can include offering resources, subsidies, reduced fees, market research, development kits, venture capital (Facebook fbFund).<\/li>\n<li>Maintain backward compatibility (Apple\u2019s Mac OS X Rosetta translation software for PowerPC to Intel)<\/li>\n<li>For rivals, be compatible with larger networks (Apple\u2019s move to Intel; Live Search Maps)<\/li>\n<li>For incumbents, constantly innovate to create a moving target and block rival efforts to access your network (Apple\u2019s efforts to block access to its own systems)<\/li>\n<li>For large firms with well-known followers, make preannouncements (Microsoft)<\/li>\n<\/ul>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Move Early<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">In the world of network effects, this is a biggie. Being first allows your firm to start the network effects snowball rolling in your direction. In Japan, worldwide auction leader eBay showed up just five months after Yahoo! launched its Japanese auction service. But eBay was never able to mount a credible threat and ended up pulling out of the market. Being just five months late cost eBay billions in lost sales, and the firm eventually retreated, acknowledging it could never unseat Yahoo!\u2019s network effects lead.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Another key lesson from the loss of eBay Japan? Exchange depends on the ability to communicate! EBay\u2019s huge network effects in the United States and elsewhere didn\u2019t translate to Japan because most Japanese aren\u2019t comfortable with English, and most English speakers don\u2019t know Japanese. The language barrier made Japan a \u201cgreenfield\u201d market with no dominant player, and Yahoo!\u2019s early move provided the catalyst for victory.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_p03\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Timing is often critical in the video game console wars, too. Sony\u2019s PlayStation 2 enjoyed an eighteen-month lead over the technically superior Xbox (as well as Nintendo\u2019s GameCube). That time lead helped to create what for years was the single most profitable division at Sony. By contrast, the technically superior PS3 showed up months after Xbox 360 and at roughly the same time as the Nintendo Wii, and has struggled in its early years, racking up multibillion-dollar losses for Sony (Null, 2008).<\/p>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">What If Microsoft Threw a Party and No One Showed Up?<\/h4>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s01_p04\" class=\"nonindent para\">Microsoft launched the Zune media player with features that should be subject to network effects\u2014the ability to share photos and music by wirelessly \u201csquirting\u201d content to other Zune users. The firm even promoted Zune with the tagline \u201cWelcome to the Social.\u201d Problem was the Zune Social was a party no one wanted to attend. The late-arriving Zune garnered a market share of just 3 percent, and users remained hard pressed to find buddies to leverage these neat social features (Walker, 2008). A cool idea does not make a network effect happen.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Subsidize Adoption<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Starting a network effect can be tough\u2014there\u2019s little incentive to join a network if there\u2019s no one in the system to communicate with. In one admittedly risky strategy, firms may offer to subsidize initial adoption in hopes that network effects might kick in shortly after. Subsidies to adopters might include a price reduction, rebate, or other giveaways. PayPal, a service that allows users to pay one another using credit cards, gave users a modest rebate as a sign-up incentive to encourage adoption of its new effort (in one early promotion, users got back fifteen dollars when spending their first thirty dollars). This brief subsidy paid to early adopters paid off handsomely. EBay later tried to enter the market with a rival effort, but as a late mover its effort was never able to overcome PayPal\u2019s momentum. PayPal was eventually purchased by eBay for $1.5 billion, and the business unit is now considered one of eBay\u2019s key drivers of growth and profit.<\/p>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">When Even Free Isn\u2019t Good Enough<\/h4>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p02\" class=\"nonindent para\">Subsidizing adoption after a rival has achieved dominance can be an uphill battle, and sometimes even offering a service for free isn\u2019t enough to combat the dominant firm. When Yahoo! introduced a U.S. auction service to compete with eBay, it initially didn\u2019t charge sellers at all (sellers typically pay eBay a small percentage of each completed auction). The hope was that with the elimination of seller fees, enough sellers would jump from eBay to Yahoo! helping the late-mover catch up in the network effect game.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p03\" class=\"indent para\">But eBay sellers were reluctant to leave for two reasons. First, there weren\u2019t enough buyers on Yahoo! to match the high bids they earned on much-larger eBay. Some savvy sellers played an arbitrage game where they\u2019d buy items on Yahoo!\u2019s auction service at lower prices and resell them on eBay, where more users bid prices higher.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p04\" class=\"indent para\">Second, any established seller leaving eBay would give up their valuable \u201cseller ratings,\u201d and would need to build their Yahoo! reputation from scratch. Seller ratings represent a critical switching cost, as many users view a high rating as a method for reducing the risk of getting scammed or receiving lower-quality goods.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s02_p05\" class=\"indent para\">Auctions work best for differentiated goods. While Amazon has had some success in peeling away eBay sellers who provide commodity products (a real danger as eBay increasingly relies on fixed-price sales), eBay\u2019s dominant share of the online auction market still towers over all rivals (Stone, 2008). While there\u2019s no magic in the servers used to create eBay, the early use of technology allowed the firm to create both network effects and switching costs\u2014a dual strategic advantage that has given it a hammerlock on auctions even as others have attempted to mimic its service and undercut its pricing model.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s03\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Leverage Viral Promotion<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s03_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Since all products and services foster some sort of exchange, it\u2019s often possible to leverage a firm\u2019s customers to promote the product or service. Internet calling service Skype has over five hundred million registered users yet has spent almost nothing on advertising. Most Skype users were recruited by others who shared the word on free and low-cost Internet calls. Within Facebook, feeds help activities to spread virally (see <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch08\/\">Chapter 8 \u201cFacebook: Building a Business from the Social Graph\u201d<\/a>). Feeds blast updates on user activities on the site, acting as a catalyst for friends to join groups and load applications that their buddies have already signed up for.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Expand by Redefining the Market<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">If a big market attracts more users (and in two-sided markets, more complements), why not redefine the space to bring in more users? Nintendo did this when launching the Wii. While Sony and Microsoft focused on the graphics and raw processing power favored by hard-core male gamers, Nintendo chose to develop a machine to appeal to families, women, and age groups that normally shunned alien shoot-\u2019em ups. By going after a bigger, redefined market, Nintendo was able to rack up sales that exceeded the Xbox 360, even though it followed the system by twelve months (Sanchanta, 2007).<\/p>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Seeking the Blue Ocean<\/h4>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p02\" class=\"nonindent para\">Reggie Fils-Aim\u00e9, the President of Nintendo of America, describes the Wii Strategy as a Blue Ocean effort (Fils-Aim\u00e9, 2009). The concept of <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">blue ocean strategy<\/a><\/span> was popularized by European Institute of Business Administration (INSEAD) professors W. Chan Kim and Ren\u00e9e Mauborgne (authors of a book with the same title) (Kim &amp; Mauborgne, 2005). The idea\u2014instead of competing in <em class=\"emphasis\">blood-red<\/em> waters where the sharks of highly competitive firms vie for every available market scrap, firms should seek the <em class=\"emphasis\">blue waters<\/em> of uncontested, new market spaces.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p03\" class=\"indent para\">For Nintendo, the granny gamers, moms, and partygoers who flocked to the Wii represented an undiscovered feast in the Blue Ocean. Talk about new markets! Consider that the best-selling video game at the start of 2009 was Wii Fit\u2014a genre-busting title that comes with a scale so you can weigh yourself each time you play! That\u2019s a far cry from Grand Theft Auto IV, the title ranking fifth in 2008 sales, and trailing four Wii-only exclusives.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p04\" class=\"indent para\">Blue ocean strategy often works best when combined with strategic positioning described in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch02\/\">Chapter 2 \u201cStrategy and Technology: Concepts and Frameworks for Understanding What Separates Winners from Losers\u201d<\/a>. If an early mover into a blue ocean can use this lead to create defensible assets for sustainable advantage, late moving rivals may find markets unresponsive to their presence.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s04_p05\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Market expansion sometimes puts rivals who previously did not compete on a collision course as markets undergo <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">convergence<\/a><\/span> (when two or more markets, once considered distinctly separate, begin to offer similar features and capabilities). Consider the market for portable electronic devices. Separate product categories for media players, cameras, gaming devices, phones, and global positioning systems (GPS) are all starting to merge. Rather than cede its dominance as a media player, Apple leveraged a strategy known as <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">envelopment<\/a><\/span>, where a firm seeks to make an existing market a subset of its product offering. Apple deftly morphed the iPod into the iPhone, a device that captures all of these product categories in one device. But the firm went further; the iPhone is Wi-Fi capable, offers browsing, e-mail, and an application platform based on a scaled-down version of the same OS X operating system used in Macintosh computers. As a \u201cPocket Mac,\u201d the appeal of the device broadened beyond just the phone or music player markets, and within two quarters of launch, iPhone become the second-leading smartphone in North America\u2014outpacing Palm, Microsoft, Motorola and every other rival, except RIM\u2019s BlackBerry (Kim, 2007).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Alliances and Partnerships<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Firms can also use partnerships to grow market share for a network. Sometimes these efforts bring rivals together to take out a leader. In a classic example, consider ATM networks. Citibank was the first major bank in New York City to offer a large ATM network. But the Citi network was initially proprietary, meaning customers of other banks couldn\u2019t take advantage of Citi ATMs. Citi\u2019s innovation was wildly popular and being a pioneer in rolling out cash machines helped the firm grow deposits fourfold in just a few years. Competitors responded with a partnership. Instead of each rival bank offering another incompatible network destined to trail Citi\u2019s lead, competing banks agreed to share their ATM operations through NYCE (New York Cash Exchange). While Citi\u2019s network was initially the biggest, after the NYCE launch a Chase bank customer could use ATMs at a host of other banks that covered a geography far greater than Citi offered alone. Network effects in ATMs shifted to the rival bank alliance, Citi eventually joined NYCE and today, nearly every ATM in the United States carries a NYCE sticker.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Google has often pushed an approach to encourage rivals to cooperate to challenge a leader. Its Open Social standard for social networking (endorsed by MySpace, LinkedIn, Bebo, Yahoo! and others) is targeted at offering a larger alternative to Facebook\u2019s more closed efforts (see <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch08\/\">Chapter 8 \u201cFacebook: Building a Business from the Social Graph\u201d<\/a>), while its Android open source mobile phone operating system has gained commitments from many handset makers that collectively compete with Apple\u2019s iPhone.<\/p>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Share or Stay Proprietary?<\/h4>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s05_p03\" class=\"nonindent para\">Defensive moves like the ones above are often meant to diffuse the threat of a proprietary rival. Sometimes firms decide from the start to band together to create a new, more open standard, realizing that collective support is more likely to jumpstart a network than if one firm tried to act with a closed, proprietary offering. Examples of this include the coalitions of firms that have worked together to advance standards like Bluetooth and Wi-Fi. While no single member firm gains a direct profit from the sale of devices using these standards, the standard\u2019s backers benefit when the market for devices expands as products become more useful because they are more interoperable.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Leverage Distribution Channels<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Firms can also think about novel ways to distribute a product or service to consumers. Sun faced a challenge when launching the Java programming language\u2014no computers could run it. In order for Java to work, computers need a little interpreter program called the Java Virtual Machine (JVM). Most users weren\u2019t willing to download the JVM if there were no applications written in Java, and no developers were willing to write in Java if no one could run their code. Sun broke the logjam when it <em class=\"emphasis\">bundled<\/em> the JVM with Netscape\u2019s browser. When millions of users downloaded Netscape, Sun\u2019s software snuck in, almost instantly creating a platform of millions for would-be Java developers. Today, even though Netscape has failed, Sun\u2019s Java remains one of the world\u2019s most popular programming languages. Indeed, Java was cited as one of the main reasons for Oracle\u2019s 2009 acquisition of Sun, with Oracle\u2019s CEO saying the language represented \u201cthe single most important software asset we have ever acquired\u201d (Ricadela, 2009).<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">As mentioned in <a class=\"xref\" href=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/chapter\/ch02\/\">Chapter 2 \u201cStrategy and Technology: Concepts and Frameworks for Understanding What Separates Winners from Losers\u201d<\/a>, Microsoft is in a particularly strong position to leverage this approach. The firm often bundles its new products into its operating systems, Office suite, Internet Explorer browser, and other offerings. The firm used this tactic to transform once market-leader Real Networks into an also-ran in streaming audio. Within a few years of bundling Windows Media Player (WMP) with its other products, WMP grabbed the majority of the market, while Real\u2019s share had fallen to below 10 percent<sup>1<\/sup> (Eisenmann et. al., 2006).<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_p03\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Caution is advised, however. Regional antitrust authorities may consider product bundling by dominant firms to be anticompetitive. European regulators have forced Microsoft to unbundle Windows Media Player from its operating system and to provide a choice of browsers alongside Internet Explorer.<\/p>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Antitrust: Real Versus Microsoft<\/h4>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s06_p04\" class=\"nonindent para\">From October 2001 to March 2003, Microsoft\u2019s bundling of Windows Media Player in versions of its operating system ensured that the software came preinstalled on nearly all of the estimated 207 million new PCs shipped during that period. By contrast, Real Networks\u2019 digital media player was preinstalled on less than 2 percent of PCs. But here\u2019s the kicker that got to regulators (and Real): Microsoft\u2019s standard contract with PC manufacturers \u201cprevented them not only from removing the Windows Media Player, but even [from] providing a desktop icon for Real Networks\u201d (Hansen &amp; Becker, 2003; Eisenmann et. al., 2006). While network effects create monopolies, governments may balk at allowing a firm to leverage its advantages in ways that are designed to deliberately keep rivals from the market.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s07\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Seed the Market<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s07_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">When Sony launched the PS3, it subsidized each console by selling at a price estimated at three hundred dollars below unit cost (Null, 2008). Subsidizing consoles is a common practice in the video game industry\u2014game player manufacturers usually make most of their money through royalties paid by game developers. But Sony\u2019s subsidy had an additional benefit for the firm\u2014it helped sneak a Blu-ray player into every home buying a PS3 (Sony was backing the Blu-ray standard over the rival HD DVD effort). Since Sony is also a movie studio and manufacturer of DVD players and other consumer electronics, it had a particularly strong set of assets to leverage to encourage the adoption of Blu-ray over rival HD DVD.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s07_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Giving away products for half of a two-sided market is an extreme example of this kind of behavior, but it\u2019s often used. In two-sided markets, you charge the one who will pay. Adobe gives away the Acrobat reader to build a market for the sale of software that creates Acrobat files. Firms with Yellow Page directories give away countless copies of their products, delivered straight to your home, in order to create a market for selling advertising. And Google does much the same by providing free, ad-supported search.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s08\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Encourage the Development of Complementary Goods<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s08_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">There are several ways to motivate others to create complementary goods for your network. These efforts often involve some form of developer subsidy or other free or discounted service. A firm may charge lower royalties or offer a period of royalty-free licensing. It can also offer free software development kits (SDKs), training programs, co-marketing dollars, or even start-up capital to potential suppliers. Microsoft and Apple both allow developers to sell their products online through Xbox LIVE Marketplace and iTunes, respectively. This channel lowers developer expenses by eliminating costs associated with selling physical inventory in brick-and-mortar stores and can provide a free way to reach millions of potential consumers without significant promotional spending.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s08_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Venture funds can also prompt firms to create complementary goods. Facebook announced it would spur development for the site in part by administering the fbFund, which initially pledged $10 million in start-up funding (in allotments of up to $250,000 each) to firms writing applications for its platform.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s09\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Leverage Backward Compatibility<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s09_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Those firms that control a standard would also be wise to ensure that new products have <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">backward compatibility<\/a><\/span> with earlier offerings. If not, they reenter a market at installed-base zero and give up a major source of advantage\u2014the switching costs built up by prior customers. For example, when Nintendo introduced its 16-bit Super Nintendo system, it was incompatible with the firm\u2019s highly successful prior generation 8-bit model. Rival Sega, which had entered the 16-bit market two years prior to Nintendo, had already built up a large library of 16-bit games for its system. Nintendo entered with only its debut titles, and no ability to play games owned by customers of its previous system, so there was little incentive for existing Nintendo fans to stick with the firm (Schilling, 2003).<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s09_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Backward compatibility was the centerpiece of Apple\u2019s strategy to revitalize the Macintosh through its move to the Intel microprocessor. Intel chips aren\u2019t compatible with the instruction set used by the PowerPC processor used in earlier Mac models. Think of this as two entirely different languages\u2014Intel speaks French, PowerPC speaks Urdu. To ease the transition, Apple included a free software-based <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\"><a class=\"glossary-term\" aria-haspopup=\"dialog\" aria-describedby=\"definition\" href=\"#term_220_659\">adaptor<\/a><\/a><\/span>, called Rosetta, that automatically emulated the functionality of the old chip on all new Macs (a sort of Urdu to French translator). By doing so, all new Intel Macs could use the base of existing software written for the old chip; owners of PowerPC Macs were able to upgrade while preserving their investment in old software; and software firms could still sell older programs while they rewrote applications for new Intel-based Macs.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s09_p03\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Even more significant, since Intel is the same standard used by Windows, Apple developed a free software <a class=\"glossary-term\" aria-haspopup=\"dialog\" aria-describedby=\"definition\" href=\"#term_220_659\">adaptor<\/a> called Boot Camp that allowed Windows to be installed on Macs. Boot Camp (and similar solutions by other vendors) dramatically lowered the cost for Windows users to switch to Macs. Within two years of making the switch, Mac sales skyrocketed to record levels. Apple now boasts a commanding lead in notebook sales to the education market (Seitz, 2008), and a survey by Yankee Group found that 87 percent of corporations were using at least some Macintosh computers, up from 48 percent at the end of the PowerPC era two years earlier (Burrows, 2008).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s10\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Rivals: Be Compatible with the Leading Network<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s10_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Companies will want to consider making new products compatible with the leading standard. Microsoft\u2019s Live Maps and Virtual Earth 3D arrived late to the Internet mapping game. Users had already put in countless hours building resources that meshed with Google Maps and Google Earth. But by adopting the same keyhole markup language (KML) standard used by Google, Microsoft could, as TechCrunch put it, \u201cdrink from Google\u2019s milkshake.\u201d Any work done by users for Google in KML could be used by Microsoft. Voil\u00e0, an instant base of add-on content!<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s11\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Incumbents: Close Off Rival Access and Constantly Innovate<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s11_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Oftentimes firms that control dominant networks will make compatibility difficult for rivals who try to connect with their systems. AOL has been reluctant to open up its instant messaging tool to rivals, and Skype for years had been similarly closed to non-Skype clients.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s11_p02\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Firms that constantly innovate make it particularly difficult for competitors to become compatible. Again, we can look to Apple as an example of these concepts in action. While Macs run Windows, Windows computers can\u2019t run Mac programs. Apple has embedded key software in Mac hardware, making it tough for rivals to write a software emulator like Boot Camp that would let Windows PCs drink from the Mac milkshake. And if any firm gets close to cloning Mac hardware, Apple sues. The firm also modifies software on other products like the iPhone and iTunes each time wily hackers tap into closed aspects of its systems. And Apple has regularly moved to block third-party hardware, such as Palm\u2019s mobile phones, from plugging into iTunes. Even if firms create adaptors that emulate a standard, a firm that constantly innovates creates a moving target that\u2019s tough for others to keep up with.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s11_p03\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Apple has been far more aggressive than Microsoft in introducing new versions of its software. Since the firm never stays still, would-be cloners never get enough time to create a reliable emulator that runs the latest Apple software.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12\" class=\"section\">\n<h2 class=\"title editable block\">Large, Well-Known Followers: Preannouncements<\/h2>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p01\" class=\"nonindent para editable block\">Large firms that find new markets attractive but don\u2019t yet have products ready for delivery might <em class=\"emphasis\">preannounce<\/em> efforts in order to cause potential adaptors to sit on the fence, delaying a purchasing decision until the new effort rolls out. Preannouncements only work if a firm is large enough to pose a credible threat to current market participants. Microsoft, for example, can cause potential customers to hold off on selecting a rival because users see that the firm has the resources to beat most players (suggesting staying power). Statements from start-ups, however, often lack credibility to delay user purchases. The tech industry acronym for the impact firms try to impart on markets through preannouncements is <em class=\"emphasis\">FUD<\/em> for fear, uncertainty, and doubt.<\/p>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_n01\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">The Osborne Effect<\/h4>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p02\" class=\"nonindent para\">Preannouncers, beware. Announce an effort too early and a firm may fall victim to what\u2019s known as \u201c<span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">The Osborne Effect<\/a><\/span>.\u201d It\u2019s been suggested that portable computer manufacturer Osborne Computer announced new models too early. Customers opted to wait for the new models, so sales of the firm\u2019s current offerings plummeted. While evidence suggests that Osborne\u2019s decline had more to do with rivals offering better products, the negative impact of preannouncements has hurt a host of other firms (Orlowski, 2005). Among these, Sega, which exited the video game console market entirely after preannouncements of a next-generation system killed enthusiasm for its Saturn console (Schilling, 2003).<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_n02\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-highlight\">\n<div class=\"textbox shaded\">\n<h4 class=\"title\">Too Much of a Good Thing?<\/h4>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p03\" class=\"nonindent para\">When network effects are present, more users attract more users. That\u2019s a good thing as long as a firm can earn money from this virtuous cycle. But sometimes a network effect attracts too many users and a service can be so overwhelmed it becomes unusable. These so-called <span class=\"margin_term\"><a class=\"glossterm\">congestion effects<\/a><\/span> occur when increasing numbers of users lower the value of a product or service. This most often happens when a key resource becomes increasingly scarce. Users of the game Ultima were disappointed in an early online version that launched without enough monsters to fight or server power to handle the crush of fans. Twitter\u2019s early infrastructure was often unable to handle the demands of a service in hypergrowth (leading to the frequent appearance of a not-in-service graphic known in the Twitter community as the \u201cfail whale\u201d). Facebook users with a large number of friends may also find their attention is a limited resource, as feeds push so much content that it becomes difficult to separate interesting information from the noise of friend actions.<\/p>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p04\" class=\"indent para\">And while network effects can attract positive complementary products, a dominant standard may also be the first place where virus writers and malicious hackers choose to strike.<\/p>\n<div style=\"text-align: center; font-size: .8em; max-width: 786px;\">\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_f01\" class=\"figure large\">\n<p class=\"nonindent title\"><span class=\"title-prefix\">Figure 6.2<\/span> The Twitter Fail Whale<\/p>\n<p class=\"indent\"><a><br \/>\n<img loading=\"lazy\" decoding=\"async\" class=\"aligncenter size-full wp-image-219\" src=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/324\/2018\/06\/6.5.0.jpg\" alt=\"The Twitter Fail Whale\" width=\"786\" height=\"601\" srcset=\"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/324\/2018\/06\/6.5.0.jpg 786w, https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/324\/2018\/06\/6.5.0-300x229.jpg 300w, https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/324\/2018\/06\/6.5.0-768x587.jpg 768w, https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/324\/2018\/06\/6.5.0-65x50.jpg 65w, https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/324\/2018\/06\/6.5.0-225x172.jpg 225w, https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-content\/uploads\/sites\/324\/2018\/06\/6.5.0-350x268.jpg 350w\" sizes=\"auto, (max-width: 786px) 100vw, 786px\" \/><br \/>\n<\/a><\/p>\n<div class=\"copyright\">\n<p class=\"nonindent para\">Michael Porter \u2013 <a href=\"https:\/\/www.flickr.com\/photos\/libraryman\/2528892623\/in\/photolist-4RteEX-5CRpK5-6dzkSR-7DNWPQ-5H7R9E-8hWNmc-6ThstR-56vWBJ-8vsfs1-6bPuXk-7vp82S-5895WQ-veyBTC-6AoFVD-5U9NvG-5SNns3-62smc1-6fkCR5-73VBj6-51TCNN-56TJJr-8K21fz-8eAb8A-6b1YoX-4ZrafF-6ErGFi-aVwkvP-6bAKfw-558vSj-6Soowg-55366r-6b692J-8Dd9D6-7UY816-86LLSP-5cob7c-6MGfVW-629R69-5fWFcs-52jyZF-52KX94-gAAgGd-5QZmBB-9sXdkg-5R1no7-azBEtf-8eYehU-6UNrBA-6cmK7y-5ZR4uz\">twitter whale error image<\/a> \u2013 CC BY-NC-ND 2.0.<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<p>&nbsp;<\/p>\n<\/div>\n<p id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_p05\" class=\"indent para editable block\">Feel confident! Now you\u2019ve got a solid grounding in network effects, the key resource leveraged by some of the most dominant firms in technology. And these concepts apply beyond the realm of tech, too. Network effects can explain phenomena ranging from why some stock markets are more popular than others to why English is so widely spoken, even among groups of nonnative speakers. On top of that, the strategies explored in the last half of the chapter show how to use these principles to sniff out, create, and protect this key strategic asset. Go forth, tech pioneer\u2014opportunity awaits!<\/p>\n<div id=\"fwk-38086-ch05_s05_s12_n04\" class=\"bcc-box bcc-info\"><\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<\/div>\n<div class=\"glossary\"><span class=\"screen-reader-text\" id=\"definition\">definition<\/span><template id=\"term_220_659\"><div class=\"glossary__definition\" role=\"dialog\" data-id=\"term_220_659\"><div tabindex=\"-1\"><p>A product that allows a firm to tap into the complementary products, data, or user base of another product or service.<\/p>\n<\/div><button><span aria-hidden=\"true\">&times;<\/span><span class=\"screen-reader-text\">Close definition<\/span><\/button><\/div><\/template><\/div>","protected":false},"author":217,"menu_order":5,"template":"","meta":{"pb_show_title":"on","pb_short_title":"","pb_subtitle":"","pb_authors":[],"pb_section_license":""},"chapter-type":[49],"contributor":[],"license":[],"class_list":["post-220","chapter","type-chapter","status-publish","hentry","chapter-type-numberless"],"part":209,"_links":{"self":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/220","targetHints":{"allow":["GET"]}}],"collection":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters"}],"about":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/types\/chapter"}],"author":[{"embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/users\/217"}],"version-history":[{"count":6,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/220\/revisions"}],"predecessor-version":[{"id":745,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/220\/revisions\/745"}],"part":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/parts\/209"}],"metadata":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapters\/220\/metadata\/"}],"wp:attachment":[{"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/media?parent=220"}],"wp:term":[{"taxonomy":"chapter-type","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/pressbooks\/v2\/chapter-type?post=220"},{"taxonomy":"contributor","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/contributor?post=220"},{"taxonomy":"license","embeddable":true,"href":"https:\/\/pressbooks.ccconline.org\/bus3060\/wp-json\/wp\/v2\/license?post=220"}],"curies":[{"name":"wp","href":"https:\/\/api.w.org\/{rel}","templated":true}]}}